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THE PRESENT POSITION OF LIBERAL THEOLOGY IN GREAT BRITAIN: A STUDY OF TENDENCIES

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It has sometimes happened to a holiday-maker by the shore of lake or sea that while he was looking out upon some placid bay a big steamer passed, a long distance from the coast, almost without attracting his attention; then, quite awhile after the boat had disappeared round the headland, its passing forgotten, there came the swell from its paddle or screw—wave upon crested wave breaking against the shore, causing not a little commotion among the small craft moored in the harbor. Something similar to this familiar phenomenon is going on in the world of theology today. Certain towering hulls, bearing the names of great pioneers along a variety of lines of research, have passed beyond our horizon some time since; but it is only now that the swell they created is being properly felt—the rollers are dashing themselves against the theologic shore, causing much stir and some incidental discomfort, especially among the occupants of the lesser and lighter boats which never venture into very deep water at any time. Dropping the language of metaphor, the religious phenomenon of our day is the advent of liberal theology as a factor to be reckoned with, and one that is making itself ever more widely felt. Today it is possible to say that liberal theology has arrived; and the moment may be opportune for such a study as will be attempted in the following pages.

It is quite true that the very contention thus put forward is being vigorously challenged. Thus, e.g., Professor Burkitt, of Cambridge, in proclaiming the "failure of liberal Christianity," maintains that the most flourishing period of liberal theological views coincided with the vogue of Tennyson, and especially of *In Memoriam*, and that "the decline of interest in Tennyson's poetry is the measure of the decline of liberal Christianity as a vital force." This seems to us an extraordinary misreading of past and present alike. Tennyson's poetry can take care of itself; here it suffices to point out that while *In Memoriam* was published in 1850, the very mild theological liberalism of *Essays and Reviews* provoked a storm ten years later; that Colenso's *Pentateuch* (1862) caused its author to be inhibited from preaching in nearly every English diocese; and that the publication of Farrar's *Eternal Hope* in 1877 was the signal for prolonged and furious controversy. To suggest, in view of these dates, which tell their own story, that the maximum expansion of liberal Christianity fell in the mid-Victorian era, while today we are assisting at its decline and fall, is to indulge a somewhat desperate taste for paradox; the facts are otherwise.

I

What, then, are the facts—what has happened, and why does so temperamentally cautious a theologian as Dr. Sanday declare in his recent work on *Christologies Ancient and Modern* that "we must modernize, whether we will or no"? The answer may be supplied by quoting the words of a competent and at the same time highly conservative observer like Sir W. Robertson Nicoll, who in 1907 summed up the case in the formula: "The new philosophy, the new criticism, the new science are compelling a restatement of the Christian faith." Let us show very briefly how these various forces, by exercising a kind of simultaneous pressure, have created a new situation, and especially a new outlook.

We should place foremost among those forces the scientific, i.e., critical, study of history—the general adoption of the attitude described by Ranke in his grandly simple saying: "Ich will nur sagen wie es eigentlich gewesen ist." As Professor Bury expressed

it in his inaugural lecture at Cambridge: "Before the beginning of the last century the study of history was not scientific. . . . The transformation of history involved in the recognition that the study of history must be pursued by rigorously scientific methods—a transformation not yet complete—is a great event in the history of the world." Certainly, the extension of this principle to the historical documents of Christianity has been a great event in the evolution of theology; more particularly the application of scientific historical methods to the study of the Gospels has been for theologians "a school of honesty." We shall presently give the reader some illustrations of the results achieved, or in process of achievement, by these methods.

Again, the immense impetus given to the study of physical science within the last two generations has reacted with tremendous force upon theology, and that not merely by calling in question, say, the accuracy of the stories of creation and the fall as told in Genesis, but by altering our whole prepossessions. Modern science has literally given us a new heaven and a new earth, and the sheer force of facts and of logic has brought it home to us that to the unimaginably vast universe we inhabit many of the older religious conceptions are—like the outgrown clothes of our childhood—no longer adequate. More particularly has it to be said that science has changed the modern attitude toward the miraculous. Without dogmatically stating that miracles are impossible—or even, with Matthew Arnold, that they "do not happen"—such events have never been felt to be so *improbable* as today. The average person is not at all a man of science; but he lives and moves in an atmosphere impregnated with science, whose first presupposition—always verified and never falsified by experience—is the uniformity of nature. The result is that the modern mind approaches the miraculous with a novel caution; what is sometimes rather plaintively referred to as a bias against miracles is in reality simply the feeling—unavoidable under the altered circumstances—that such occurrences ought to be supported by very strong and unimpeachable evidence in order to command belief. In a word, miracles, once the witnesses most confidently relied upon to demonstrate the truth of the Christian revelation, are now recognized as stand-

ing themselves in special need of attestation: it is a question of *quis custodiet ipsos custodes*—who shall verify these verifiers?

And this impression has been deepened by the new science of comparative religion, which in widening our horizon has also presented us with fresh problems. When we read of the supernatural birth of the Buddha, of the shining light and the heavenly chorus of praise attending that event, of a venerable sage foretelling the future greatness of the holy babe on his name-day; when we are told of his temptation, his power over the demons, his miraculous feeding of a multitude, his transfiguration in the presence of two disciples; when we learn that the death and resurrection of a savior-divinity is a feature of many oriental religions, and that these stories often present remarkable similarities of detail to those in the Gospels: it would be strange indeed if such parallels did not raise new questionings in the place of old certainties. If accounts of miraculous births and resurrections are plainly fabulous when we meet with them in other faiths, are they necessarily historical when they occur in the Christian Scriptures? At any rate we feel that stringent evidence will be required to prove them so.

If the influence of philosophy in the liberalizing of theology is less directly traceable than that of criticism and science, it has been none the less real and powerful. The renewed stress laid on the doctrine of divine immanence has altered the current view of God's relation to the world and to man; instead of thinking of the Deity as far remote from the universe, of the world as normally—but for the occasional irruption of miracle—allowed to go its own way, and of man as by nature alienated from God, we have come to see God revealed in and through the universe, and man as consubstantial—homogenous—with God, lit by a divine spark within him, a partaker of the divine substance. The idea of God's constant presence, his constant revelation, the Providence of un failing law, has had far-reaching effects: for if God has always been in the world and with man, it is hard to see how either world or man could ever have got into so hopeless a condition as is implied in the orthodox scheme of salvation. If the universe is not a mechanism but an organism, thrilled and pervaded by an eternal energy that "worketh even until now," then we shall be less inclined to expect

on occasional spasmodic manifestation of the Deity in the shape of some physical portent, but look for his action—in Sir Oliver Lodge's phrase—"if at all, then always."

To Sir W. Robertson Nicoll's catalogue of the forces of change—"the new philosophy, the new criticism, the new science"—we have to add a fourth, and not the least powerful, viz., the new ethical temper of the age. It is this which has put an end to the doctrine of everlasting punishment; this which abolished the doctrine of predestination and election as formulated in the *decretum horribile* of Calvin: *Non pari conditione creantur omnes; sed aliis vita aeterna, aliis damnatio aeterna, praeordinatur*. It is due to the same ethical temper that—to quote the words of Dr. Ballard, the eminent Methodist theologian—"the doctrine of the atonement is no more proclaimed with that fearful, offhand, mercantile assurance by which, in years gone by, God the Father and God the Son were arrayed against each other with all the dramatic effect of an innocent victim pleading with a tyrant. The old dreadful reiteration of 'the blood,' 'the blood,' has given place to appeals more impressive for human hearts because less shocking to human minds." Indeed, the whole transactional view of the atonement, with its talk of "imputed righteousness" and substitutionary punishment, is being increasingly abandoned, because it is not ethical enough, not *good* enough; it has had to be moralized, and therefore to be modernized.

II

That the forces so hurriedly enumerated rather than surveyed have jointly and severally forced on the advent of liberal theology is in the present writer's view "clear as the day and evident as the sun"; if we single out for slightly more detailed treatment some of the effects of biblical criticism upon theology, it is because this is the field in which those effects can be most unmistakably demonstrated—and also because it is in this field that the battle, in its present phase, is being fought out.

So far as the Old Testament is concerned, that battle is by this time won, the completeness of the victory being brought into fuller relief by the unavailing efforts of a few theological die-hards to

move the theological clock back. That the critical views for which Robertson Smith suffered barely a generation ago should today have become the commonplaces of Old Testament study is as significant as it is, to progressives, gratifying; but even more remarkable, because less to be expected, is the advance—of course, far more recent—achieved in the application of critical principles and methods to the New Testament. Staunch conservatives of the old school, like Canon Liddon in the last generation, were, after all, from their own standpoint, clear sighted enough in opposing an emphatic *non possumus* to the Old Testament critic, declaring that if the Book of Daniel were admitted to be a production of the second, and not of the sixth, century B.C., the end of all things—the things they stood for—was at hand; for if the critic were once allowed within the sacred inclosure of the canon at all, on what grounds—or with what effectiveness—could you issue a ukase of “hands off” so far as the New Testament was concerned?

Those defenders of the old order, therefore, who preached the doctrine of *principiis obsta* were right, according to their lights, and if they were with us today, would have the melancholy satisfaction of saying, “We told you so.” Developments have, indeed, been rapid, and illustrations are only too plentiful to show how all along the line the tide of New Testament criticism has been advancing. Thus we have Professor Sanday—whom we already quoted as admitting the necessity of modernizing—declaring that “we may be sure that if the [gospel] miracles of the first century had been wrought before trained spectators of the twentieth, the version of them would be *quite different*”¹—a very far-reaching admission when we consider all that is implied in the words we have italicized. Thus, again, we read in a by no means revolutionary work like Hastings’ *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, in reference to the angelic annunciations of the Savior’s birth, the angels’ song that greeted the nativity, the voice from heaven, and the descent of the dove at his baptism, that “we are free to admit that they were such as were not unlikely to be added to the gospel tradition by disciples and by the first Christian community”—a statement which surely leaves us “free to admit” that other mirac-

¹ *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, 104.

ulous features in the gospel record besides those mentioned may have been similarly "added." On the miracle of the cursing of the figtree it is remarked in the same work that "the majority of critics are disposed to regard it as a mere endowment of the Lukan parable of the Barren Figtree with concrete form," and that "the incident of the cursing is encumbered with inherent improbabilities." On the Book of Jonah, which Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* places among "the category of symbolical narratives," the *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels* observes that it "can certainly be held without belittling our Lord's divinity" that he "cited details from the story of Jonah as facts, he himself thinking them to be facts," even "on the supposition that the book is not historical, but a fictitious narrative with a didactic purpose." What would Liddon, to whom the mild concessions made to Old Testament criticism by the *Lux Mundi* school were anathema, have thought of such a surrender, by evangelical scholarship, not only of the historicity of Jonah *per se*, but of that historicity as attested by Jesus Christ? Must it not be said that the alleged "bias against the miraculous"—i.e., the stronger insistence on satisfactory evidence, and the disposition to withhold belief in the absence of such evidence—is no longer confined to German theologians?

All this grows doubly clear when we consider what has been happening lately in relation to the doctrine of the virgin birth. Until the other day held as one of the "things most surely believed," that doctrine is today more and more generally treated as an "open question"—an expression which we may be forgiven for classing among the diplomatic phrases of theology, heralding retreat and surrender. "It has been," says Mr. Brierley, the most popular of English religious essayists, "a mistake of orthodoxy, from which it is time Christian thought finally rid itself, to base its doctrine of incarnation on the notion of a virgin birth. . . . The birth stories of Matthew and Luke fail to approve themselves as of authority."² That an author addressing so large a public should use such uncompromising language, and that without calling forth angry protests, is itself a sign of the times. But let us take a writer who is considered many degrees less advanced than Mr. Brierley,

² *Our City of God*, 31-32.

viz., Dr. Horton, and hear what he has to say on the same subject. He remarks in his commentary on Matthew's Gospel:

No wise person will presume to say that they [the birth stories] are untrue; but a man may be a Christian without holding that they are facts of history. History in the strict sense of the word begins where Mark and Paul and John begin. The idyl of the infancy belongs to another kind of literature. . . . Poetry is as instructive as history, but not in the same way. . . . The divinity of Jesus does not rest on his physical origin, but on his moral and spiritual character. . . . If the divinity of Jesus rested on it [the virgin birth] we should indeed be in a perilous way. . . . The part that his human father had in his birth is a secret over which reverence and delicacy will draw a veil [pp. 5-9].

All this may be said to be vague and inconclusive; but when a doctrine which for all these centuries has been regarded as essential is suddenly declared to be of secondary importance only, we know that there must be good and even urgent reasons for such a change of front. The reason is that the evidence is seen not to satisfy modern standards. And when even the ultra-orthodox, Anglo-Catholic *Church Times* of December 21, 1911, while defending the virgin birth, states that belief in it "is in no way essential to a right faith in the incarnation," we may be tolerably certain that the end of this particular controversy is in sight, and that judgment will presently be given by "consent."

It will suffice for our purpose if we point to yet another direction in which the progress of modern criticism must affect and profoundly modify theology, viz., in its estimate of the historical value of the Fourth Gospel. It is a symptom of the first importance when Dr. Moffatt, in his recent *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament*, quietly excludes this gospel from the historical documents, and reserves it for separate treatment in another portion of his work. That he assigns it to a date incompatible with a Johannine authorship is of only secondary interest in comparison, for it is not with the authenticity so much as with the historicity of the Fourth Gospel—or with the first only for the sake of the second—that we are in any vital sense concerned. The traditional contention has always been that, since this work was the composition of an apostle and an eyewitness, its contents must be historical: the legitimate method of approaching the problem is, on

the contrary, to inquire whether the Fourth Evangelist related history, since only if this preliminary question is answered in the affirmative can we possibly see in him one of the Twelve, or at any rate think of him as a contemporary of Jesus.

Now for the first time in British scholarship is there a marked and growing tendency to treat the Johannine problem not apologetically but objectively, and where this is done there is a surrender of the historical character of the Fourth Gospel. When one remembers all the learned and ingenious attempts made in the past to defend the contents of that gospel, *bon gré, mal gré*, as a record of fact—attempts which lend too much color to Schweitzer's gibe at "obstructive erudition" as "the special prerogative of theology"—one appreciates the magnitude of the change which is accomplishing itself under our very eyes. Even a theological moderate like Professor Denney admits nowadays that "it is so difficult in the Gospel according to John to distinguish between the mind of the writer and that of the subject . . . that it could only be used inconclusively in the present inquiry"³—viz., into the self-revelation of Jesus in the Gospels. More startling is the blunt statement of Professor Burkitt that the Fourth Evangelist's suppression of the institution of the communion, and his substitution of the washing of the disciples' feet, is "a deliberate sacrifice of historical truth."⁴ One wonders what would have happened to Professor Burkitt, had he made such a pronouncement in what he regards as the golden age of liberal Christianity, fifty years ago; but the simple fact is that he would not have made it.

But let us take another and more crucial instance. Of all the miracles attributed to Christ the greatest is confessedly the raising of Lazarus, which is found exclusively in the Fourth Gospel. None has greater theological significance, and none has been more stoutly and even desperately defended. Yet here are two British scholars of the front rank delivering themselves to the following effect upon this narrative. Professor E. F. Scott says:

We cannot, with any show of probability, find room for it in an intelligible scheme of the life of Christ. It is inconceivable that a miracle of such magnitude, performed in the one week of our Lord's life of which we have a full record,

³ *Jesus and the Gospel*, 174.

⁴ *The Gospel History and Its Transmission*, 225.

and in presence of crowds of people in a suburb of Jerusalem—a miracle, moreover, which was the immediate cause, according to John, of the crucifixion—should have been simply passed over by the other evangelists. We are almost compelled to the conclusion that the narrative is in the main symbolical.⁵

Professor Burkitt says:

If the events occurred as told in the Fourth Gospel, if they were as public as the Fourth Evangelist insists, so fraught with influence upon the action both of friends and foes, they could not have been unknown to a well-informed personage like Mark, nor could he have had any reason for suppressing a narrative at once so public and so edifying. . . . Must not the answer be that Mark is silent about the raising of Lazarus because he did not know of it? And if he did not know of it, can we believe that, as a matter of fact, it occurred? It is, I am persuaded, impossible to regard the story of the raising of Lazarus as a narrative of historical events.⁶

We need hardly trouble the reader with further quotations in support of the conclusion we are trying to commend to him: when—as is inevitable—it becomes generally known that in the view of eminent Christian scholars the Fourth Gospel, though priceless as a spiritual interpretation of the person and mind of Christ, is in the main not history, must not such a conclusion act as a solvent upon the traditional theology? If the various changes of attitude, front, and emphasis we have so rapidly described do not indicate a corresponding strengthening of the position of liberal theology, then we confess ourselves entirely at a loss to read these signs of the times.

If, however, anything were needed to assure us as to the accuracy of our diagnosis, we should derive such assurance from the various attempts that are being made to show that liberal theology, liberal Christianity, liberal Protestantism, have failed, or collapsed, or otherwise come to grief. Death as a rule presents unmistakable symptoms, and does not require laborious demonstration; on the other hand, a school of thought or body of opinions that has to be vigorously argued against, by that very fact proves its vitality—or its opponents perform that service on its behalf, for who would waste time in slaying the dead? The eagerness exhibited in some quarters at present to pronounce funeral orations over the liberal movement in theology, is itself a most encouraging symptom—for

⁵ *The Fourth Gospel*, 37.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 222-23.

liberal theologians; as for those who, all unbidden, come to bury Caesar, if not to praise him, they might profitably ponder the advance achieved within less than a generation in matters theological, when perhaps they come to the conclusion that *Così non soglion fare i piè de' morti*.

The attack upon the liberal position proceeds in the main, and in spite of some overlapping, along three lines, which may be respectively described as the *skeptical*, the *scriptural*, and the *eschatological*. It is argued, i.e., by some that a thoroughgoing criticism of the Gospels leaves us with a "historical Jesus" who matters so little that it is not he, but the supra-historical, meta-physical Christ who is the true reality, the true basis of Christianity; by others, that if we will only let the New Testament speak for itself, we shall see that the figure there presented to us is the Christ, not of liberal theology, but of traditional evangelicalism; while others yet declare that an unbiased criticism discloses the Christ, not of liberal Protestantism, but of Catholicism. With each of these three contentions we must now proceed to deal.

III

The paradoxical—and at heart essentially skeptical—attempt to save the Christ of dogma at the expense of the Jesus of history is one of those enterprises which will always exercise a fascination of its own over a certain order of intelligences. It is not new, for, as Professor Bacon reminds us, Cerinthus and the Docetic Gnostics of the second century already "distinguished between the aeonian Christ and the historic Jesus, regarding the latter as religiously a *quantité négligeable*"; nevertheless, this highly fantastic game is being played once more today, and that with extraordinary zest and audacity. No living theologian probably exhibits these qualities, allied with astonishing intellectual verve and brilliancy, in greater measure than Dr. Forsyth, the renowned principal of Hackney College, London; few Christian teachers, we imagine, have expressed themselves concerning the Synoptic Jesus in terms so little appreciative.

Truth to say, the reason of Dr. Forsyth's "imperfect sympathy"—to borrow Charles Lamb's euphemism—with the Jesus of the

Synoptists is not far to seek. That Jesus is, if not like, yet too like the Jesus of liberal theology. He is a teacher, to begin with; and moreover he gives a kind of teaching which lays no stress upon—indeed, practically ignores—that which in Dr. Forsyth's view was his whole and sole *raison d'être*, viz., his death, or rather Paul's interpretation of that death, or, to be still more accurate, Dr. Forsyth's interpretation of Paul's doctrine. This teaching, so unsatisfactory from his point of view, he accordingly sets himself systematically to depreciate in his treatise on *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ*. He has discovered—like the Rev. R. Roberts, of *Jesus or Christ?* notoriety—that “there was in his [i.e., Jesus'] mere thought or precept little that was new or original” (p. 64); “what made the church” was “not the teaching of Jesus. That teaching was only preserved from oblivion by the existence of a church founded on another base” (p. 125); it was “occasional and sometimes transitory,” having reference to “an incomplete situation, a raw audience, and an inchoate context of events” (p. 118). What really and what exclusively mattered was his death—the finishing of his work by the cross; but this truth “was not always perfectly certain in Christ's earthly thought”—he was mistaken about it “even in Gethsemane” (p. 167); the truth about himself which he missed was left to be discovered by the apostles, who “gave the meaning of Christ in a way that the earthly Christ himself could not” (p. 166). “The apostolic inspiration,” therefore—in other words Paulinism—“takes as much precedence of his earthly and (partly) interim teaching as the finished work is more luminous than the work in progress” (p. 168). The preaching activity of the Lord—his proclamation of the kingdom, the Sermon on the Mount, the parables, and the rest—all this, we are given not obscurely to understand, was essentially futile: “the result of his life and teaching was that they all forsook him and fled” (p. 326). Paul did right, therefore, in treating his Lord's ministry as hardly worth mention, laying all the emphasis on the “one thing needful”—the cross—for in this case the disciple really was, a certain gospel saying notwithstanding, greater than his Master.

Now the sheer daring of Dr. Forsyth's *plaidoyer*—and he is a

great advocate—must not blind us for a moment to the radical unsoundness of his case. For if “a deeper knowledge of the Judaism of Christ’s times forces on us the conviction that there was in his mere thought and teaching little that was new and original”; if “it can mostly be gathered from contemporary Judaic ideas”—an odd tribute of respect for a Christian to deposit at his Lord’s feet!—certain questions inevitably arise. If this body of teaching contained nothing very new, then why was it received as a novelty? Why did the common people hear him gladly, and how did they discern that he spoke with authority, and not as the scribes? Of all the strange paradoxes, surely one of the strangest is this, that there was nothing in the sayings of Jesus to startle anyone—only, everyone was violently startled; that he said nothing but what any instructed Jew was familiar with, but that the instructed Jews of the period promptly put him to death for echoing the commonplaces of their culture! And the whole baseless contention is shattered into fragments by the one revolutionary refrain: “Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time—but I say unto you.” As Mr. Claude G. Montefiore, the distinguished Jewish scholar—who knows perhaps as much about the Judaism of Christ’s time as Dr. Forsyth—says:

Even if you could find separate close parallels for nine hundred and seventy out of, say, the thousand verses in the gospel in which Jesus is the speaker, and even if you put them together and made a nice little book of them, you would not have produced a substitute of equal religious value. The unity, the aroma, the spirit, the genius, would all have fled. Or, rather, you could not infuse *them* into your elegant collection of fragments and tid-bits.⁷

To put it quite frankly, liberal theology has little to fear from an anti-liberalism which, in order to make out its case, has to disparage the teaching of him who spake as never man spake—that teaching which would not have been preserved so religiously but from men’s instinctive sense of its surpassing preciousness, and which will retain its fragrance and its power in undiminished measure, long after the subtlest volume of Pauline dogmatics has crumbled into dust.

More recently, Dr. Forsyth has given us an interesting glimpse

⁷ *The Synoptic Gospels*, I, p. cv.

into his mind by stating that "mere historicism works out, as in Drews, to sheer skepticism." That is an amazing proposition, backed up by an amazing reference. It means, if it means anything at all, that if we apply the historical method (which has been of such service to liberal theology) rigorously enough, we arrive in due course at nothing at all; and for proof of this dictum we are pointed to so thoroughly worthless and unscholarly a production as Drews's *Christ Myth*. Surely when orthodoxy seeks support from skepticism of the wilder sort, we are reminded that "misery acquaints a man with strange bed-fellows." Anybody could have told Dr. Forsyth that Drews reaches his skeptical conclusions, not by the application of any sound historical method, but by the wildest guesses, the most reckless assertions, the most childish etymologies. Drews's method, in a word, is not "merehistoricism"; it is mere charlatanism, and it takes Dr. Forsyth to identify the two. The explanation, once more, is that "mere historicism"—as a nickname for the historical method—has to be cried down, in order that mere dogmatism may be cried up. That a free and objective historical inquiry into the gospel records does not "work out to skepticism" at all, let Schweitzer attest when he says:

There are few characters of antiquity about whom we possess so much indubitably historical information, of whom we have so many authentic discourses. The position is much more favorable, for instance, than in the case of Socrates; for he is depicted for us by literary men who exercised their creative ability upon the portrait. Jesus stands much more immediately before us, because he was depicted by simple Christians without literary gifts.⁸

The skeptical argument against liberal theology—of which Dr. Forsyth is the leading exponent in this country—would persuade us that the criticism of the Gospels leaves us little but a pallid and ineffective figure, whose thought and teachings had little originality or claim to remembrance—one of whom it might be said that "nothing in his life became him like the leaving it," and who did not understand the meaning even of his death; and that under the circumstances we had better accept a hyper-Paulinism as the only alternative. To such a reading of the facts we confidently oppose the verdict of scholars who have made the subject of gospel criti-

⁸ *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, 6.

cism their own, as Dr. Forsyth has not—scholars like Harnack, von Soden, Jülicher, Weinel, Holtzmann, Schmiedel, Bousset, and a host of others; such men, who have devoted years of indefatigable industry to the elucidation of these problems, do not share Dr. Forsyth's despairing conclusions, or his low estimate of "the earthly Christ."

IV

Totally different from the skeptical is the scriptural argument against the conclusions of liberal theology, as developed by Professor Denney in his learned and painstaking treatise *Jesus and the Gospel*. Where the former depreciates the Jesus of the Synoptics in order to exalt the Pauline Christology, the latter seeks, by dint of minute and careful examination, to determine "whether the interpretation of Christ which is current in the church is that which is really yielded by the primitive witnesses"; and the conclusion is reached that the Christ of the New Testament—the Jesus of history—is not that of liberal theology, but of traditional evangelicalism.

We cannot, of course, undertake to enter into any detailed criticism of this large and learned volume; but we would, in the first place, respectfully suggest that though the author explicitly "disclaims any apologetic intention," he again and again shows himself, however unintentionally, swayed by a subconscious, apologetic purpose, and the presence of that purpose continually affects his argument.

Is there not, e.g., the apologetic motive clearly seen in such a statement as this: "In the practical sense of believing in him they [i.e., the earliest believers] all confessed his Godhead" (p. 12). Quite apart from the question of the deity of our Lord, is it legitimate simply to equate belief in him with confession of his Godhead? And when only two pages farther on the author quotes Peter's description of his master as "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved unto you by miracles and signs which God wrought through him," it is impossible not to wonder how, in view of the Christology expressed in so representative a passage, Dr. Denney can make his earlier assertion as to the confession he ascribes to all the primitive believers.

Again, a sentence like the following: "There cannot be another to whom all the prophets bear witness" (p. 17), breathes the spirit, not of objective inquiry, but of subjective devotion. *Do* all the prophets bear witness to Jesus? When Dr. Denney comes to examine Matthew's "proofs" from prophecy, he admits readily enough that many of them "are to us unconvincing," and the argument from prophecy becomes simply "the argument that the Old Testament and the New are continuous, and that what God is preparing in the one he has achieved in the other" (p. 64). But that is something very different from the earlier statement.

Once more, it is the apologist rather than the student who tells us that our Lord "does not stand with us . . . sharing our worship and our needs, offering on his own behalf the prayers we offer on ours" (p. 94); the ordinary reader of the Gospels, with no case to prove, is perfectly conscious that the evangelists represent Jesus as habitually praying to God, dependent in everything upon God—so even in the Fourth Gospel (cf. 5:19, 30; 8:28)—and that in Gethsemane he offered on his own behalf just such a prayer as many tortured souls have sent up on theirs.

When we come to Dr. Denney's chapter on the resurrection, we venture to think that his apologetic bias fairly "leaps to the eyes." "So far as the fact of the resurrection of Jesus is concerned," we read, "the narratives of the evangelists are quite the least important part of the evidence with which we have to deal. . . . The real historical evidence for the resurrection is the fact that it was believed, preached, propagated, and produced its fruit and effect in the new phenomenon of the Christian church long before any of our gospels were written" (p. 111).

Is not this an implicit admission that the evidence of the Gospels is not conclusive, and is it not a hazardous principle to advance that *belief* in an occurrence is historical *evidence* for that occurrence? Where would the application of such an axiom lead us to? "The third day," Dr. Denney says, "was the first day of the week, and every Sunday as it comes round is a new argument for the resurrection" (p. 113). "The New Testament references to the first day of the week as the Lord's day are weighty arguments for the historical resurrection" (p. 114). But the resurrection of Osiris,

too, was celebrated on the third day following his death; and if Dr. Denney really looks upon the references to the Lord's day in Acts and Revelation as "weighty arguments for the historical resurrection," one wonders what are the arguments he would consider as less weighty or even negligible!

The circumstance, however, that the learned author of *Jesus and the Gospel* is less innocent of bias than he believes himself to be, is of only secondary importance compared with the fact that the whole underlying assumption on which he rests his argument seems to us a gigantic *petitio principii*. That underlying assumption is quite simply the identification, implied throughout, of "the Jesus of the New Testament" and "the Jesus of history." But this, surely, is the very point in dispute. No critic of the liberal school would for a moment maintain that even the earliest of our New Testament witnesses present us with a picture of Jesus every feature of which is historically beyond question; his contention is precisely that some of the features in the very earliest portraits of Jesus are unhistorical. As Mr. Brierley has well expressed it:

The great trouble of the modern investigator is the haziness of the old-world witnesses as to the difference between a fact and an imagination. To reach our fact we have to struggle through two thick fog-banks. First, there is that of the second-hand, hearsay character of our evidence. In pre-scientific times the story as it passes from mouth to mouth continually changes form. . . . But when we have got through this fog-wall; when, through the region of second- or third-hand reports, we have reached our first-hand witness, we are not even then in clear daylight. Our first-hand witness may have a fog in his own brain. What is his capacity for seeing the thing before him, and reporting it?⁹

All this seems obvious and elementary; and hence we confess that we are not quite sure what is thought to be accomplished by the demonstration that "the interpretation of Christ which is current in the church is that which is really yielded by the primitive witnesses." That interpretation was formulated in the days when the testimony of the primitive witnesses was taken at its face-value, without deduction or discrimination; and that is just the attitude which, to us, has become impossible. As a restatement

⁹ *Our City of God*, 40-41.

of the scriptural position—patient, exhaustive, unflinchingly serene and gracious in spirit—a book like *Jesus and the Gospel* is entitled to respect; as an argument against liberal theology it proves nothing to those who do not share the author's premisses.

V

Quite recently, however, there has come upon the scene a new and revolutionary interpretation of the gospel history and its central figure, an interpretation which has been received with enthusiasm in some quarters one would not at first sight have imagined ready to welcome anything so startling. We are referring to the eschatological theory, whose principal champion, Dr. Schweitzer, in his volume on *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, announced the discovery that the one feature or element in the Gospels, which explains the personality and the earthly career of our Lord is to be found in those sayings of His, which express the expectation of the impending end of the age. According to Schweitzer, Jesus regarded the kingdom of God eschatologically, i.e., purely as a supernatural event to be consummated in the immediate future. From the days of the Baptist a number of persons—the “men of violence”—had been forcing on that great consummation, a host of penitents wringing this supreme boon from God, so that it was “at hand,” and might appear at any moment. Jesus' own purpose was “to set in motion the eschatological development of history, to let loose the final woes, the confusion and strife from which shall issue the Parousia, and so to introduce the supra-mundane phase of the eschatological drama.” It was with this object in view that he sent out the Twelve, and ultimately went to Jerusalem, resolved to die, in order to compel the advent of the kingdom, whose coming had to be preceded by tribulation. It was because he firmly believed himself to be the future Messiah—in the eschatological sense of Dan. 7:13—that he designated John the Baptist as the Elijah; but he closely guarded the secret of his messiahship from all and sundry. That secret was revealed to Peter, James, and John in a moment of ecstatic rapture, and subsequently, contrary to the Lord's expressed wishes, disclosed to the rest of the disciples by Peter. In the eyes of the inhabitants of Jerusalem the entry into

the capital was no messianic entry, or the fact would have been adduced at the trial of Jesus as proof of his messianic claims; but the high priest knew of those claims, for it was this, the messianic secret, and not the Master's place of concealment, that Judas had betrayed to the authorities.

Such a violent reconstruction, we repeat, might have been expected to arouse the utmost distrust among conservative British theologians; as a matter of fact, it has created something of a *furor*. "I wonder," said Professor von Dobschütz, in his lectures on *The Eschatology of the Gospels*, "I wonder how it happened that this theory met with much more appreciation in England than in Germany, where even Schweitzer's friends were rather surprised by the one-sidedness of his views, and declined to follow him" (p. 57). The answer is that the eschatological theory was a veritable godsend to the opponents of liberal theology—the first stroke of good fortune they had known for years, the first setback to criticism of the modern school. If this theory was true, then the liberal critics had been altogether at fault in their reading of the Gospels, and as representatives of a movement they were discredited—*blamiert*, as they say in Germany. *The eschatological hypothesis was welcomed in England because it seemed to signify "the failure of liberal christianity."* If the real purpose of Jesus was not to teach a new and loftier law of conduct, that proved *pro tanto* what Professor Burkitt calls the "Catholick" view of Christ; for, as he pointed out, "the picture of our Lord sketched in the Creed does not fit the Christ of liberal Christianity at all. . . . There is nothing in the Creed about Christ as a teacher of the higher morality—in fact, he is not spoken of as a teacher at all." *Ergo*, Schweitzer's view, which shifted the emphasis from the gospel teaching to eschatology, relegating the former to a secondary place, was a triumph for the Creed and for "Catholicks"; once more the stone which the builders rejected had become the head of the corner.

How much ground is there for these rejoicings? Or rather, how much truth is there in Schweitzer's hypothesis? We think that its author has done a real service in drawing attention to an element in the Gospels which it had been customary to ignore;

it seems to us proved that eschatological conceptions entered into our Lord's outlook to a greater degree than had been commonly recognized by modern theologians. So far so good; but when Schweitzer asks us to believe that eschatological expectations supplied the exclusive motive-power, and furnish the sole explanation, for the public ministry of Jesus, and that nothing else in the Gospels matters but this, we are irresistibly reminded of a reflection of his own—à propos of someone else, of course—"Who ever discovered a true principle without pressing its application too far?"

Our present purpose is to show and examine the use which has been made of the eschatological theory as a weapon with which to fight liberal theology; and the most outstanding example of that use is to be found in the late Father Tyrrell's book, *Christianity at the Cross-Roads*. Let it be said that it would have been far more pleasant to write what will follow during the Modernist leader's lifetime; but the work itself appeared posthumously, and the accident of death can confer no exemption from criticism.

Tyrrell enjoyed—or rather, he anything but *enjoyed*—the mistaken sympathy extended to him by liberal Protestants who vaguely imagined that he was more or less on similar lines as they themselves, because he had been excommunicated by the Vatican; whereas he was particularly anxious to let it be understood that his Modernism was above everything else a protest against liberal Protestantism (p. xvii.) That being so, it is not without interest to gather together some evidence of the temper in which he envisaged his opponents; indeed, this is rather a needed preliminary. Let a few illustrations suffice. When a writer tells us that liberal Protestantism "is rather a system of religious ethics than a religion" (p. 66); that "in vindictively stifling transcendentalism, it has stifled the Jesus of history" (p. 89); when he informs his readers that liberal Protestants, in redrawing the picture of Jesus "could only find the German in the Jew; a moralist in a visionary; a professor in a prophet" (p. 42); when he drops, in referring to liberal Protestantism, the airy and disparaging phrase, "*so far as it admits another life at all*" (p. 78); when he asserts that those Protestants who escape the problems of the Catholic Modernists see in Christ "no more than the Moslem sees in Mohammed"

(p. xxi)—when a writer commits himself to such statements as these, we have no right to doubt his sincerity; at the same time he puts himself out of court as an unbiased or even reasonably fair judge of the position he attacks. It is well, we say, that Tyrrell placed his views of liberal Protestantism so unreservedly on record; by exhibiting the full extent of his prejudice he has placed his opponents under an obligation.

Tyrrell shared with Dr. Forsyth and the Rev. R. Roberts a somewhat slight esteem for Jesus as a religious teacher: quite in the style of these two writers—*tres faciunt collegium*—he lays it down that there was “nothing original in the righteousness preached by Jesus” (p. 51); nor indeed was there any occasion for such originality, since he “did not come to reveal a new ethics of this life.” But not only has Tyrrell rather a poor idea of the value of the moral teaching of our Lord, but he has a poor idea of the religious value of morality or righteousness of any sort; as is natural in one who believes that “it is only the sacraments that make us sons of God—morality can never do so” (p. 72). Of course, holding this view of the relative unimportance of conduct, believing that “a life of very average morality, with frequent sacraments, is more pleasing to God than a life of heroic morality without sacraments (*ibid.*), all his instincts are outraged by the importance attributed by liberal Protestants to the teaching of Jesus—those “unoriginal” and really negligible precepts and parables which the world, with strange perverseness of judgment, has thought worth preservation and admiration. Our Lord’s emphasis, we are told emphatically, was not on right-doing: “*What need of a new ethics for an expiring humanity?*” (P. 66.)

In this last sentence we get the core of Tyrrell’s contention: the real motive-power which actuated Jesus was his conviction of the fast-approaching end of the age—his whole thinking and course of action were dominated by eschatological conceptions. There were two sides to the gospel he proclaimed—“moralism” and “apocalypticism”; but of these the former was only “incidental,” while the latter was “central”; and liberal Protestantism, “having eliminated what was principal in the Gospel”—viz., apocalypticism, eschatology—and “retained what was but secondary and sub-

ordinate—the moral element,” has “stifled the Jesus of history” (pp. 88–89).

How a mind like Tyrrell’s convinced itself of the soundness of this position may well fill one with wonder; though really a writer who could soberly assert that Jesus taught man to be, until baptism, “possessed by Satan, in virtue of his natural birth” (p. 71), and that in acknowledging the divine authority of the ceremonial law our Lord was “at one with the Pharisees” (p. 75), proves himself to have been *un peu capable de tout*. We may approach Tyrrell’s theory of the “central apocalypticism” and the “incidental moralism” of the gospel from two points of view, viz., by asking, (a) Is it borne out by the facts of the case?—and (b) What if it were?

The first of these questions has been answered with scholarly fairness by Professor von Dobschütz in his *Eschatology of the Gospels*; and a perusal of his pages is sufficient to dispel the eschatological nightmare which filled Tyrrell with such strange rapture. In inquiring how much genuinely eschatological matter there is in the utterances of Jesus as recorded in the Gospels, Dr. von Dobschütz shows that there is “plenty of evidence that sayings of Jesus were colored afterward . . . by eschatological additions and changes (p. 80),” and pronounces the great apocalyptic discourse (Mark, chap. 13; Matt., chap. 24; Luke, chap. 21) “an eschatological addition to the original Jesus-tradition” (p. 90). As against the theory that our Lord regarded himself merely as destined to be the Messiah in the apocalyptic future, he points to his answer to the high priest’s question—“Tell us whether thou be the Christ”—“Thou hast said”—as sufficient proof to the contrary. Full weight is given to the genuine—and genuinely—eschatological sayings, which prove that Jesus looked forward to an imminent supernatural consummation of the age; but over against these are set passages like Luke 11:20; 17:21; Matt. 12:28, in which he declares that the kingdom, so far from being a merely eschatological conception, is already present—*ἔφθασε*—already in the midst—*ἐντος ὑμῶν*—in a word, already realized. Moreover, all the eschatological elements taken together represent no more than a minute proportion of the sayings of Jesus; they are almost lost

among the main body of his utterances, which are of a non-eschatological, moral tenor. In the light of that obvious fact Tyrrell's audacious phrase about the "central apocalypticism" and "incidental moralism" of Jesus is seen to be not so much a perversion as an inversion of the truth. Of the thirty sayings common to Mark and Q—sayings which must have been the most widely circulated and appreciated of the Lord's—only seven have any eschatological tinge, while the rest are of an ethical character. One can only say that while in his depreciation of the religious value of morality Tyrrell may have been right or—as we think—deplorably wrong, in attributing the same view to Jesus he was simply blind.

But, we must now proceed to ask, what if it were indeed true that the only element in Christ's utterances which really mattered, or was characteristic of him, was that of eschatological expectation, the insistence upon the impending end of the world? In what way would the triumph of this theory—however detrimental to liberal theology—promote the traditional conception of Christ? Is it not plain that "if there was nothing in Jesus but eschatology," then, since those apocalyptic hopes and predictions have certainly been falsified by events, he was "a misguided enthusiast," and no more? For falsified they have been, every one. Not one of "those that stood by" lived to see the Son of Man coming in his glory. "This generation" did "pass away," and many generations since, without witnessing the great consummation. The disciples might have gone through the cities of Israel many times over before the Son of Man appeared in apocalyptic splendor, for he has not so appeared to this day. And assuming that Jesus sought, by his death, to force on the end, was he not the victim of a pathetic and miserable delusion? Where, in all this insistence on the eschatological element, lies the gain for orthodoxy? But, as a matter of fact, the attempt to interpret Jesus solely from the point of view of eschatology is a flagrant instance of that false generalization which has been well called the worst of all faults in method; while as a matter of history it is not liberal theology, with its rightful emphasis upon the teaching of our Lord, but eschatological Christianity which has utterly and unmistakably failed.

Utterly and unmistakably, for already in the New Testament

we see at what an early age those expectations of the approaching end became a stumbling-block, and had to be spiritualized, as in the closing verse of Matthew's Gospel, and in the Fourth Gospel generally. And when Tyrrell himself admits that "moreover, as a fact, this inward righteousness" preached by Jesus "*is the only sensible result of the Gospel*" (p. 61), he goes much farther than the majority of liberal theologians, for most of whom Christianity is not "a law of commandments contained in ordinances," but centers in the person of Christ, "God manifest in the flesh." And another question presses for an answer: If eschatology is the true core of Christ's message, how has Christianity as a thing in being survived all these centuries without it? And, on the other hand, what a comment upon its founder that the Christian church, from the sheer instinct of self-preservation, should have had to drop, as Tyrrell admits, what was central in his proclamation "as a troublesome accident"! (P. 61.) The fact is that those who harbor such ideas move in a realm of unrealities; this whole attempt to play off the eschatological theory against liberal theology is only a kind of *dernière cartouche* fired by a hard-pressed garrison—in effect, less a weapon of offense than a signal of distress. The truth of the matter cannot be better stated than by Professor von Dobschütz, when he says:

It is not only the amount of non-eschatological materials in the Gospels that forbids us to account for Jesus' whole life by his eschatology. It is at the same time the permanent value of his non-eschatological teachings that causes us to put them in the first rank. It is, lastly, the history of the Christian church, from its beginning in the Apostolic age to our own time, that proves the non-eschatological element to be essential.¹⁰

And when Tyrrell himself has to confess that it was the *righteousness* preached by Jesus—the righteousness in which he yet professes to see "nothing original"—that has "leavened and transformed humanity" (p. 61), we may well say, What need have we of further witnesses?

We have now concluded our survey of the three main arguments that are being urged against liberal theology in England today—the skeptical, the scriptural, and the eschatological—and there is little left to add. Of the three, the first and third are in our view

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

intimately related; they are also destined, we are convinced, to pass away far sooner than the second. What may be the extent of the influence exercised by Tyrrell upon English Catholics—a small number, all told—we have no means of estimating; we do not imagine it to be considerable, nor can we think that his line of reasoning appeals to many non-Catholics in this country. Protestants, again, however highly they may regard the Apostle Paul, are not likely to be captivated by the plea—when they understand it—that Jesus' teaching counts for so little *per se*, and his interpretation of himself was so defective, that it is not he but Paul who takes rank as the real authority: they will still continue to say, "We would see Jesus," and yet again, "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." Whatever savors of belittling the Jesus of the Gospels will fail, even when its avowed object is that of rescuing the Christ of the creeds.

It is therefore to be anticipated that for some time to come yet the scriptural school, represented by Professor Denney—the school which seeks merely to ascertain the testimony of the New Testament witnesses concerning Christ, and abides by that—will continue to form the strongest bulwark of theological traditionalism against theological liberalism. Only for some time to come, however: for the principle of unreservedly applying the canons and methods of historical criticism to the Gospels is gaining ground every day—it is wringing concessions, as we showed, even from conservative scholarship—it is certain of achieving the same ultimate triumph in the field of the New Testament as in that of the Old: and then?

Then, what but that liberal theology which, while surrendering as legendary accretions not a little that once passed as fact—which interprets as poetry some things that former generations regarded as history—retains its firm faith in that historic Jesus who is also the divine Christ, the sublime Teacher and Savior, who loved us and gave himself up for us, the Express Image of God's Substance, the Way, the Truth, and the Life? For that a genuine criticism will give us a less exalted estimate of him who is the central figure, not of the Gospels only but of humanity, is alike unfounded whether as a hope or fear.

To those who allege the failure of liberal theology, and seek consolation in composing anticipatory epitaphs upon it, we can only reply in the words of Socrates: "If this be death, then let me die again and again." These prophets of doom are doubtless sincere; so were those who busily predicted the discomfiture of Darwinism, and the speedy collapse of the "documentary" hypothesis of the composition of the Hexateuch. But prophecy is still the most gratuitous form of error; and the only forecasts worth taking seriously are those which are based upon a sufficiently wide, sufficiently dispassionate, and sufficiently intelligent survey of actual facts. To such exceptional qualities it would be presumption on our part to lay claim; if we nevertheless firmly believe in the coming triumph of liberal theology in this country, it is for the sole and simple reason that we can see *nothing to stop it*.

THE ALLEGED PERSECUTION OF THE CHRISTIANS AT LYONS IN 177

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Within the past generation our information regarding the persecution of the Christians has been very much enlarged, thanks chiefly to Mommsen's¹ researches into the depths of Roman Law, to DeRossi's² and Le Blant's³ patient study of early Christian inscriptions, and to the careful examination of this evidence by a long series of historical scholars, German, French, and English. Many of the results of these investigations have been far-reaching, and almost revolutionary in their nature—for example, that with reference to the catacombs. We now know as never before both the law and the history of the persecutions of Decius,⁴ Valerian,⁵ and Diocletian.⁶ In spite of increasing difficulties as research has moved backward into the second and first centuries, new light has even been cast upon the earliest relations of the Roman government to the church.⁷

¹ "Der Religionsfrevall nach römischem Recht," *Hist. Zeitschrift*, LXIV, 1890, pp. 389-429.

² *Roma sotterranea*.

³ *Inscriptions chrétiennes. Inscriptions chrétiennes de la Gaule antérieures au VIII^e siècle*. 2 vols., 1856. Supplément, 1892; "Les actes des martyrs," *Mém. de l'Acad. d. Inscript.*, XXX, 2, pp. 57-347.

⁴ Görres, *Jahrb. für prot. Theologie*, XVI, 1890, pp. 454 ff.; Gregg, *The Decian Persecution*.

⁵ Healy, *The Valerian Persecution*; Benson, *Life of Cyprian*.

⁶ Hunziker, "Zur Reg. u. Christenverfolgung des k. Diocletian u. s. Nachfolger," *Budinger's Untersuch. zur römischen Kaiser Geschichte*; Belzer, *Zur Diokl. Christenverfolgung*, 1891.

⁷ Mommsen's researches are the point of departure of the best of this literature, e.g., Ramsay, *The Church and the Roman Empire before 170* (see p. 194); Hardy, *Christianity and the Roman Government* (see Preface); Neumann, *Der römische Staat und die allgemeine Kirche*, 1890; Conrat, *Die Christenverfolgungen im. röm. Reiche vom Standpunkte d. Juristen*, Leipzig, 1897, etc.

Of all the executions for the faith recorded before the Decian persecution that which is said to have happened in 177 at Lyons in the reign of Marcus Aurelius is easily the most important, both for the victims and for the violence of the process. For centuries the story of the martyrdom of Blandina has been one of the cherished traditions of the church. Scaliger declared he never could read the account of this persecution in Eusebius without tears. So far as I am aware modern historical research had not yet impeached the veracity of Eusebius' account of this persecution.⁸ Not even Rénan, the most skeptical of historians, has questioned it.⁹ Mommsen,¹⁰ Harnack,¹¹ Lightfoot,¹² Du Chesne,¹³ accept it as a fact, although the tradition of the church itself was that Marcus Aurelius was not a persecutor.

It is the purpose of this article to show that this tradition is valid and that the account in Eusebius is of third-century, not second-century, origin. Harnack in 1894 expressed the opinion that a re-examination of the evidence concerning the relations of Marcus Aurelius to the Christians was desirable,¹⁴ and in the next year, inspired by this suggestion, Hirschfeld attempted this appraisal.¹⁵ Although all the evidence pertaining to the persecution at Lyons was sifted by him, Hirschfeld's conclusions were not subversive of the traditional belief.

Criticism of the persecution of 177 hitherto has chiefly been devoted to attempts to explain the enigmatical character of the

⁸ "There can be no doubt as to the early date and reliability of the epistle. It bears no traces of a later age. . . . Its genuineness is, in fact, questioned by no one so far as I am aware."—Professor A. C. McGiffert's English translation of Eusebius, *Nicene and Post-Nic. Fathers*, 2d ser., I, 212, note.

⁹ *Marc-Aurèle*.

¹⁰ *Röm. Strafrecht*, 238, 308, 313, etc. On p. 238, note, he specially says: "Die glaubwürdigen Martyreichte, so die Scillitanischen und die von Lyon."

¹¹ *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, I, 191.

¹² *Ignatius*, I, 499.

¹³ *Fastes épiscopaux de l'anc. Gaule*, 32-38.

¹⁴ "Die Quelle d. Berichte über d. Regenwunder im Feldzuge Marc Aurels gegen die Quaden," *Sitzungsberichte d. k. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, July 19, 1894.

¹⁵ "Zur Geschichte des Christ. in Lugdunum vor Konstantin," *ibid.*, 1895, p. 381

emperor;¹⁶ to reconcile the professions of "a philosopher upon the throne," the disciple of Epictetus, the enlightened and cultured ruler, with the treatment of the Christians at Lyons to which he is alleged to have given his approval. The riddle is all the more complicated because of Tertullian's testimony that Marcus Aurelius was not hostile to the Christians.¹⁷

In spite of the heavy weight of opinion in favor of the authenticity of the account in Eusebius, it seems to me that a re-examination of the evidence is still necessary and a new opinion possible regarding the relation. "The purpose of historical criticism," as Bernheim has pointed out,¹⁸ "is to determine in what degree the data afforded by the sources and the study of events known by the data are genuine or false. These determinations are judgments. They are concerned in part with the relation of the sources with the facts, and in part with the relation of the facts to each other." There is here, therefore, a problem both of external and of internal criticism.

The evidence for the persecution of the Christians at Lyons in 177 consists solely of the apparently circumstantial letter of "the servants of Christ living at Vienne and Lyons in Gaul to the brethren throughout Asia and Phrygia."¹⁹

Eusebius is our only source of information for this event. The argument from silence is very impressive. It is not recorded by any pagan or Christian writer, Greek or Latin, before Eusebius

¹⁶ Cf. Ramsay, *Church and the Roman Empire*, 337; Hardy, *Church and the Roman Government*, 147. Gregg, *Decian Persecution*, 31, makes a typical observation: "Evidently the Stoic saw no contradiction involved in the contrast between his words and his deeds, when he could speak of himself as one whose hands were free from blood, and at the same time issue edicts the outcome of which was torture and bloodshed." Keim's *Celsus' Wahres Wort*, Zürich, 1873, does not hesitate to count Marcus Aurelius a ferocious persecutor. See also Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaft. Theologie*, 1881, p. 325; Draeseke, *Jahrbücher für prot. Theologie*, 1881, p. 177.

¹⁷ *Apol.*, 5. Mommsen, in the article cited in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, LXIV, 400, note 3, in 1890 pointed out that Tertullian's view is not without foundation. Considering the fact that the Christians who suffered at Lyons were Montanists and that Tertullian himself had Montanist leanings, his favorable opinion of Marcus Aurelius is all the more remarkable. It is singular that Tertullian makes no mention of the events at Lyons in 177.

¹⁸ *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode* (last edition), chap. iv, the first sentence.

¹⁹ Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, V, chaps. 1, 2.

(ca. 280-340), nor was it known in the West before the beginning of the fifth century.²⁰ The silence of pagan historians like Julius Capitolinus, Dion Cassius, Herodian, Libanius is absolute. That of Christian writers is quite as profound, such as Tertullian, Cyprian, Sextus Julius Africanus, Sextus Rufus, Arnobius, and Lactantius, the probable²¹ author of the *De mortibus persecutorum*, who once dwelt at Trèves.²² Christian Rome's ignorance is very remarkable. Irenaeus, though a native of Asia Minor, labored in Gaul. The *Adversus haereses* was probably written in Gaul when Eleutherius was bishop of Rome, between 174-89.²³ No allusion is made in this work to the persecution at Lyons. Even admitting that the *Adversus haereses* was written before 177, the absence of any information at Rome of the persecution is singular, for Irenaeus was in intimate correspondence with the bishop of Rome,²⁴ and Victor, who ruled the see from 188-99, is "the first Latin writer of Christendom."²⁵ In the last half of the fourth century when the cult of the martyrs was strongly developed by the church, Pope Damasus (366) endeavored to collect authentic data upon the martyrs and often found himself baffled.

Even in Gaul the persecution was unknown before 400. The first western chronicler who records it is Sulpicius Severus (died about 410). The statement he makes is very meager: "Sub Aurelio deinde, Antonini filio, persecutio quinta agitata; ac tunc primum inter Gallias martyria visa, *serius* trans Alpes Dei religione

²⁰ Considering that it was the policy of the Christians "to write down the history of the martyrs and to hand it to future generations"—"Acts of St. Theodore," 237, in Conybeare, *Monuments of Early Christianity*, 1894—the absence of any other record seems singular.

²¹ See Bury's edition of Gibbon, II, 531-32.

²² Brandt, "Ueber die Entstehungsverhältnisse der Proaschr. des Lactantius und des Buches de Mort. persecutorum," *Sitzungsberichte der Wiener Akad.*, CXXV, Abh. vi, 12 (1892).

²³ Krueger, *Early Christian Literature*, 148.

²⁴ Rénan, *Marc-Aurèle*, 341. Rénan inclines to believe that the letter in Eusebius was written by Irenaeus himself and endeavors (p. 339, note 4) to discover internal evidence of identity of style and thought between it and parts of the writings of Irenaeus.

²⁵ Krueger, *Early Christian Literature*, 155.

suscepta."²⁶ Sulpicius Severus is the first Latin Christian chronicler.²⁷ Whence did he learn of the persecution at Lyons in the reign of Marcus Aurelius? Undoubtedly his source must have been the Latin translation of Eusebius made at the suggestion of St. Jerome by Rufinus of Aquileia.²⁸ It was this translation which first informed the Latin church of the persecution at Lyons. Even then the information obtained slowly. The continued silence of Christian writers of the fifth century increases the impression of doubt. Neither Salvian, who was a priest of Marseilles, nor Sidonius Apollinaris, who was a native of Lyons and bishop of Clermont, nor Prosper of Aquitaine, nor Paulin of Nola, nor Orosius alludes to it. Prudentius of Spain, one of the earliest of Christian poets, deplored the *vetustatis obsoleta oblivio*, which enveloped the history of the martyrs,²⁹ but it is a little singular that for centuries oblivion should have covered so fierce a persecution as that reputed to have happened in 177, especially in the country where it took place.³⁰

The absence of any *particular* statement by Sulpicius Severus is to be noted. He simply says that persecution appeared late (*serius*) beyond the Alps. His statement, it seems to me, must apply to individual executions for the faith in the second century in Gaul, of which there are traces,³¹ and not to any extended per-

²⁶ *Hist. Sacr.*, II, chap. 32; cf. *Acta S. Saturnini*—"sensim et gradatim."

²⁷ Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France*, Introd., 37. For the literature upon Sulpicius Severus see p. 128.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I, 37; Valentin, *St. Prosper d'Aquitaine*.

²⁹ Pope Gelasius I forbade the *Lives of the Saints* to be read in the churches because they were so seldom authentic. Dudden, *Gregory the Great*, I, 285, note.

³⁰ The papal archives in the time of Gregory I contained no copy of Eusebius' *Acta Martyrum* and Gregory had never heard of it.—Greg., *Epp.*, VIII, 28.

³¹ The most probable is the martyrdom of SS. Epipodius and Alexander at Lyons in 178. See Ruinart, *Acta Sincera*, 62-67, and *AASS*, April 3, pp. 8-10. The text is ancient—that is, of the fifth century. Cf. Tillemont, *Mém. eccles.*, III, 30-35. Much more dubious are the martyrdoms of St. Marcellus near Châlons-sur-Saone about 178. Cf. two accounts in *AASS*, September, pp. 196-99; 199-200; St. Valerianus, martyred at Toumus about 178, *AASS*, September 5, pp. 21-22. The version is of the ninth century probably, according to Molinier, I, No. 45: "Une passion sans grande autorité"; St. Symphorian was a martyr of Autun about 180 according to Ruinart, *Acta Sincera*, 69-73. But according to Baronius he suffered in the reign of Aurelian. For the literature see Molinier, *op. cit.*, No. 46.

secution. This opinion is strengthened by the silence of Sidonius Apollinaris. In order to appreciate the weight of his silence a glance at the fulness and activity of his life is necessary. He was born in Lyons about 430; his grandfather and father before him were Christians; his education was received in the best schools the Roman empire then afforded; in 472 he was made bishop of Clermont. His letters show how wide was his acquaintance and how deep his culture, and his commemorative and panegyric verse prove the distinguished position he had. Such a man, cultured, traveled, and himself a bishop, it would seem would have known of the persecution at Lyons—if it ever happened. He had ample opportunity to celebrate it, for during the episcopate of bishop Patiens at Lyons (451-91), a new basilica—later named after Saint Nizier, bishop of Lyons, 552-73—was erected, for the dedication of which Sidonius wrote a poem at the request of Patiens.³² This poem is devoid of the usual classical and mythological allusions in which he delighted. Yet there is not the remotest allusion to the martyrs of Lyons in this poem or his other *Carmina*, nor in his voluminous correspondence. The omission seems remarkable considering Sidonius' episcopal position, his learning, and his tender interest in things pertaining to the Christian dead.³³

No reliance can be put upon the account of Gregory of Tours.³⁴ He obviously is following the tradition (*dicuntur*) which had been formed in the course of the two centuries preceding him. While Eusebius does not state the exact number of those who suffered and only gives the names of eight, in Gregory of Tours we find that forty other hitherto unknown victims have acquired names. Yet Gregory omits Attalus, one of the most prominent victims in the Eusebian account. Moreover there are two victims named Pothinus.³⁵ Elsewhere he further confuses things by making these 48 perish during the events which befell Lyons when Albinus rebelled and the city was punished by Septimius Severus in 203,

³² *Ep.*, I, 5, 8; IV, 2, 5; *Carmina*, XIII, 23.

³³ Cf. *Ep.*, II, 8; III, 11, 12, and De Boissieu, *Inscriptions antiques de Lyon* (1846), 563.

³⁴ *Ex gloriae martyrum*, chap. 49.

³⁵ Gregory spells the name Fotinus.

and he specifically names Vettius Epagathus who is the first martyr mentioned in Eusebius.³⁶ Finally making confusion worse confounded, Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist, with whose spirituality Eusebius compares that of Vettius Epagathus, in Gregory of Tours also becomes a martyr! Later martyrology still more confuses things. The slave girl Blandina becomes a man; Zacharias is a presbyter of the church in Lyons; more names are added.³⁷ So far have myth and legend enlarged the original account. Is the letter in Eusebius genuine? We may not take the argument of silence and the fact of subsequent perversion of the account as conclusive.

There is another line of evidence of a totally different nature which has to do with the probable extent of Christianity in the valley of the Rhone in the second century. Christian epigraphy shows how slow was the spread of Christianity in Gaul, and conclusively proves the unreliability of Irenaeus. Harnack,³⁸ following Hirschfeld,³⁹ has summarized the low value of Irenaeus' testimony. And yet Harnack and Du Chesne,⁴⁰ in the face of evidence which seems to me to make the letter open to doubt, still adhere to the traditional belief.

Next to Italy, Africa and Gaul are richest in Christian inscriptions.⁴¹ Le Blant, in his great work,⁴² deplors the number of Christian inscriptions which have been exhumed and lost without having been copied. But since the appearance of that work in 1865 some progress has been made. The first edition included almost 800 numbers. Since then 330 have been added, but not

³⁶ *Hist. Franc.*, I, 27. Rénan, *Marc-Aurèle*, 307, thinks Vettius Epagathus was not put to death in 177 since he is not subsequently mentioned among the martyrs, and in Eusebius, V, 1, 10, is referred to as if still alive: "For he was and is a true disciple of Christ."

³⁷ Migne, *Patrologie Latine*, XXX, 475. The version probably belongs to the sixth century.—Du Chesne, *Révue archéologique de l'École de Rome*, 1886.

³⁸ *Mission and Expansion of Christianity* (Eng. trans., 1908), I, 453-60; II, 261-64, 269.

³⁹ "Zur Geschichte des Christ. in Lugdunum vor Konstantin," *Sitzungsberichte d. k. Preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.*, 1895, pp. 381 ff.

⁴⁰ *Fastes épiscopaux de l'anc. Gaule*, 32-38.

⁴¹ Le Blant, *L'épigraphie chrét. en Gaule et dans l'Afrique romaine*, 1.

⁴² Le Blant, *Inscriptions chrét. de la Gaule*, I, p. cxxviii.

one affords any evidence of Christianity at Lyons before the third century.⁴³ Of the 350 inscriptions contained in Le Blant's second edition, 135 pertain to the territory of Lyons, Vienne, Narbonne, and the Maritime Alps, that is to say, to the provinces nearest Italy and the Mediterranean.⁴⁴ The paucity of Christian inscriptions is manifest by the fact that the fourth century furnishes us with 4, the fifth 54, the sixth 31.⁴⁵ If, as some think, the evangelization of Gaul was well under way at the end of the second century, some Christian inscription ought to show it, but there is not one. Early Christian inscriptions in the Greek language—and the Christians of Lyons in the account in Eusebius are obviously Greek—are very rare in Gaul. The most celebrated is that of Autun. There is one of Lyons, three of Trèves, one of Vienne, one of Apt, which is doubtful, one of Tourelles, one of Marseilles, and one of Narbonne. There are no Greek inscriptions in Latin letters nor Latin inscriptions in Greek letters.⁴⁶ The testimony of the marbles seemingly coincides with that of Sulpicius Severus as to the late spread of Christianity beyond the Alps, for, save for the celebrated epitaph of Autun, all the early Christian inscriptions belong to places near the sea.⁴⁷ Epigraphy proves that Christianity was relatively late in Gaul except for the seaboard, and that its expansion was slow.⁴⁸ It seems hardly a sufficient rejoinder to say that time, war, flood, fire have so dealt with Lyons that its archaeological remains have been utterly destroyed. It is true that the old church of St. Nizier and the catacombs have been obliterated by the rise in the bed of the river and the changes due to mediaeval building.⁴⁹ But such complete absence of early Christian inscriptions cannot fairly be attributed entirely to the ravages of time and ignorance; for as late as the ninth century Amolon, archbishop of Lyons (841-52), wrote to Theobald, bishop of Langres (849-59), of the discovery of unidentified tombs of forgotten saints.⁵⁰

Moreover, the episcopal list with reference to Lyons increases our skepticism as to the presence of Christianity there as early as

⁴³ Le Blant, *L'épigraphie chrét. en Gaule*, 106. Cf. De Boissieu, p. 157.

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, 41.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 23.

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, 27.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 41.

⁴⁸ De Boissieu, 284, pp. 535.

⁵⁰ Migne, *Patrologie Latine*, CXVI, 77; De Boissieu, p. 544.

the second century. Apart from the statement in Eusebius that Pothinus was bishop of Lyons, there is no evidence to indicate that there was any bishopric in Gaul before the middle of the third century. The sixty-eighth epistle of Cyprian (died 258) proves that Arles and Lyons had bishops about 250.⁵¹ But how old were these sees? Excluding Eusebius' testimony as to Lyons we can only infer it. Du Chesne,⁵² arguing from the episcopal lists in which Verus of Vienne, who was present at the Council of Arles⁵³ in 314, was counted as the fourth bishop of Vienne, and assuming an average episcopate of eighteen years, thinks that the bishopric of Vienne can hardly have been older than 250. Harnack,⁵⁴ in refutation, argues that the list is not old and is unreliable; that it is arbitrary to assume an average episcopate of eighteen years; and finally that what may apply to Vienne does not necessarily apply to Lyons. Yet from the rubric of the letter one might reasonably infer that the Christian community of Vienne was greater than that of Lyons.

The improbability of there being a Christian community in Lyons so early and of sufficient numbers to attract such a repression as that described in Eusebius seems great. These Christians were almost all Syro-Asiatic Greeks—unless we are to give credence to the Latin names in Gregory of Tours. Many evidently answered the magistrates in Greek.⁵⁵ Sanctus replied τῆ Ῥωμαικῆ φωνῆ,⁵⁶ as also did Attalus, a native of Pergamos, although in the case of the latter the circumstance may be explained by the fact that he was a Roman citizen. Now if these first Christians of Lyons were Greeks, the churches of Vienne and Lyons must have been established from Marseilles, which was a Greek colony.⁵⁷ But the

⁵¹ Harnack, *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, I, 457-58.

⁵² *Fastes épiscopaux de l'anc. Gaule*, I, 59.

⁵³ "There was no bishop of Arles, we may be sure, before the death of Irenaeus about 203."—Benson, *Life of Cyprian*, 316, note 3.

⁵⁴ *Mission and Expansion of Christianity*, I, 459.

⁵⁵ This is evident from Eusebius, V, 1, 20, 52, where emphasis is laid on the fact that Sanctus and Attalus could speak Latin.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, V, 1, 20.

⁵⁷ "The church of Lyons could not have been Greek at all unless Greek Christianity had existed at the estuary of the Rhone."—Harnack, *Mission and Expansion*

evidence for Christianity at Marseilles in the second century is purely inferential. The only inscription which bears witness to it cannot conclusively be referred to that time. Du Chesne himself asserts that (Lyons excepted on the word of Eusebius) no church was founded at any distance from the coast or in the valley of the Rhone before the middle of the third century,⁵⁸ and the indication that any Christians were ever burned in Marseilles is insufficient.⁵⁹ Lyons, "unlike any other city in northern Gaul and unlike a large majority of the southern, was founded from Italy and was a Roman city."⁶⁰ The same is true of Vienne.

Another line of reasoning tending to invalidate the reliability of the letter in Eusebius is that pertaining to the exercise of the police power, the operation of which is minutely described. There are several anomalies and anachronisms in this account. The most obvious of these is the fact that Lyons and Vienne were in different provinces, the former in the *provincia Lugdunensis*, the latter in the *provincia Narbonnensis*. Moreover, the former was an imperial province⁶¹ governed by a legate, while the latter was a senatorial province.⁶² The spectacle of a Roman governor so transcending his prerogative as to invade the jurisdiction of another governor

of Christianity, II, 261, note 1. The earliest Christians in the Lyonnais were Graeco-Syrians and dwelt on an island at the junction of the Rhone and the Saone near Athanacum.—Rénan, *Marc-Aurèle*, 303, note 3. The churches of Lyons and Vienne preserved Greek liturgical traces until the sixth century.—*Ibid.*, 343, note 2. For evidence of the presence of Syrians in Gaul—in the fifth and sixth centuries—see Sidonius Apollinaris, *Ep.*, I, 8; Greg. Tur., *Hist. Franc.*, VII, 21; VIII, 1; X, 26; Miraculi S. Martini, III, 10; Salvian, *De Gubernatione Dei*, IV, 69; Jonas, *Vita Columbani*, 41. When Gontran of Burgundy entered Orleans in 585 the Syrian colony there was so great that it welcomed the King in the Syriac language—Greg. Tur., VIII, 1. See on the whole subject: Bréhier "Les colonies d'Orientaux en Occident au commencement du moyen âge," *Byz. Zeit.*, XII, 1, 2.

⁵⁸ *Fastes épiscopaux de l'anc. Gaule*, I, 39.

⁵⁹ Le Blant, No. 458; Rénan, *Marc-Aurèle*, 302, note 1.

⁶⁰ Mommsen, *Roman History*, I, 87. Cf. his *Provinces of the Roman Empire*, I, 92. For the evidence in regard to both Lyons and Vienne see Desjardins, *Géographie de la Gaule romaine*, III, 65-67, 372 (Lyons); 83, 376 (Vienne).

⁶¹ Desjardins, III, 152.

⁶² *Ibid.*, III, 246; Viollet, *Institutions politiques de la France*, I, 63. In the fourth century the Lugdunensis was governed by a *praeses* and the Narbonnensis by a *consularis*.

would certainly be extraordinary. The hesitation of Caesar at the Rubicon shows how gravely such an action would be regarded. All the evidence is in favor of a strict limitation of the governor's authority to his own territory.⁶³

An additional suspicious circumstance—all the more suspicious owing to the remarkable conduct of the legate—is the absence of the governor's name.⁶⁴ Some writers have conjectured that the governor may have been Sextus Ligurius Marinus, but this is a rash inference from the inscription recording the games in the circus which he gave. He was merely a *duumvir*, whose powers could not have extended beyond casting the Christians into prison to await the action of the governor who alone had the power of life and death.⁶⁵ With more plausibility some historians have surmised that the governor may have been the future emperor Septimius Severus whom Marcus Aurelius appointed governor of Lyons in 186.⁶⁶ But it was unusual to permit a governor to remain long in the same province and more unusual to reappoint him. Antoninus Pius extended the term of an efficient governor to seven years⁶⁷ and Niger advised Marcus Aurelius to reduce the term of all governors to five years.⁶⁸ It seems unlikely then that Septimius Severus could have been the governor in the persecution of

⁶³ Mommsen, *Hist. Zeitschrift*, LXIV (1890), 399, note 1; Halgon, *Les Provinces sénatoriales*, 295. The *Digest* is clear upon the point. See I, 16, 1; 18, 3, 13; II, 20, Neumann, *Der römische Staat und die allgemeine Kirche*, I, 29, note, avoids the difficulty by arguing that Vienne was untouched by the persecution, which Harnack, II, 261, refuses to believe and which is directly controverted by the account in Eusebius, V, 1, 13. But Harnack does not attempt to solve the difficulty.

⁶⁴ In the Acts of St. Marcel, who was martyred at Châlons-sur-Saone on September 4, 178, and of St. Valerian, who suffered for the faith at Tournon on September 15, 178, Priscus is mentioned as the legate in the *provincia Lugdunensis*. But neither account may be relied upon. According to Molinier, *Les sources de l'histoire de France*, I, Nos. 44-45, the Acts of St. Marcel are "sensiblement plus récents," and the *passio* of St. Valerian "sans grande autorité; écrite après la fondation de l'abbaye de Tournon (IX^e siècle?)."

⁶⁵ De Boissieu, p. 162.

⁶⁶ Spartianus, *Vita Severi*, 3-4; *Vita Pescenn. Niger*, 3; De Boissieu, p. 226. Caracalla was born in Lyons in 186.

⁶⁷ Capitolinus, *Vita Antonini*, 5.

⁶⁸ *Vita Pescenn. Niger*, 7. Cf. Mommsen, *Römische Staatsrecht* (3d ed.), II, 1, p. 255, note 5, and II, 2, p. 932, note 1.

177 unless he had been reappointed in 186 and enjoyed the singular and unusual favor of the emperor. On the other hand, if the alleged persecution of 177 has been confused with that of 203 after the revolt of Albinus was crushed, when we know that the Christians suffered, then the governor may have been Titus Flavius Secundus Philippianus, who celebrated the return of order by erecting a monument to Bona Mens, which was discovered in 1780.⁶⁹

The conduct of the soldiery in the account in Eusebius also gives ground for suspicion. We are told that they were taken to the forum by the chiliarch (the Greek equivalent of a *tribunus militum*); that Pothinus was carried by the soldiers to the tribunal.⁷⁰ Now in the Latin half of the Roman empire urban military posts were to be found in different localities chiefly for the suppression of highway robbery and for the prevention of the formation of secret societies.⁷¹ This local constabulary had a large part in the pursuit and arrest of the Christians,⁷² but they were particularly enjoined, at least in Trajan's time, not to seek them out⁷³ and apparently Marcus Aurelius continued the policy.⁷⁴ Exactly the opposite was done at Lyons.⁷⁵

Now the witness of Tertullian,⁷⁶ Sulpicius Severus,⁷⁷ Orosius,⁷⁸ Dion Cassius,⁷⁹ and Zonaras,⁸⁰ is that the Christians were not molested by the imperial government—mob rioting is another matter—in the reign of Antoninus Pius. In the case of Marcus Aurelius, according to his rescript preserved by Modestinus in the *Digest* xxx. 48. 19 (30) banishment to an island was the penalty for religious contumacy, while the emperor's legislation, as pre-

⁶⁹ De Boissieu, pp. 64-67. Neumann has shown that no proof exists that Septimius Severus issued any edict against the Christians. Cf. Ramsay, *Church and the Roman Empire*, 194. If Flavius Secundus Philippianus was the governor alluded to in Eusebius, V, 1, his authority in Gaul explains why the persecution extended across the boundary between the *provincia Lugdunensis* and the *provincia Narbonnensis*, for the inscription on the monument he erected specifically says: "Omnes Gallias regebat."

⁷⁰ V, 1, §§ 8, 30.

⁷¹ Mommsen, *Römische Strafrecht*, 307-8.

⁷² *Ibid.*

⁷³ Pliny, *Ep.*, 97: *conquirendi non sint*.

⁷⁴ Tertullian, *Apol.*, 2.

⁷⁵ Eusebius, V, 1, 13-14.

⁷⁶ *Apol.*, 5.

⁷⁷ *Hist. Sacr.*, II, 31.

⁷⁸ VII, 14.

⁷⁹ LXX, 3.

⁸⁰ XII, 1. The statement in the paragraph takes no cognizance of the alleged rescript of Antoninus Pius in Eusebius, IV, 13. As a matter of fact, "the title is a clumsy forgery."—Bury, ed. Gibbon, II, 542.

served in Paul's *Sentences* v. 21. 2, provided for deportation of the better citizens and the execution of the lesser. Considering the remarkable unity in the administrative policy of the Antonine emperors, it is with some suspicion then that we read the account of a governor in the reign of Marcus Aurelius so abusing his authority. Is it probable that an Antonine governor would have flagrantly violated the prohibition against pursuit of the Christians, as the letter in Eusebius specifically says?⁸¹

It is true that the *jus coercendi* which appertained to a Roman governor, as Mommsen has shown,⁸² was one of considerable latitude, and in its application to the Christians varied according to the inclination of each official. But restraint was thrown around the acceptance of denunciation as evidence. Hadrian went further in this particular than Trajan, when he ordered the proconsul of Asia not to admit accusations against the Christians unless they were founded on other delicts, and consequently to throw them out of court unless they constituted an accusation of *lèse-majesté*, in which event the procedure *de calumnia* was recommended.⁸³ Unless then we are prepared to admit that Marcus Aurelius made a radical departure⁸⁴ from Antonine precedent, or was singularly lax, the conduct of the governor in Lyons seems strange. Yet we are told that Caesar wrote in approval.⁸⁵

The governor seems also to have abused his authority in another particular. Under the early empire in the case of a capital crime the governor was required, *even after the indictment was established*, to refrain from formal condemnation and to send the accused to Rome, if he were a Roman citizen.⁸⁶ This provision was later modi-

⁸¹ V, 1, 13-14.

⁸² *Römische Staatsrecht* (3d ed.), I, 136-61. For its application to the Christians see the article cited in *Hist. Zeitschrift*, LXIV, 398.

⁸³ Mommsen, *Römische Strafrecht*, 577, note 3; cf. Justin, *Apol.*, I, 68.

⁸⁴ The scornful statement of Avidius Cassius, the emperor's rival as a philosopher, to the effect that while Marcus Aurelius philosophized his governors did as they pleased—Vulcac. Gallicanus, *Avid. Cassius*, 14—must be taken with reservation.

⁸⁵ Eusebius, V, 1, 47.

⁸⁶ Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, 239. Pliny, *Ep.*, 96-97, sent the Roman citizens of Bithynia to Rome and put the others to death. Trajan punished Marcus Priscus, governor of Africa, for condemning a Roman knight and seven friends to death, and under Hadrian the magistrates of Smyrna were sharply reminded of the limitations upon their authority.

fied, for the more the right of Roman citizenship extended into the provinces the more it became necessary to enlarge the discretionary powers of the governor.⁸⁷ In the city of Rome the emperor delegated his capital jurisdiction to the praetorian prefect; in the provinces the *jus gladii* was conferred upon different governors. The details of this transition are unknown and it is possible that even as early as Augustus delegations of this kind were made. Probably in the beginning each case was a special case.⁸⁸ But it is evident that in the third century the *jus gladii* was generally delegated to the governors of imperial provinces, probably with the restriction that the governor was obliged to secure the emperor's confirmation in the case of Roman citizens before execution.⁸⁹ This is the way in which it was applied at Lyons⁹⁰ save in one case which makes the governor's conduct anomalous. Attalus, we are told,⁹¹ was a Roman citizen. Yet, "to please the people the governor ordered Attalus to the wild beasts and he was later tortured by fire."⁹² Certainly the spectacle of a Roman governor so transcending his prerogative in the Antonine epoch is extraordinary. I fail to see the "analogy" which Sir William M. Ramsay⁹³ perceives between the proceedings in Bithynia and those at Lyons.

Skepticism increases as we examine farther. In Roman law avowed Christians were *ἀθεοί*⁹⁴ and Rome logically and legally punished defiance of the cult of the emperors as a crime against the state.⁹⁵ In principle the crime was the same for citizens and non-citizens and the punishment was death. With Roman citizens it was by decapitation. In the case of others they might be

⁸⁷ Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, II, 1, p. 270.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 1, pp. 243-44, and notes.

⁸⁹ But even in the third century actual execution without imperial confirmation must have been exceptional, judging from the opinions of the juriconsults. See Paulus, V, 26, 1; Ulpian, *Digest*, XLVIII, 6, 7, and cf. Mommsen, *Röm. Staatsrecht*, II, 1, p. 259 and note 3. After Constantine the *jus gladii* was even conferred on officials of second rank.—Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, 274.

⁹⁰ Eusebius, V, 1, 44, 47.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, V, 1, 50, 51.

⁹² *Ibid.*, V, 1, 44.

⁹³ *Church and the Roman Empire*, 240, 264.

⁹⁴ Justin, *Apol.*, 2; Clement of Alex., *Strom.*, 7, 1, 14; Dion Cassius, LXVII, 14.

⁹⁵ The *Passio Sanctorum Scilitanorum*, in the reign of Commodus, is a clear exemplification of Rome's attitude in this particular. See Robinson, *Texts and Studies*, I, 112-16; Gwatkin, *Selections from Early Christian Writers*, 78-83.

strangled as criminals, or again as Rome used her criminals, thrown to the lions. This was done at Lyons,⁹⁶ but there is no allusion to the cult of the emperors in the process at Lyons and no evidence that any attempt was made to compel the accused to sacrifice to the bust of the emperor.⁹⁷ Is not the omission significant? Until the first general edict of Decius against the Christians the requirement to burn incense to the bust of the emperor was the usual test.⁹⁸

There is still another anomaly in the matter of the use of torture as described in the account in Eusebius. Conybeare has pointed out that:

The whole question of the rationale of the punishments and tortures to which the Christian confessors were subjected is an obscure one and has not been fairly worked out, mainly owing to the assumption made by nearly all writers, that Christians were treated in an exceptional manner and not merely as other criminals. . . . Now the end aimed at in torture was . . . purely judicial. . . . The torture was only for the purpose of extracting evidence from them. The idea of torturing men by way of punishing them for their religious opinions was alien to the Roman mind. It was the Christian church that first instituted religious persecution in the true sense of the phrase, i.e., as punishment of purely speculative tenets. . . . They were not tortured as Christians, but as witnesses called on to give evidence in a law court. It was an easy and natural mental transition from the conception of a Christian suffering as a judicial witness to that of him as witnessing by his suffering to the truth of the faith. . . . The tortures inflicted on martyrs were in the main those of which we hear in earlier times as inflicted on witnesses, especially on slaves. In Cicero we hear of the *candentes laminae* or red-hot plates, which we often read of in the martyrdoms.⁹⁹

In the persecution at Lyons the anomaly is the most conspicuous in the use of fire. Fire as a means of execution probably was introduced by Septimius Severus, who established it as a form of capital punishment in the case of flagrant crime against the state.¹⁰⁰ The instance of Polycarp at Smyrna in 155 (?) is beside the mark, for there is reason to believe that in this case the police authorities

⁹⁶ Eusebius, V, 1, 37-42.

⁹⁷ But Ponticus was "pressed to swear by the idols."—Eusebius, V, 1, 53.

⁹⁸ Pliny, *Ep.*, 96-98. Cf. *Apology and Acts of Apollonius*, §7 (ed. Conybeare): "The prefect said: 'Come then and sacrifice to Apollo and to the other gods and to the emperor's image.'"

⁹⁹ *Monuments of Early Christianity*, 280-82.

¹⁰⁰ Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, 591.

were overawed by the populace. In other words, Polycarp was lynched.¹⁰¹ Save in the case of Polycarp and the alleged persecution at Lyons, there is no other example of the use of fire against the Christians before the Decian persecution (250).¹⁰² This fact at once arouses suspicion as to the account in Eusebius. For it is manifest that Blandina, Sanctus, Attalus, and their associates were not tortured for the purpose of securing evidence but as a means of punishment. The words of the letter specifically state that fire was applied as a means of punishment. "These having endured all tortures which serve as punishments . . . were finally put to death."¹⁰³ Attalus "was placed on an iron stool (*τήρανον*) (literally frying-pan) and the fumes arose from his burning body." Blandina also was roasted.

Before Septimius Severus magic and poison were the usual crimes in the Roman law punishable with death by fire.¹⁰⁴ Magic was a familiar charge against the Christians in the later persecutions, notably in that of Diocletian, but it may be doubted if it was as common an accusation as Le Blant and Neumann think. Much more popular were charges of grossly immoral practices and the eating of human flesh.¹⁰⁵ But such immoralities—or alleged orgies—in law were *stupra*.¹⁰⁶ But there is no evidence that the charge of magic was lodged against the martyrs at Lyons. On the contrary they were persecuted *διὰ τὸ ὄνομα*. "The governor . . . asked only this one question, if he [Vettius Epagathus] was

¹⁰¹ Lacour-Gayet, *Antonin le pieux*, 384; Allard, *Lectures on the Martyrs*, 264.

¹⁰² For much evidence as to the use of fire see Le Blant, *L'épigraphie chrét. de la Gaule*, p. 11, note.

¹⁰³ Eusebius, V, 1, 52, 56.

¹⁰⁴ Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, 637, 643, and notes 2 and 3. "The Roman emperors lived in a great fear of supernatural attack. There was a very great interest for many people in the question: When will the emperor die? Many, no doubt, made use of any apparatus of astrology or sorcery to find out. To the emperor and his adherents this seemed to prove a desire that he should die, and was interpreted as treasonable."—Sumner, *Folkways*, 236-37.

¹⁰⁵ "Thyestean banquets and Oedipodean intercourse."—Eusebius, V, 1, 14. Cf. Justin, *Apol.*, I, 26; Tertullian, *Apol.*, VII, 8; *ad Nat.*, 7. There was a certain ground for the popular pagan belief that the Christians partook of human flesh in the doctrine of the real presence in the Eucharist, which a pagan could hardly be expected to understand and might ignorantly misconstrue.

¹⁰⁶ Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, 682-704.

a Christian."¹⁰⁷ Those who confessed what they were, were imprisoned as Christians, no other accusation being brought against them.¹⁰⁸ This is clear also from the reply of Sanctus: "To all questions he replied in the Roman tongue: 'I am a Christian.'"¹⁰⁹

Quite as extraordinary is the treatment of those who recanted.

For those who had recanted at their first arrest were imprisoned with the others and endured terrible sufferings, so that their recantation was of no profit to them even in this present time. . . . [They] were treated as murderers and defiled with blood and suffered twice as severely as the others.¹¹⁰

This is a most remarkable departure from the usual procedure, for the Roman law was lenient to recusants. Pliny asked of Trajan whether recantation entailed pardon, or whether once a Christian always a Christian.¹¹¹ To which the emperor replied: "Where the party denies he is a Christian and shall make it evident that he is not by invoking our gods, let him, notwithstanding any form of suspicion, be pardoned."¹¹² Pardon was extended to apostates even after sentence had been passed.¹¹³ Rome's aim was less to punish the Christians than to dissuade them, at least before the time of Decius. This is what the emperor—was it Marcus Aurelius?—commanded to be done at Lyons?¹¹⁴ Yet what do we find? "Those who had recanted at their first arrest were imprisoned with the others and endured terrible sufferings so that their denial was of no profit to them."¹¹⁵ Evidently the governor disobeyed the instructions.

But we are not yet finished with the illegal—or extra-legal—phases of this persecution. The anomalous, extraordinary and anachronistic statements in this account continue unto the last paragraph. The treatment of the remains of the martyrs is of a piece with all the rest in its illegality.

¹⁰⁷ Eusebius, V, 1, 10.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, V, 1, 20.

¹¹¹ *Ep.*, 97.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, V, 1, 33.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, V, 1, 38.

¹¹² *Ep.*, 98.

¹¹³ Origen, *contra Cels.*, 2, 13. In the case of Apollonius (185 A.D.) the prefect gave him an arrest of judgment for one day to reconsider.—Conybeare, *Monuments of Early Christianity*, 39 (§ 10 of the process). In the case of the martyrs of Scili the proconsul asks: "Numquid ad deliberandum spatium vultis? Moram xxx dierum habete et recordamini."

¹¹⁴ Eusebius, V, 1, 47: "Any who denied should be set free."

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, V, 1, 33.

The bodies of the martyrs, having thus in every manner been exhibited and exposed for six days, were afterward burned and reduced to ashes and swept into the Rhone by the wicked men so that no trace of them might appear on the earth. And this they did as if able to conquer God and prevent their new birth; "that," as they said, "they may have no hope of a resurrection. . . . Now let us see if they will rise again and if their God is able to help them and to deliver them out of our hands."¹¹⁶

Tertullian speaks of the savage devastation of Christian tombs and the popularity of the cry, "Areae non sint!"¹¹⁷ The persecution in Africa in the reign of Septimius Severus under the proconsul Scapula in 103-4 was characterized by the spoliation of Christian cemeteries.¹¹⁸ But the annihilation of the bodies of the martyrs was a development of the persecutions of the third century when the situation and the policy of the Roman government had materially changed.¹¹⁹ The influence of the Christian idea of the resurrection of the body on Rome's policy is an implication of the third century.¹²⁰ Even then, until the great Diocletian persecution, such horrific process was exceptional. The body of Cyprian, who suffered in the Valerian persecution of 258, "was borne away with tapers and torches" to the cemetery.¹²¹ This, it must be admitted, was an extenuation of Valerian's legislation. For Valerian sequestered Christian cemeteries and deprived the Christians of interment.¹²²

But Roman law was exceedingly jealous of the rights of sepulture. Even a slave had the right of decent burial. It is true that Christianity was a *crimen majestatis* and as such, in law, was a *perduellio* variously punished by fire, interdiction of fire and

¹¹⁶ Eusebius, V, 1, 62-63.

¹¹⁸ Tertullian, *ad Scap.*, 3.

¹¹⁷ *Apol.*, 37; cf. Le Blant, p. 110.

¹¹⁹ Allard, pp. 313-14.

¹²⁰ Tertullian, *Apol.*, 48; *de Anima*, 4; Lactantius, *Inst. div.*, IV, 26. During the Sepoy rebellion in India in 1857 the English shot the Sepoys to pieces at the cannon's mouth. The motive was the same as that of Rome. It was the one and only form of punishment dreaded by the natives, since it destroyed their hopes of any future existence in the flesh.

¹²¹ *Acta proconsularia Cypriani*, ed. Hartel, II, p. cxi; *Corpus SS. eccles. Lat.*, III (1871); Benson, *Life of Cyprian*, 509.

¹²² Ruinart, p. 216; Aubé, pp. iv, 343-44; Eusebius, VII, 10, 10-11. Gallienus reversed his father's legislation and restored the Christian burial places. Eusebius, VII, 13, 3; Homo, *Le règne de l'empereur Aurélien*, 194, note 2.

water, confiscation, deportation, and in flagrant cases by death. In event of the last penalty execration of memory and deprivation of burial might follow. But Tiberius and Domitian had so abused their power in this particular that the legislation of the Antonines relaxed the rigor of the law in cases of *lèse-majesté* until the constitutions of the third century, probably those of Septimius Severus, revived the old penalties again.¹²³ Even toward Christians the Antonines were liberal in the matter of burial privileges.

The undoubted possession of the Christians at the end of the second century of *areae* or *coemeteria* of their own seems necessarily to imply that in some way or other they had corporate rights, that their community ranked as juristic persons, a result which could only follow from their being specially or generally licensed. It was Marcus Aurelius that first granted these corporate rights to licensed *collegia*.¹²⁴

From this extended study of the account of the martyrdom alleged to have happened at Lyons I am forced to conclude that the persecution cannot be attributed to the reign of Marcus Aurelius. That it never happened at all I am not prepared to believe, although the argument from silence is a very heavy one. Both pagan and Christian historiography, in the third century, was amazingly inaccurate and ignorant. Even in the reign of Diocletian, as the account in *Vopiscus XXIX, 2*, shows, there was great want of accurate knowledge regarding even most important events. Examination of the law and the alleged facts points to the second half of the third century at the time of its occurrence. These Christians in Lyons were Montanists and it is almost inconceivable that Tertullian, with his own Montanist leaning, should not have known of the persecution at Lyons if it happened in 177, when arraigning Scapula for the persecution in Africa in 203-4. Conybeare has pointed out that "in appraising the historical value of an early Christian document, we ought to condemn it . . . in case the sentiments and teachings put into the mouths of the

¹²³ Mommsen, *Strafrecht*, 591.

¹²⁴ Hardy, *Church and the Roman Government*, 193, who cites the *Digest*, III, 4, 1. Waltzing, *Les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*, I, 316, however, denies that this practice obtained before the third century, principally on the ground that Tertullian, who was a lawyer, would not have failed to mention it. But elsewhere (I, 134, note 1) he admits that "de son temps, c'était généralement le cas."

actors and the actions attributed to them be foreign to their age and country so far as of these we have any reliable knowledge."¹²⁵

The intrinsic psychological evidence is distinctly characteristic of the late third century.

Notice (1) the passion for martyrdom: "They with all eagerness finished the confession of martyrdom";¹²⁶ "for the joy of martyrdom encouraged them."¹²⁷ Pothinus is "invigorated with spiritual zeal because of his intense eagerness for martyrdom."¹²⁸ Now the *furor passionis martyrum* especially characterizes the history of the persecutions of the third century. Gibbon's statement has received the indorsement of many subsequent historians:

It is not easy to extract any distinct ideas from the vague though eloquent declarations of the Fathers or to ascertain the degree of immortal glory and happiness which they confidently promised to those who were so fortunate as to shed their blood in the cause of religion. They inculcated with becoming diligence that the fire of martyrdom supplied every defect and expiated every sin; that while the souls of ordinary Christians were obliged to pass through a slow and painful purification, the triumphant sufferers entered into the immediate fruition of eternal bliss, where, in the society of the patriarchs, the apostles and the prophets, they reigned with Christ, and acted as his assessors in the universal judgment of mankind. The assurance of a lasting reputation upon earth, a motive so congenial to the vanity of human nature, often served to animate the courage of the martyrs. The honors which Rome or Athens bestowed on those citizens who had fallen in the cause of their country were cold and unmeaning demonstrations of respect when compared with the ardent gratitude and devotion which the primitive church expressed toward the victorious champions of the faith.¹²⁹

"The blood of the martyrs," as Lactantius finely said, "was the seed of the church." It was no plan of the persecuting emperors to make Christianity popular. This explains why the legislation of Valerian substituted confiscation, exile, imprisonment in the mines, degradation of rank, and reserved the death penalty for the clergy only.¹³⁰

2. The miraculous elements in the Eusebian account, notably in the case of Sanctus,¹³¹ is again typically characteristic of third-

¹²⁵ Conybeare, pp. 4, 5.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, V, I, 34.

¹²⁶ Eusebius, V, 1, 11.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, V, 1, 29.

¹²⁹ Edition of Bury, II, 103-4.

¹³⁰ Cyprian, *Ep.*, 80. Those of official station were punished with special rigor.

¹³¹ Eusebius, V, 1, 24.

century martyrology. The authenticity of the Acts of the Martyrs of Scili (between 180-92) "rests chiefly on the circumstance that miracles are conspicuously absent."¹³²

3. The reference to the Virgin in the account of the tortures of Blandina¹³³ is another statement open to suspicion in a second-century document. Allusion to the Virgin is rare before the third century¹³⁴ and unusual even then. No orthodox writer of the first four centuries assigns Mary any privileged place in Christian worship, or represents veneration of or devotion to her as a means of grace. Maryolatry was a product of the Nestorian controversy.¹³⁵ The name Mother of God was first attributed to the Virgin by the Council of Ephesus in 431.

Finally the literary form of the account in Eusebius arouses suspicion of its second-century provenance. In the first place, miraculous additions¹³⁶ are of third-century embellishment. Secondly, dialogue between the judge and the accused is a striking characteristic of the authentic records of the martyrs of the second century.¹³⁷ Further—to quote the admirable words of Conybeare:

In very many martyrdoms the saint is made to recite his creed; and we find on the whole that the creeds given in the Acts of the second century are simpler than those given in third-century Acts. Thus in the Acts of Apollonius, Christ is merely said to have been the Word of God made man in Judea where he taught all goodness to man and was crucified. No mention is here made of his resurrection nor of his miraculous birth.¹³⁸

To sum up: The utter silence of all historians, whether pagan or Christian, as to the persecution of Lyons before Eusebius; the absence of any tradition of this nature before the Latin translation

¹³² Bury in appendix to Gibbon, II, 545.

¹³³ Eusebius, V, 1, 45. At first sight the allusion might seem the familiar symbolism of the Apocalypse and the Shepherd of Hermas. But this cannot be the meaning for the contrast is drawn (V, 1, 18) between Blandina's "earthly mistress"—she was a slave—and the Virgin Mother, so that the allusion must be a personal one to Mary, the mother of Jesus.

¹³⁴ Conybeare, pp. 14, 337.

¹³⁵ Socrates, *Eccles. Hist.*, vii, 32-34.

¹³⁶ Cf. Eusebius, V, 1, 24.

¹³⁷ Cf. the trial of the Scilitan martyrs and the Acts of Apollonius. The presence of dialogue in the Acts of St. Phocas is an evidence of authenticity.—Conybeare, pp. 94-95.

¹³⁸ Conybeare, p. 14.

of Eusebius was known in the West; the extrinsic evidence against the probability of there having been any Christian community in Lyons before the middle of the third century; the flagrant violations of Roman law alleged of the governor in a century when the imperial administration was at its best; the singular anomalies and anachronisms of the process—if the persecution actually took place in the second century—the internal psychological evidence—all these point to a later and probably a third-century origin of the account.

Is the letter in Eusebius an authentic narrative? If so, it is difficult to understand, after Eusebius' work appeared, the more especially when we remember that Constantine opened the archives freely,¹³⁹ why the interest of the church or some churchman was not strong enough to actuate it to ascertain more about the martyrs of Lyons. The *procès-verbaux* of the trials were full, as we know, for:

Many instances are recorded in which they [Christians] purchased from the clerks (*commentarienses*) copies of the official shorthand report of the proceedings at trials of the martyrs, and these official Acta form the groundwork of many of the tales of martyrs, and are even reproduced verbatim in some of the best and most authentic accounts. The rescript would certainly be preserved in pro-consular archives.¹⁴⁰

The shorthand notes of the trial of Apollonius were accessible to his coreligionists.¹⁴¹

The whole account in Eusebius *may* be a Christian fabrication composed during the Valerian or Diocletian persecution, in order to encourage the faithful and to prevent recantation. The Decian persecution, we know, caused an alarming amount of apostasy among the Christians.¹⁴² It was the church's object to prevent recantation; to teach those who wavered that no mercy would be accorded them by the government; that their punishment would be as severe, or more severe than before; that they would gain nothing in this world by relapsing and lose "the one honorable and

¹³⁹ Le Blant, *Acad. d. Inscríp.* (1879), 210; Doucet, *Rapport de l'église chrét. et l'état Romain*, 83, note 2; Conybeare, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ Ramsay, p. 330.

¹⁴¹ Conybeare, p. 33.

¹⁴² Cyprian, *De lapsis and Ep.*, 11, 34, 59; Gibbon, II, 103, note.

glorious life-giving Name."¹⁴³ This form of pious forgery was not uncommon in the third century.

If the other alternative—the historical veritability of the account—be insisted upon, *Marcus Aurelius must be acquitted and the martyrdom of Lyons put a century later, in the reign of Aurelian (270-75)*. The evidence for this is not direct; much of it is inferential from the reading of other events, but it seems to me constructively sound.

One of the most striking events of Aurelian's short reign was his reform of the coinage and the reorganization of the imperial mints. At the time of his campaign in the east in 272, the emperor repressed the frauds at Antioch,¹⁴⁴ not without violent disturbance in the city. In order to understand the reason for such insurrection it must be remembered that the workmen of the mints formed colleges or guilds whose members were united by ties of solidarity and relationship, for employment in the mints passed from generation to generation in the same family,¹⁴⁵ and that these guilds were in intimate and not always honest relation with a crowd of bankers, brokers, money-changers, and contractors, so that frauds upon the government must have prevailed.¹⁴⁶ Already in the year before (271), Aurelian had undertaken drastic reorganization of the mint at Rome. The senatorial aristocracy, secretly hostile to the emperor, abetted the insurrection. The formidable nature of the movement against him owing to his reforms is apparent from the fact that Aurelian lost 7,000 soldiers in subduing it.¹⁴⁷ Now in 274, after the defeat of Tetricus, "tyrant" of Gaul, in the

¹⁴³ Eusebius, V, 1, 35.

¹⁴⁴ *Homo, Aurélien*, 166 and note 1. Cf. the whole chapter.

¹⁴⁵ De Boissieu, p. 282; Waltzing, *Les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*, I, 180; II, 229, 232-33, 260, 283-85; *Cod. Theod.*, X, 20, 16; XI, 7, 7; XII, 6, 2.

¹⁴⁶ "Dans toutes les professions exercées à Lyons . . . ce qui est fort remarquable, c'est que le même homme cumulait souvent deux, trois ou quatre négoes et faisait partie de plusieurs collèges."—Waltzing, *Les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*, II, 181. This was contrary to Roman law (*ibid.*, 353) and assuredly Aurelian was not the emperor to permit the continuance of such practices.

¹⁴⁷ Vopiscus, *Vita Aur.*, 38; Mommsen, *Röm. Münzwesen*, 799; *Röm. Staatsrecht*, II, 2, p. 1028, with the long note appended; *Homo, Aurélien*, 163-64; Waltzing, *Les corporations professionnelles chez les Romains*, II, 228.

battle of Châlons,¹⁴⁸ the monetary reform was in all likelihood extended to the mint of Lyons¹⁴⁹ from which Tetricus had issued his counter coinage.¹⁵⁰ As a result Lyons seems to have revolted, too, and been crushed as pitilessly as in 203 by Septimius Severus.

That the Christians in both Rome and Lyons must have suffered from popular fury in these rebellions is indubitable. There was a violent pagan reaction at Rome in or near the first year of Aurelian's reign¹⁵¹ when the monetary reform was pending, and some of the Christian population suffered.¹⁵² Why not in Lyons where the brokers, bankers, and money-changers were abundant?¹⁵³ There was intimate connection between the workmen in the mint and the goldsmiths and silversmiths much of whose trade was in the manufacture of images.¹⁵⁴ This class, like Demetrius at Ephesus¹⁵⁵ in the days of Paul, undoubtedly was incensed at the teachings of the Christians.

This reasoning seems more probable when it is remembered that Aurelian contemplated an extensive persecution of the Christians, a purpose which was interrupted by his assassination, and that preliminary instructions to this end had been sent to the governors of the provinces.¹⁵⁶ Now Aurelian's right hand man in Gaul was Julius Placidianus, prefect of the *vigilii* under Claudius, who had held Tetricus in check till Aurelian's arrival in 273 and whose headquarters were at Grenoble not far from Lyons.¹⁵⁷

¹⁴⁸ Homo, *Aurélien*, 118-21.

¹⁵¹ Allard, III, 202-4; Aubé, IV, 444, denies it.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 166, 310-11.

¹⁵² Allard, III, 204.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 173, note 1.

¹⁵³ Desjardins, III, 447, note 2.

¹⁵⁴ *Argentarius* and *nummularius* are equivalent words in both the early and the late empire. Under the Byzantine empire we find *αργυραμοιβοί* = *nummularius*.—Waltzing, II, 231. The word *argentarius* is used to designate both a silversmith or worker in the precious metals and a banker.—Waltzing, I, 111, 114, 115, note 1. It is difficult sometimes to distinguish them. In the *Dictionnaire* of Darenberg and Salio, I, 407, M. Saglio translates *argentarius* = *banquier*.—Dury, VI, 289 = *orfèvre*. Many of these goldsmiths were probably Syrians (Christians?). An inscription of the second century in Allmer and Dissart, *Inscrip. antiq. du musée de Lyon*, 160, pertains to one who was a native of Germanicia in Syria.

¹⁵⁵ Acts 19: 23-41.

¹⁵⁶ Homo, *Aurélien*, 195 and notes; Doucet, 171.

¹⁵⁷ Homo, *op. cit.*, 66, 143. If Julius Placidianus "omnes Gallias regebat" as did Flavius Secundus Philippianus in 203 and Posthumius in the reign of Valerian—he was *Galliae praeses* (Treb. Poll., *Triginta Tyr.*, II)—the distinction between the *provincia Lugdunensis* and the *provincia Narbonnensis* would not have hindered his action.

When Aurelian left Lyons after installing the new monetary reforms he went on to Autun, Sens, Auxerre, Troyes, Dijon, and Orleans.¹⁵⁸ In his absence did the populace vent its wrath upon the Christians and the rising become so formidable that the local authorities sent word to Julius Placidianus, who could readily arrive from Grenoble within a few days? May not the governor, already aware of the emperor's intention to institute a new persecution, have fallen in line with the popular fanaticism, and knowing Aurelian so well, though he informed him of the event, have had the hardihood to ignore his instructions in the particulars mentioned?

Does this interpretation strain the evidence? I do not think so. On the contrary it seems to me that this reasoning, while inferential, is justified by the facts which we know of Aurelian's reign. If it be so, then the letter in Eusebius finds a rational and proper place; even the psychological elements in it fall in, for, as we have seen, these phenomena are typical of third-century martyr-ology. Color is lent to this theory by the fact that the tradition of the martyrs attributes executions of Christians to Aurelian at Autun, Sens, and Auxerre, the very places through which he passed after leaving Lyons.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, if authentic, these executions must all be placed in the summer of 275¹⁶⁰ and Aurelian was killed in August or September of the same year. As M. Homo says: "The memory of Aurelian remained very vivid in this part of Gaul."¹⁶¹

There remains but one stumbling-block in the way. Why did Eusebius ascribe the letter giving an account of the persecution at Lyons to Marcus Aurelius—or at least mean to do so? Certainly he took large liberties with the evidence before him and "jumped" to the conclusion, although he was so hazy in his mind as to actual facts that he could not distinguish between Marcus Aurelius and his brother in the foreword which he wrote to introduce the account.¹⁶² Professor McGiffert's ingenious explanation¹⁶³ it seems to me really condemns Eusebius, for the letter of the Christians of Lyons and Vienne neither in rubric nor text gives any indication

¹⁵⁸ Homo, *op. cit.*, 311, note 5.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 375-76.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 377.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 376.

¹⁶⁰ Eusebius, V, *Introd.*, 1.

¹⁶³ McGiffert's Eusebius (*Ante-Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*), 390-91.

as to the time when the persecution took place, and Eusebius, apparently arbitrarily or by a method of his own, ascribed it as he did. The genuineness of many of the documents in Eusebius is open to question. Seeck rejects all in the *Vita Constantini*. In the *Ecclesiastical History*, IV, 13, the alleged letter of Antoninus Pius, though its authenticity was believed by Baronius, Tillemont, Hergenroether, and Champagny, is rejected by Baur, Keim, Rénan, Allard, Aubé, and others.¹⁶⁴ Overbeck denies the authenticity of the letter attributed to Hadrian by Eusebius in IV, 26.¹⁶⁵ Eusebius' critical ability, though admitting he was superior to the church writers of his time, was not great. He was credulous enough to believe that the correspondence between Abgar of Edessa and Jesus in I, 13, was genuine.¹⁶⁶ In the case of the letter in IV, 13, Eusebius was extraordinarily careless, for after saying that it is a letter of Antoninus Pius, when later on, he proceeds to give the text *in extenso*, he inserts the name of Marcus Aurelius instead.¹⁶⁷ Why may he not have made a similar blunder in the case of the letter of Lyons, admitting that the letter bore the name of any emperor at all upon it, which is not certain? The analogy of name between Aurelius and Aurelian might readily have contributed to confusion in so uncritical and careless a writer. In numbers of examples of the Acts of the Martyrs ascribed to Aurelian's reign the persecutions are in reality referable to other emperors—Decius, Valerian, Diocletian, and notably to *Marcus Aurelius*.¹⁶⁸ The two are often confused.

If the contentions in this article be valid, then the tradition of the early church to the effect that Marcus Aurelius was not a persecutor was truer to actual history than historical scholarship has hitherto believed.

¹⁶⁴ "The context in Eusebius shows that he regarded the edict as issuing from Titus, and so it would seem, as Harnack suggests, that he found the incorrect title in his source and did not venture to omit or alter it, while he assumed it to be wrong. In any case, the title is a clumsy forgery."—Bury, ed. Gibbon, II, 542.

¹⁶⁵ *Theolog. Jahrbücher*, Tübingen, 1856, p. 387.

¹⁶⁶ See McGiffert's English translation, p. 100, note.

¹⁶⁷ On Eusebius' confusion of the names of the emperors see McGiffert's edition, pp. 390-91.

¹⁶⁸ Homo, *Aurélien*, 376.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITION OF RELIGION¹

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No scientific discipline can be credited with much accuracy until it has succeeded in defining its principal terms. While recent contributions to the still youthful field of the psychology of religion have made the problems clearer, and at least partially solved some of them, no definition that has yet been proffered has met with wide acceptance. It is the purpose of this paper to suggest a working definition which, it is hoped, will prove to be reasonably satisfactory. It will be claimed that the definition adequately covers the established facts in regard to religion, that it furnishes a clear line of demarkation between religion and related fields, and that it is serviceable as a preliminary step toward the solution of the more difficult questions of the social significance and metaphysical validity of religion.²

An adequate definition of religion must satisfy two prerequisites. The first of these is that, to meet the requirements of logic, it must be exactly coextensive with the term defined.³ It must include all varieties of all religions in the past as well as the present, and all of the logically possible forms that religions may conceivably assume in the future, no matter whether we believe these forms to be desirable or undesirable, uplifting or degrading, true or false. It must be thoroughly impersonal and descriptive, not normative.

¹ Portions of this paper were read at a joint session of the Western Philosophical and Psychological associations at the University of Chicago last April. The writer is indebted to Professors Lindley and Haggerty of Indiana University, Professor McGilvary, Dr. Kallen, and Dr. Otto of the University of Wisconsin, Professor Mead of the University of Chicago, and Rev. John R. Ellis of Bloomington, Ind., for suggestions, partly of a negative character, that have helped him to define his positions.

² The worthlessness for psychological purposes of the older definitions, advanced by philosophers and philologists, is patent. Cf. James H. Leuba, *Monist*, XV.

³ Those acquainted with the literature will see the reason for emphasizing this truism. Professor George M. Stratton, in his valuable *Psychology of the Religious Life* (pp. 1-3), clearly states the proper psychological attitude, and admirably maintains it.

And it must avoid confusing religion with morals, magic, ethics, aesthetics, and other subjects that have borne in the past, or now bear, close relationship to it.

The second desideratum in a preliminary definition of religion for the purposes of functional psychology is that it should be an accurate description of the subjective attitude of the practicers of religions, and not an assertion regarding the actual function of religion in human society, as determined by the objective observer. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, prudence demands that a functional psychologist make his definition frankly subjective in order to avoid the suspicion of being implicated in the psychologist's fallacy, a suspicion often, and perhaps not without reason, felt against investigators of his ilk. Secondly, it will be much easier to secure agreement upon the facts. The precise influence of any religion in social and moral evolution, complicated as is its interaction with other forces, is extremely difficult to determine. At the present time, there would be great difficulty in ascertaining the precise influence that Christianity has had upon European history,⁴ and it would be yet more difficult to make a general statement that would apply to all religions. Personally I believe that it is possible to arrive at conclusions unambiguously favorable to Christianity as a factor of genuine and great service and importance in moral and social development, and I think that, to a less degree, this may be claimed of religion in general. In fact, a few points in regard to the social function of religion from the objective viewpoint will be mentioned toward the close of this paper; but the extreme difficulty of the subject makes it clear that it will be much easier to secure agreement upon the facts if a frankly subjective definition alone is attempted as a preliminary step toward the solution of the larger sociological and historical problem.

⁴The conclusions of Lecky, who attempted to estimate the influence of the Christian religion in certain periods of European history, and who still is our chief authority on this subject, are often delivered with hesitation (*A History of European Morals*). Westermarck's theory of the subjectivity of moral judgments apparently excludes a consideration of their objective function (*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*). Hobhouse limits his conclusions to a few important but restricted details (*Morals in Evolution*, II, 155-59, and *passim*).

To meet these desiderata, therefore, I propose to set forth, in a manner that possibly may appear a little formal and pedantic, but will, I believe, make for accuracy, a definition of religion by genus and differentia. The genus will have to be broad enough to include within its bounds every conceivable form of religion. The differentia will need to be sufficiently narrow and specific to exclude from the species of religion everything included within the genus that is not properly religious. By thus seeking for breadth in our genus, and for narrowness and definiteness in our differentia, we ought to be able to satisfy all requirements and to secure a logical definition.

Of the various attempts to define religion psychologically, two types of definition are probably regarded at the present time, at least in this country, with most favor. One of these is the definition in terms of the conservation of values, which originated with Höfding,⁵ and has recently been brilliantly defended by Irving King⁶ and Edward S. Ames.⁷ While most reviewers have recognized the merit of this definition in promoting the search for data and discovery of valuable psychological principles, many of them have criticised it as too broad and indefinite—as including more within the species of religion than properly belongs there. On the other hand, so far as I can recall, no critic has charged this definition with being too narrow in its scope. The other type of definition most in favor has been presented in various forms by a variety of writers, but has been most accurately stated by James H. Leuba,⁸ who defines religion as belief in a “psychic, superhuman power.” This definition, I believe, is usually thought to be the more clear-cut and definite, but to lack the breadth and suggestiveness of the former definition. It is more accurate, but less fruitful in stimulating to further investigation. In other words, it is too narrow in its scope, just as the first definition is too broad.

If, then, we proceed to seek the genus of our definition in the conception of religion as concerned with the conservation of values,

⁵ *Philosophy of Religion.*

⁶ *The Development of Religion.*

⁷ *The Psychology of Religious Experience.*

⁸ *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*, chap. vi; “Religion as a Factor in the Struggle for Life,” *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, II. The quoted phrase appears only in the latter article.

we shall be reasonably sure to obtain enough breadth and suggestiveness, and if we seek our differentia along the lines indicated by Professor Leuba, we shall be able to find a differentia accurate and specific enough to avoid the danger of confusing religion with related subjects.

The genus of the definition proposed is therefore this: *the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values*. This definition is broad enough, it is believed, to bring religion under a genus that includes every type of it. Of course the genus includes many other things besides—some phases, at least, of morals, ethics, art, science—but that is not our present concern; the differentia, later to be discussed, will exclude these.

Each expression in the genus has been chosen advisedly. "Endeavor" makes it clear that the attempt to secure the conservation of values need not prove successful, even in the subjective belief of the follower of the religion. If he is making the endeavor he is making use of religion, though he do so with little faith, and afterward fully recognize the futility of his attempt. Thus Clovis may have had little faith in his gods before he ceased praying to them, and his confidence in the Christ of Clotilda may have barely been enough to make it seem worth while to try upon the battle-field the experiment of praying: "Clotilda says that Thou art the Son of the living God, and that Thou dost give the victory to those that put their trust in Thee. I have besought my gods, but they give me no aid. I see well that their strength is naught. I beseech Thee, and I will believe in Thee, only save me from the hands of mine enemies."⁹

The genus states that religion is the endeavor to secure the conservation of *values*. These may of course be of any conceivable sort. They have included almost everything that is a conscious object of desire. Food, the scalps and heads of enemies, deliverance from pestilence and disaster, riches, long life, posterity, counsel as to the future, fame, courage, wisdom, justice, forgiveness from sin, regeneration, Nirvana, blessedness, are only a few of the many values, private and public, that human beings have sought to conserve through religious means. As civilizations progress and

⁹ Munro and Sellery, *Mediaeval Civilization*, p. 80.

moral insight advances, the values sought through religion become more moral and spiritual; and to an increasing extent values involving self-feeling and other self-conscious attitudes become prized more highly than those that refer exclusively to external objects and conditions.¹⁰

Our genus further asserts that values, in order to become religious, must be *socially recognized*. By this expression full recognition is accorded to the evidence given by W. Robertson Smith regarding the Semites,¹¹ and extended by Professor King to other races, that practices, if really religious, conserve values that the tribe recognizes, and are at least not inimical to its interests. On the other hand, the more vague and unqualified term "social values" is avoided. Properly understood, the adjective "social" can here only mean what is more precisely described as "socially recognized." To be sure, there is a sense in which language is of "social" origin, and probably all conceptual thinking; and according to Baldwin¹² and others even the self is a "social" construction. Cooley¹³ has shown that private reflection is often "social" in the sense that in our own private thought we often carry on imaginary conversations with ourselves. A bomb-throwing anarchist in the course of his own private and intensely anti-social thinking may make use of word imagery and concepts, carry on imaginary conversations with himself, and be keenly aware of his own personal identity as opposed to other *alteri*: shall we therefore call his thinking "social"? Used in this very broad sense, of course all religious values, and all values of every sort, even the most egoistic and anti-social, can be dubbed "social"! But surely such instances as an African native's prayer to the river-spirit to upset his enemy's canoe and destroy him,¹⁴ and Hannah's prayer that she might bear a son are to be interpreted as cases in which the worshipers are thinking of what they regard

¹⁰ Cf. Lovejoy, "The Desires of the Self-Conscious," *Columbia Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, etc.*, IV, 29-39; and Coe's review of Ames's book in the *American Journal of Theology*, XV, 305.

¹¹ *The Religion of the Semites*.

¹² *Social and Ethical Interpretations*.

¹³ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 52 ff.; 359 ff.

¹⁴ Mary H. Kingsley, *West African Studies*, p. 359.

as their own private desires, and not as matters of any great concern to their tribes.¹⁵ It would therefore be misleading to call such values social from the subjective viewpoint of our definition. However, it is true that such values are socially recognized. Vengeance is legitimate and commendable according to West African ethics; to bear children was a great blessing, and to be barren a great misfortune in the opinion of Hebrew women of Hannah's time. Religious values, therefore, may be either personal or social in the thought of a worshiper; but they are always values of which his group approves, and in this sense "socially recognized."

Moreover, the endeavor is to secure the *conservation* of socially recognized values. The word "conservation" is not very satisfactory, but is the best that has yet been suggested. A person first recognizes something as a value, and then seeks to conserve it through religious means. Religion is thus thoroughly instrumental, a means to an end; it is not the discoverer of new values, but the conservator of values already appreciated. So while Todas seek the welfare of the buffalo cows and the purity of their milk through a ritual, and native Australians seek to conserve the lore of their fathers through initiation ceremonies, and American parents dedicate their children to the Christian faith at their baptism, the values implied in these practices were first recognized as values before the ceremonies properly became religious.

The definition here defended is entirely in agreement with Professor King's probable theory that religious ceremonies have often arisen from actions that originally were performed instinctively or habitually, without conscious values being attached to them.¹⁶ In such cases three stages are distinguishable: (1) the habitual, unappreciated action; (2) the action, perhaps as a result of inhibition, becomes an object of general conscious attention and effort, and hence involves a socially recognized value; (3) the endeavor to conserve this socially recognized value through religious means, as set forth in our definition as a whole. If the Eucharist developed from an original social meal, as is sometimes

¹⁵ In this connection Professor Fite's protest, "The Exaggeration of the Social," *Columbia Journal of Philosophy, etc.*, IV, 393 ff., and the systematic treatment in his *Individualism* deserve careful attention.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, chaps. iii-v.

conjectured, it became a religious sacrament only when it reached the third stage. Professor King's theory of the origin of value, and the manner in which it becomes self-conscious, and, as I should say, socially recognized, can therefore be accepted, and the differentiation between religious values and other kinds of socially recognized values can be regarded as appearing after the emergence of socially recognized values in general. My differentia, later to be explained, will show the difference between religious values and other socially recognized values. Perhaps an imperfect comparison will make my position clearer. William James has somewhere said that "truth happens to an idea," that ideas first come into existence, and later sometimes become true. In a somewhat similar way I should say that socially recognized values first come into existence, and later some of them become religious. Religiosity "happens" to them when endeavor is made to conserve them in the manner set forth in our definition as a whole.

From the fact that religion is conservative of values already recognized, it does not follow that it is necessarily reactionary, though perhaps its chief peril is the danger of becoming so. It is possible for a religion to be progressive and constantly to endeavor to conserve new values. Values need only become socially recognized before a live and growing religion can adopt them, impart to them its sanction, and so afford them increased strength and stability. Christianity in ancient times assimilated and so conserved many of the best features of Greek philosophy and Roman law; it conserved and elevated what was best and most manly in mediaeval warfare through the institution of chivalry; in modern times the disciples of Luther, Calvin, and Loyola each in their own way have conserved the independent worth of the individual man; and in our own day there are indications that it is already beginning to throw the protection of its conserving mantle around the newly discovered categories of social justice with a celerity that is surprising when we consider how very recently these values have come into social recognition, and how radically opposed they are to the individualism of the century immediately preceding us.

Again, while strongly sympathizing with Professor Ames's¹⁷ desire that religion shall conserve all the *highest* values, and while believing that this is the conception of religion which it is everyone's duty to seek to make a reality both in his own private life and in society, yet this seems to me to be a norm or an ideal for present endeavor and future attainment, and not a descriptive statement unqualifiedly applicable to all religions of the past and present. Istar, the primitive Semitic goddess, seems to have been thought to require of all women the sacrifice of their chastity as a religious duty long after womanly purity had come to be appreciated as a higher moral value.¹⁸ The Olympian gods must have ceased to stand in the Hellenic mind for the highest values long before they ceased to be worshiped, or a more spiritual religion, able to assist in conserving their highest moral values, had become known to them. Even today many a Protestant minister may feel it to be his religious duty to preach vehemently against prize-fights in Nevada and Sunday baseball games, who would not use his pulpit to denounce the election of Senator Lorimer or to plead for higher wages for shop girls in city department stores. This may not at all mean that purity in politics and living wages for working girls do not seem to him the higher values; but because they are not values with which religion has been concerned in the past, he feels that they are secular matters involving political and economic questions in regard to which the minister of religion should be neutral. That we believe the minister to be mistaken in his judgment is irrelevant. His religious attitude is a fact, of which a subjective definition must take account.

If, then, our genus is sufficiently broad to cover all varieties of religion, we are now ready to consider the differentia, and to decide whether the latter is narrow enough to distinguish religion from all *other* endeavors to secure the conservation of socially recognized values.¹⁹ The differentia is, *through specific actions that are believed to evoke some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings, and that imply a feeling of dependence upon this agency.*

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, *passim*.

¹⁸ W. Robertson Smith, *op. cit.*, 2d ed., p. 59.

¹⁹ Other endeavors are made through science, law, government, art, literature, etc. I recognize the existence of secular agencies, and that they are often successful and commendable.

Each term in the differentia is necessarily employed with a wide denotation, but will not seem vague when explained. No one can be more painfully aware of the ponderousness of the differentia than the writer, but he feels that it is less serious for a definition to be clumsy and technical than for it to be illogical by failing to mark off the precise boundaries of the term defined. That the definition is of practical value will be shown later, but first the terms of the differentia require explanation in detail.

"Specific actions" rather than ritual has been employed in order to make it clear that it includes any kind of act whatsoever that has been employed to serve the purpose—whether a dance about an arrow, a magic spell or incantation, an initiation or *Intichiuma* ceremony, counting the beads of a rosary, repeating the mystic word "Om," or the sacred *Allah il Allah*, or purely mental acts like concentrating one's thought upon the eightfold path of the Buddha, thoughtful meditation upon the meaning of life or the sublimity of nature, or the silent prayer a Christian might momentarily make when confronted by a sudden emergency. Such an action, whatever it may be, is always, in the mind of him who makes it, definite and specific. *It is a distinct act of his consciousness, enlisting in his service an agency other than the ego of that moment of his consciousness for the purpose of securing a value.* This characterization applies to all religious actions, and effectively differentiates them from non-religious actions.

The differentia proceeds to describe the agency employed. It is "some agency different from the ordinary ego of the individual, or from other merely human beings." This is only so general as is necessary to cover all the facts. The agency greatly varies in different religions, and is variously regarded by different individuals of the same religious faith. It may be some mysterious impersonal power in things known as *manitou*, or *wakonda*, or *mana*,²⁰ it may be a totem pole or a fetich or a charm or an amulet, a dead or living animal; it may be the visual image of *Humanité* in the features of one's own wife or mother;²¹ it may be the Blessed Virgin Mary or one of the saints; it may be Nature as conceived

²⁰ King, *op. cit.*, chap. vi.

²¹ Graham Wallas has given an interesting psychological explanation of this feature of Comte's religion, *Human Nature in Politics*, pp. 69 ff.

by a romantic poet like Shelley or a philosopher like Marcus Aurelius; it may be the deceased spirit of one's father, or it may be some other spirit or god or God; or it may simply be the reserve outlooks and vistas furnished by one's own subconscious self as the result of mystic trance or rational meditation. The agency may even be a human being like an Egyptian king or a Roman emperor provided he is believed to be not *merely* human, but in some respect divine.²² The expression as stated in the definition is believed to be broad enough to include every agency through which the conservation of values has been sought, or conceivably could be sought, in a manner that the seeker himself would regard as religious.²³

While it is my own belief that the agency tends to be thought of as personal, and that a personal monotheistic God is both intellectually and morally the most satisfying way to conceive of this agency, and that in the religion of the future the agency will so be conceived, it is impossible to ignore the well-established fact that not only have there been highly developed atheistic and pantheistic religions in the past, but that at the present time the conception of a personal God is not at all prominent or important in the minds of a few sincerely devout and profoundly religious people.²⁴ Consequently it is impossible to describe the agency as necessarily personal in a psychological definition that is descriptive and not normative.

The last clause of the differentia is intended to complete the differentiation of religion from science, and also to emphasize an

²² Frazer gives numerous instances of the worship of living human beings, *Golden Bough*, I, 139-66.

²³ The very wide denotation of the differentia is illustrated by the following incident. While I was writing this paper, a friend came into my office, and remarked that he did not know if he was religious or not, that he is not sure whether he believes in the existence of a God at all, and that this question does not interest him; but that he does believe that society is now advancing toward higher things, and that the universe is so organized as always to make a forward progress possible provided we do our part. In answer to my question, he added that he likes to meditate upon society and the world in this way, that it gives him confidence and a better grip upon himself. We decided that his deliberately putting himself in this contemplative attitude for the purpose of moral reinforcement is an instance of religion, and is included by the definition.

²⁴ J. H. Leuba, "The Contents of Religious Consciousness," *Monist*, XV, 536-73.

important aspect of the religious attitude. The scientific attitude toward nature always, as Professor Leuba has shown,²⁵ reveals a mechanical exploitation of nature. Nature is inert, passive, and man may bend and manipulate it according to his needs if he discovers the "laws" of nature, which are of course only descriptive formulae of the succession of phenomena. On the other hand, the religious attitude always implies a "feeling of dependence" toward power greater than our ordinary selves, and not an attempt to exploit this power.²⁶ As religions evolve, the affective attitude toward the agency is vastly enriched, and tends to become a feeling, not only of dependence, but also of obligation, admiration, love, and spiritual aspiration.

The important aspect of the religious attitude emphasized in this last clause is that of feeling. The very great importance of this has been eloquently set forth by Auguste Sabatier,²⁷ and, with more accurate psychological analysis, by Professor Starbuck²⁸ and Professor Pratt.²⁹ Not only does all valuation involve feeling, but this phase is more prominent in religion than in morals or ethics, or perhaps even aesthetics. The richness, warmth, and depth of religious feeling in its real worth and inner meaning can never be justly interpreted by the intellectual categories of the psychologist—thin, cold-blooded, and abstract as they necessarily are. As no one but the lover can describe his affection for his beloved, and his language conveys only to other lovers any comprehension of what he really feels, so only the saint and mystic can interpret the love of God, and they only to those who have experienced like rapture. While all psychologists must confess that intellectual analysis cannot penetrate and much less appreciate the mysteries of the heart, nevertheless most of them would probably refuse to accept as established fact the claim of Pro-

²⁵ *The Psychological Origin and Nature of Religion*, chap. ii.

²⁶ Malebranche speaks as if man may exploit God temporarily, but of course he does not think of this as religious. *Recherche de la vérité*, chap. ii, p. 76. Cf. W. K. Wright, *The Ethical Significance of Feeling*, etc., p. 19.

²⁷ *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*.

²⁸ "The Feelings and their Place in Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, I, 168-86.

²⁹ *The Psychology of Religious Belief*.

fessor Starbuck that feeling is an independent source of knowledge, notwithstanding the circumstance that such a claim seems to have been favored by the high authority of William James.³⁰ While this claim certainly deserves careful consideration, it is much more prudent for a definition of religion at present to view feeling exclusively in its affective function as a phase of the general conative attitude that has been described.

Although the differentia has largely been derived from a study of Professor Leuba's contributions,³¹ his expression "psychic, superhuman power" has been avoided. The instances cited by Professor King and Professor Ames of religion prior to the recognition of psychical agency, the difficulty of bringing esoteric Buddhism under this head, and the contemporary "religion of science"³² furnish good reasons for avoiding the term "psychic." "Superhuman" seems hardly a correct description for cases where individuals admit that they may be drawing upon their own subconscious or other reserve powers, and that while they know that they are drawing upon an agency other than the conscious ego of the moment, they are not sure that they are going outside the total sum of their own psychical resources.³³ The term "anthropopathic" seems unexceptionable as employed by Professor Leuba, but would be a dangerous term if it came into general use, and became adopted by less careful writers. It suggests too much affinity with "anthropomorphism" and the "pathetic fallacy," which though often found in religion are by no means universal properties of it.³⁴

³⁰ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, concluding chapters.

³¹ See footnote 8, above.

³² I think that Haeckel's "natural religion," *The Riddle of the Universe*, pp. 300, 306, chap. xviii, etc., and even the forlorn but resolute attitude toward the universe expressed in Huxley's *Romanes Lecture* are religious.

³³ Professor Leuba's own articles mention instances. The most striking case which I have seen reported is given by Miss Tanner, *Psychological Bulletin*, 1907, pp. 33-36.

³⁴ That is, if these terms are used with reproach. If a realist chooses to use these terms so broadly as to regard the individual's belief in other personalities, when he can only see the bodies of other men, as "anthropomorphic," or "pathetic," we can hardly object to his describing religion thus. It is obviously no reproach to religion to be classified as coming under the sole process by which any of us can escape

The present definition is compatible with Professor Coe's very suggestive conception of religious value:

Something like this is characteristic of the religious attitude universally. Through all the differentiations and enrichments of human purpose, a god, or some functional equivalent, has served as a concrete expression of a tendency to subsume particular values in a single type in such a way that they are not only included within it, but also raised, so to speak, to a higher power of themselves.³⁵

According to this theory, religion evidently seeks the conservation of value through an agency other than the individual's ordinary ego, and therefore our definition regards a part of Professor Coe's interpretation of religious value as a descriptive statement of fact. Undoubtedly too, as religions have advanced, the tendency for these values to be raised "to a higher power of themselves" has increased. And all must agree that his noble conception of religious value as a summation or synthesis of all values in a unitary whole indicates what at any rate ought to be the line of present religious endeavor, and constitutes a splendid ideal which the influence of such inspiring prophets as Professor Coe is doing much to make an actuality.

The various religious phenomena which the psychologist interprets can all be brought under our definition. Prayer, for instance, whenever it is clearly distinguishable from the spell, is the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through "an imaginative social process"³⁶ or conversation between the ordinary ego of the individual and the agency invoked. Sacrifice is the offering of gifts to propitiate the agency. All religious ceremonials consist chiefly in elaborations of prayer and sacrifice. Sacraments are rites which are believed either spiritually or magically to effect some desired change in the believer by means of the agency invoked. The evangelical revival or mission is a solipsism! Professor R. B. Perry makes a good working distinction when he says that, though the religious consciousness creates a working relationship between man and the universe, this is not a case of the pathetic fallacy unless it incorrectly *reckons with the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe* (*Approach to Philosophy*, p. 111).

³⁵ *Columbia Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, etc.*, 1908, p. 253.

³⁶ Anna L. Strong, *The Psychology of Prayer*; Ames, *op. cit.*, chap. viii; Farnell, *The Evolution of Religion*, Lecture IV.

different device to secure a similar purpose; and conversion and sanctification are changes in the personality of the individual attributed to a divine agency. Myths, whenever they have religious significance at all,³⁷ are naïve attempts to account for the origin and validity of practices employed in religion, while doctrines and creeds are more elaborate rational and philosophical explanations and justifications. Institutions, like the church or synagogue, are organizations for the purpose of preserving and propagating methods of religious endeavor for the conservation of socially recognized values. The central feature of all religion is this endeavor, as set forth in our definition; and the various details of sacrifice, prayer, and other ritual, and the rise of myths, dogmas, and institutions are incidents that appear in the carrying-out of the endeavor.

In the next place let us consider whether our definition has succeeded in differentiating religion from the terms with which it is most often confused: animism and magic, in the case of primitive religions, and morals, ethics, and aesthetics, in the case of higher religions.

Animism and magic may or may not be religious. They become religious when employed in the endeavor to secure the conservation of socially recognized values. Otherwise they are non-religious and on occasion they may become anti-religious. Magic employed in Buddhistic prayer wheels and the Christian sign of the cross is religious; while witches' charms used to secure what the individual's conscience regards as wrong³⁸ because it is inimical to the recognized social values of his tribe is black magic, and anti-religious. The simple belief in spirits about one is animism, and may be entirely non-religious. The endeavor to induce these spirits by means of offerings to adopt a desired attitude so as to conserve socially recognized values, is a religious use of animism.³⁹

³⁷ Myths are often, of course, aesthetic or speculative descriptions of the unknown, having nothing to do with religion as here conceived.

³⁸ The clearest statements of this view of conscience are by Mezes, *Ethics, Descriptive and Explanatory*, pp. 130-33; 163-84; and Dewey and Tufts, *Ethics*, Part I.

³⁹ This is true, even if the attitude desired is the simple departure of the spirits, which Jane E. Harrison believes to have been the chief religious motive of most Greeks in the sixth century B.C., *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, pp. 7 ff.

This definition therefore renders possible a clearer-cut statement of the relationship between animism, magic, and religion than has characterized most of the literature of the subject. Of course it must be frankly admitted that any definition of religion will necessarily appear somewhat artificial when applied to primitive peoples who often do not have these words in their vocabularies, and do not distinguish religion in their own minds from magic and morals. But the distinction as here given can be successfully employed wherever it is practicable to employ the term religion at all in interpreting their subjective attitudes.

The distinction between religion and morals is not to be made in terms of the content of judgments of good and evil. There is no moral content that is always religious, and none that is always non-religious. The values of religion are all in some sense moral values, though they are occasionally outworn moral values that have survived from a bygone age. What furnishes the differentia of religious from merely moral value is the peculiar nature of the *agency* through which the religious value is conserved. As our definition states, the religious agency involves a power different from ordinary human activity, evoked through some peculiar and specific act that partakes more or less of the nature of ritual. Which of the values of a tribe will be attached to this agency and so become religious depends in part upon what other agencies are also open to them, between which they can make a selection. In the case of a primitive people the values which they cannot otherwise secure are likely to be those which will become religious. Food, and protection from, and victory over, enemies are primitive religious values when food is scarce and enemies numerous and dangerous. With advance in civilization the values sought to be conserved through religion become limited, both by the experience that some things desired cannot be obtained in this way, and also by the rising conviction that religious worship should be confined to higher and more spiritual values, and not cheapened by the search through it for more sordid and material advantages.⁴⁰

The distinction between religion and ethics is similar. Ethics is the attempt to put morals upon a systematic basis by philo-

⁴⁰ Strong, *op. cit.*, chap. ii.

sophically defining and defending its principles. Religion is one of the agencies available for conserving some of the values recognized by ethics. As society advances the general tendency is for religion increasingly to conserve the more important ethical values. This tendency, already marked in the nature religions, becomes the rule in the ethical religions. The chief exception to this general tendency is due to the conservatism of religion, which causes it sometimes to remain attached to less important ethical values than those for which contemporary moral reformers and ethical philosophers are contending. The exponents of religion were thus on the side opposed to the best ethical thought of their times in ancient Israel in the period preceding the exile and in Athens in the time of Socrates. It would, however, be incorrect to say that in a conflict between religion and ethics the latter is always right and religion always wrong. A modern instance to the contrary would be the somewhat shallow and over-rationalized sophistication of certain eighteenth-century philosophers in contrast with the religious thought of their times.

The differentiation of religion from aesthetics is also provided for in our definition by the emphasis upon the *agency* employed. The religious endeavor is never an end in itself. Religious interest is always mediated. Aesthetic contemplation is interesting on its own account; it is an end in itself. Religious meditation and prayer are always for the sake of conserving socially recognized values important to the believer at other times even more than at the moment of worship. Religious values are always deadly earnest, and there is genuine faith in the agency invoked. True, religion may make use of aesthetic agencies in order to impress its values, and make them more attractive. But in this case the position of art is very humble. She is only the handmaiden of religion, who herself is the servant employed by humanity in the most serious business of life. And as the lot of the slave is seldom enviable, the position of art in religious worship has frequently been undignified, and very poor art has often met with more favor on the part of religion than its exclusively aesthetic value could have warranted. Moreover, ages of comparative religious shallowness like the Italian renaissance have often produced the

finest religious art; while, as in the case of the Puritans, movements of deep religious earnestness have sometimes rejected the services of art altogether. The differences between religion and aesthetics are so great, and the resemblances so superficial, that one wonders how the two could ever have been confused. The blunder could have been made only by chance tourists who have visited the temple of religion, admired the splendid statues and altars, sniffed the incense, listened to the music, gazed at the beautiful frescoes, and gone away fancying that these features, the merest external adornments and veriest accidents of religion, constituted her heartfelt purpose.

Nor is the religious symbol a case of make-believe in the playful, aesthetic sense. Religious symbols vary infinitely. Within Christianity symbols have been partly material—images and pictures—and partly verbal figures of speech, such as characterizing God as a "King" or "Father," and Christ as an "elder brother." Whether material or mental, the function of the symbol is to furnish more concrete and tangible imagery for profound and perhaps otherwise inexpressible meaning. In this sense the symbol is a representative device, just as a national flag is a representative device, though in reality only a piece of bunting; and, like the flag, the religious symbol gets its significance from values believed to be genuine and existential.⁴

Far from being sportive or playful in character, symbolism is one of the most important and serious instruments through which religion achieves its purpose. By means of symbolism, religion conserves moral values by representing them, not in coldly intellectual form, but embodied in powerful emotional imagery so earnest and so affecting as to grip the hearts and transform the inner lives of all men. Noble-minded Pharisees and Stoics had long preached to Hebrew and Graeco-Roman civilizations nearly all the moral values which the new Testament contains. Only, however, when the conceptions of Messiah and Logos could be recognized concretely and humanly in the person of the infant Jesus borne by a virgin mother in Augustus' time, grown into manhood to be the forgiving Christ that had suffered and died upon

⁴ In an ontological sense, so far as the worshiper is capable of such a conception.

a cross in Tiberius' time,⁴² and still operating in the vividly concrete and tangible baptismal water and eucharistic bread and wine, could these conceptions become in any sense vital in the inner feelings and experiences of all classes of men, and cause to be assimilated such inestimably rich but theretofore external moral values as universal human brotherhood, self-sacrifice, and charity.

Though religious worship and sociability are often combined, the two interests are quite distinct. Thus many primitive feasts and dances are seasons of playfulness, and yet have a religious aspect, and are institutions of social control.⁴³ At the present time many American Protestant churches make so much of social entertainments that European visitors have called them "social clubs." A little reflection will convince the reader, however, that the entertainments are valued by primitive priests and modern religious workers, not primarily because they afford amusement, but for serious ulterior purposes. So far as such entertainments are religious at all, it is because they appeal to a mediate interest.⁴⁴

Our subjective definition of religion has now been set forth, and it has been shown that it is successful in revealing the relationships and differences between religion, magic, morals, ethics, and aesthetics. However, perhaps the reader now feels that after all the definition merely affords a descriptive formulation of religion and assists in placing it in a classification with other disciplines, but that it does not throw much light upon the questions in which he is most interested. He perhaps protests: What light does this subjective definition throw upon the actual function of religion in human society? Does it throw any light upon the still more important question whether religion is merely imaginative suggestion and superstition, or a veritable source of knowledge about the universe?

⁴² It seems to me that one of the main psychological advantages that Christianity had in its contest with Mithraism for supremacy was the immeasurably more concrete and human appeal of a symbolism grown up about the incident of Golgotha than any that could grow up about the killing of a bull.

⁴³ King, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 f.

⁴⁴ For the distinction between mediate and immediate interest and the identification of the latter with play, see Dewey's pamphlet, *Interest as Related to Will*, pp. 15 ff. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1903).

These two questions, which for convenience may be called the sociologico-historical and the metaphysical, are of course extremely difficult, and within the limits of this paper can only briefly be touched upon. However, it can be shown that our definition is of some assistance in defining both of these problems, and in affording some hints as to their solution.

To consider the sociologico-historical problem first. The investigator of this problem will first need to know what actions, customs, beliefs, rites, and institutions in any society are to be classified as religious. Our definition will serve as a guide in ascertaining this. Having accomplished this classification, the inquirer will be ready to face the question: How far do these religious acts succeed in conserving values? He will at once discover that sometimes the religious endeavor is successful, and sometimes it is not. The Australian initiation ceremonies undoubtedly do make the boys feel manly responsibilities, and they do promote good-will and solidarity within the tribe. They thus really serve the social function aimed at. On the other hand, the religio-magical ceremonies for increasing the supply of totemic plants and animals obviously are not successful; we must regard them as mere superstition. Again, sometimes the religious acts are successful, but for other reasons than the worshipers suppose. For instance, Miss Kingsley says that in some African tribes spirits act as the police force:

You will see this strikingly illustrated when, as you walk along a bush path far from human habitation, you notice a little cleared space by the side of the path; it is neatly laid with plantain leaves, and on it are various little articles for sale—leaf tobacco, a few yams, and so on, and beside each article are so many stones, beans, or cowries, which indicate the price of each article, and you will see, either sitting in the middle of the things, or swinging by a bit of Tie Tie from a branch above, Egba or a relation of his—the market god—who will visit with death any theft from the shop, or any cheating in price given, or any taking-away of sums left by previous customers.⁴⁵

While it is clear that religion effects the security of a socially recognized value in this last instance, it does so by means of suggestive fear, and not through the spiritual agency imagined by the natives.

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 408.

In all cases of religious endeavor the investigator will find, I believe, that, whether the socially recognized value directly aimed at in the religious act is conserved or not, and whether it is conserved in the way worshipers imagine or in some different way, religion always performs one function. This function is to effect a certain amount of social and moral solidarity and conservatism within the group of worshipers. Furthermore, an empirical study will show that as a rule this function of religion is beneficial. Society needs a strong conservative, centripetal agency to solidify its forces and keep it from losing the values it has learned to recognize and appreciate. In performing this socializing and conserving function, religion is comparable to political, moral, and economic forces as a factor of prime importance and value in the evolution of the human race. The great service of religion in knitting men together and keeping them loyal to the achievements of past generations (which in any age must be immeasurably greater than whatever new ideas religion has not yet had time to assimilate) is so great that one wonders why it has not been more emphasized. In comparison with other religions, one great point of superiority on the part of Christianity is that it has performed this function more effectively and more in adjustment with the other factors that make for progress. In the Occident at least, Christianity has never for any great length of time been a drag upon real progress, while it has conserved and heightened moral consciousness in every age, and several times has probably saved civilization from serious disaster.⁴⁶

That Christianity has, however, sometimes been more effective as a conservator of socially recognized values than at others is illustrated by a comparison between the religious history of France and England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Within the state church in France Ultramontanism secured a complete triumph during the reign of Louis XV, with the consequence that, thenceforth it could conserve only those values already recognized,

⁴⁶ E.g., at the fall of the Roman empire. The development of rationalism and free scientific inquiry and criticism, which began to be destructive with the modern Enlightenment period, was not attended by the irresistible moral and social decay of the Greek enlightenment, in consequence of Christianity.

or such new values as could win the approval, not only of the French clerics, but also of the foreign Curia at Rome. No merely national movement of moral revival or enthusiasm that in any way conflicted with the established inheritance of the past could receive religious sanction. Consequently eighteenth-century reformers in France sprang up entirely without the church, and felt that religion was their bitterest enemy, and Voltaire's epithet *l'infame* expressed their general attitude. Since the Revolution, the divergence between religious faith and political and social progress has widened, and the inadequacy of the Roman Catholic religion as a conserver of modern French values has become more and more painfully apparent. The condemnation of such a socially and morally helpful and seemingly theologically harmless organization as the Sillon is a recent illustration of the complete hopelessness of the present situation. With the church ineffective as a centripetal force, the centrifugal forces broke all bounds during the Revolution; and, since, the nation has had to develop as best it could, handicapped by the ineffectiveness of what normally should have been a conservative without being an obstructive force in its life. Notwithstanding its deplorable maladjustment, however, the church has doubtless on the whole exercised a beneficent influence in all periods of French history, including the present.

On the other hand, though the Church of England contained about the same abuses as the French church at the opening of the eighteenth century, it was English to the core, and an organic part of the national life. The latitudinarian policy of its rulers did much to win the good-will of dissenters, and to render all classes contented, and loyal to the reigning dynasty. Dead as the early eighteenth-century church seemed to be, as a consequence of perhaps exaggerated anxiety to avoid the follies and extravagances of the "enthusiasm" of the previous century, the fires of religion were only slumbering, and quickened to new life in the mid-eighteenth-century evangelical and early nineteenth-century tractarian movements. One of the forces that helped to save England from turbulent revolutions like those across the Channel was the healthfully conservative but not excessively reactionary influence of religion.

To make it clear that the comparison just given is not intended to be a partisan brief for Protestantism, one might add that in the seventeenth century conditions were reversed. Catholicism was then a healthy factor in the French national life; while prior to 1688 religion had been out of adjustment in England. The emphatic nationalism of the last century has probably been the chief reason for the maladjustment of the Ultramontane Roman church in many Latin countries. With the growth of internationalism, which seems likely to be a characteristic mark of our century, as illustrated just now in the peace and labor movements, it is quite possible that the universal Roman Catholic church, if reasonably modernized, may through its cosmopolitan character and spirit do much to bind the nations together, and to conserve the moral values of international concord, good-will, law, and justice. Modern Judaism has admirably performed the conserving functions of religion, and held before its worshipers lofty moral and spiritual ideals: until recently its chief limitation, now showing signs of happily being overcome, has been an inclination to confine somewhat the extension of its socially recognized values to those within its own communion.

No student of American history can fail to recognize the immense value of religion as a factor in our national development, keeping us in some measure true to the ideals of our fathers, sobering our consciences, and preventing us from becoming wholly sordid in the tremendous industrial and commercial expansion through which we have passed. The fact that our moral conceptions have at all stood the strain of this rapid material development, and that political and social corruption and decay in America today are not hopeless and irremediable as they were in Rome during the last century of the Republic, is due, I believe, chiefly to the vitality of religion among us as a factor effectively conservative of our socially recognized values. So far as this is not fully appreciated, the explanation probably is that the very great diversity of confessions in America, due to our diverse origin, has kept religious bodies from co-operating as effectively as they should to further their common purposes. There has also, of course, been a failure to conserve religiously the newly found, but in our present con-

ditions supremely important, values of social justice,⁴⁷ such as equality of opportunity, just wages, sanitation, pure food, suppression of white slavery, honest stocks and bonds, conservation of national resources, and the like. But all indications point to the not far-distant overcoming of both of these defects.

In estimating the social function of religion the immense value of its apparently more individual aspects, like the expansion and enrichment of one's personality through meditation, prayer, and conversion, should also be taken into account. Spatial limitations permit only a reference here, however, to this side of religion, which, besides, has been psychologically treated in the well-known works of James, Starbuck, Coe, Cutten, and others. Its supreme importance is illustrated by the decline of the ancient Roman religion, largely due, as Professor William Warde Fowler⁴⁸ believes, to its too exclusive concern with the interests of the family and state, and consequent neglect of the inner life experiences and needs of individuals.

No psychological interpretation can of course claim to settle the question of the metaphysical validity of religion. However, if religion as here defined has performed the social function claimed for it, most philosophers will admit that any adequate conception of reality must afford it some recognition, although, of course, they may believe that theological structures cannot in the nature of the case be more secure than the philosophical foundations on which they are erected. The three philosophical schools of our generation that have the largest following in America are those of absolute idealism, realism, and pragmatism. While the absolute idealist may hesitate to accord religion a place fully equivalent with philosophy as an interpretation of the Absolute, he will at least regard it as one of the very highest orders of appearance;⁴⁹ and science, we must remember, for him is no more. The younger

⁴⁷ Cf. James H. Tufts, "The Adjustment of the Church to the Psychological Conditions of the Present," *American Journal of Theology*, 1908, pp. 177-88, for constructive suggestions.

⁴⁸ *The Religious Experience of the Roman People*, pp. 287, 340 f., 358, and *passim*.

⁴⁹ Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, pp. 381-407; *Problem of Conduct*, chap. viii; Royce, *World and the Individual*, *passim*; Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2d ed., pp. 438-54, 531-33.

realists have not yet so fully developed their philosophy as to make its religious implications clear. However, the definition here advanced in its emphasis upon religion as a practical attitude bears a good deal of resemblance to Professor Perry's interpretation, although it puts more emphasis upon conation and less upon belief.⁵⁰ Of course the definition of religion here defended, being functional, has most affinity to the pragmatism of the Chicago school. From their point of view, if it be conceded that religion has played the functional part in social evolution here claimed for it, this fact would seem to warrant full recognition of its claims to metaphysical validity, the only qualification possibly being, as Professor King remarks, "If the question of the reality of the order of existence postulated by religion is raised, we should have to say that probably all the concepts of religion fall *short* of an adequate account of experience rather than that they attribute too *much* to it."⁵¹ Our interpretation furnishes support to such defenses of religion as Professor Foster's.⁵² It is also in accordance with those features in the philosophy of William James that have been accepted by other pragmatists, without being committed to his bolder speculations upon mysticism, telepathy, the subconscious, and the like.⁵³

The upshot of the matter, as is known to the sober student of the history of philosophy who does not allow his perspective to be lost in the cloud of dust that always accompanies contemporary controversies, is that every system of metaphysics is an attempt to interpret the implications of the experience of the age. If religion is a vital factor in this experience, as I believe sociological and historical investigations must show it always is, metaphysicians will be only too glad to afford religion as much validity as is necessary to insure its intelligent and effective employment for the phases of experience in which it is found to be practically useful.

⁵⁰ *Approach to Philosophy*, pp. 53-114; *Harvard Theological Review*, II, 183-85.

⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 340 f.

⁵² *The Finality of the Christian Religion; The Function of Religion in Man's Struggle for Existence*.

⁵³ Two valuable theological estimates of pragmatism are: Lyman's *Theology and Human Problems*; and D. C. Macintosh, "Can Pragmatism Furnish a Philosophical Basis for Theology?" *Harvard Theological Review*, III, 126-35.

In a word, the social and personal usefulness of religion once established, the question of its metaphysical validity will largely take care of itself.

In conclusion, then, it is claimed that the subjective definition of religion formulated in the earlier part of this paper has proved adequate to cover the facts, and to differentiate religion from related subjects; that the definition is of further practical value in furnishing a preliminary step toward the solution of the problem of the social function of religion, and indicates that religion, at least when rightly adjusted, has performed an important and valuable function in modern life; and, if this last claim is accepted, that the validity of religious faith can be successfully defended upon the ground of contemporary metaphysics.

THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF JESUS IN ITS STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS

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It is not quite easy to define with recognizable precision the group or party whose conception of Jesus this paper is meant to scrutinize. To represent them, for instance, as only the Ritschlian school under another name would be absurd. This is a favorite device with those who wish to blacken the character of German theologians, as a body, and who conceal ignorance under strong invective; but among instructed readers it will fail. Thinkers of the caliber of Herrmann, Haering, or Kaftan can not be described as "liberals" by any who have a conscience about words. Nor is it particularly illuminating to say that liberals are advocates of the "New Theology"—a term now fortunately almost discarded. In a sense all workers in the theological field who are not rigorous traditionalists on principle may justly be denoted by the phrase "new theologians." It is the business of theology to be new each generation, to express the gospel in terms fitted to engage and win the contemporary mind charged with contemporary knowledge; and in point of fact conservatives and radicals alike have in the past shared the habit of remodeling doctrinal formulations as new facts emerged. Obviously, then, general appellations give us little help. We must begin by illustration.

A quotation from Wernle may serve as one point of departure.

We know [he writes] that above the general level of mankind rise the prophets and mediators, men who stand in an especially close relation to God and have an especial sense of being called by him, whose souls are full of the mysterious and wonderful, who breathe the air of eternity and behold visions of the world that lies beyond this outer world of phenomena. Amongst them we see Jesus. That which distinguishes him and places him apart from the others cannot perhaps be expressed theoretically at all, but we can do so prac-

tically by entering into his service and by doing his will as he bids us do it.

. . . So we testify unto men, in Jesus' own way, that he is our master and that he has made us at one with God.¹

In these sincere and moving words are manifest, I think, both the strength and the weakness of the liberal conception. "He has made us at one with God"—there lies its real strength. But Jesus, after all, has his place among the prophets, the seers—there equally lies its weakness. He is great and wonderful; but other ways also lead to the Father. In the class "mediators" he is first among his peers. This is the view of Jesus we are to examine; and in what follows I shall make frequent reference to the striking and impressive and typical article of Heitmüller on "Jesus Christ" in the new German encyclopedia *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. Let us signalize first the strong points in this modern interpretation.

1. Certain aspects of Jesus' human experience are made to stand out with extraordinary freshness. The myriad facets of his character, realized in reverent imaginative sympathy, are pictured in new and living colors. For such delicate and subtle work the scholarly mind has of late been well prepared. It has been prepared especially by the psychological methods of recent historical work whereby men have succeeded in feeling their way into ancient thought and life, playing the eavesdropper to old faiths, discerning the faintest tones of sentiment and emotion in the nobler worships of the past. Much has thus been gained for the study of Jesus. Men have striven to see him also in his familiar habit as he lived, to think his thoughts after him, to throw themselves into his unparalleled situation and listen to the very beating of his Jewish heart. I hesitate to say that the picture they have drawn is strong historically, since it will appear that certain cardinal factors of the historic reality have been obliterated; but at all events there has been a valuable endeavor to secure historic truth. We are shown how truly Jesus belonged to his human *milieu*; how his courage dealt with the religion and irreligion of that age and land; how his mind moved about in a world of ideas and imaginations now grown faint for us, and used them

¹ *Kirchenblatt* (1905), 184.

in his great way. Thought-forms used by him have been analyzed with endless care. It has been ascertained, for example, that in such things as belief in demon-possession and apocalyptic expectation his thought flowed in channels marked out by ancient religious tradition. Much has been said, and said worthily, respecting Jesus' natural temperament; and few will regret that in the newer light he appears less and less as the frail and shrinking figure pictured in certain types of devout literature and more and more as the august and commanding personality charged with a consciousness that in him God speaks to man. Not least notable, perhaps, the wondrous variety of qualities and attributes which, like rays flashing from the diamond, meet in his one person, has been revealed freshly. And for all this Jesus is the better known. About the edges of the great statue dust had gathered to obscure its finer lines, and of this some part, doubtless, has been brushed away.

In particular—though here the liberals have no monopoly of merit—we have a profounder sense of Jesus' piety. He is visible as one who dwelt with God in perfect faith and love and hope. "The nature and content of this his religious life," writes Heitmüller, "were extraordinarily plain and simple, and just for that reason so very deep-reaching. It was a life in God and with God—an immediate experience of him. God lives, God is present, God saves and judges, rules and will yet rule; here is the great undertone to which is attuned Jesus' religious life."² Scores of passages might be adduced to the same effect. *Jesus the Believer*—that, if the Epistle to the Hebrews may be trusted, is a cardinal aspect of the vast, rich truth; and we are in debt to the modern men who have forced us to see it more vividly than ever, to gaze on Jesus at prayer and to consider how much prayer was the vital pulse of his being. Everywhere religion was his prime care, and religion for him had its focus in God, personal, almighty, holy, near to man. The will-power that companied in Him with most tender inwardness of feeling drew its life from faith. His words, teachings, parables are clear windows through which we may read his own religious experience; and they reveal an inner being concentrated

² *Op. cit.*, III, 392.

with steadfast and unbroken intensity on the Father and his kingdom.

Doubtless it is a common argument in liberal pages that since Jesus prayed it is vain to speak of his higher nature. Yet prayer is essential for any Christology not frankly docetic. How could the Father be spiritually revealed save in the mirror of the Son's faith? God cannot be disclosed through communicated information, for words apart from a life of faith and love out of which they spring could have no convincing power.

But to have lit up freshly the piety of Jesus—how this raises the modern interpretation above the commonplaces and aridities of an older rationalism! Is it nothing to have it proclaimed by those who would stand "in the foremost files of time" that Jesus lived utterly in the Father, with a trust and love and joy unexampled and unconquerable? Or to have it agreed that he towers above mankind as the religious pioneer, whose great spirit founded the church and pervades it with reconciling energies to this hour? A wise man, though renouncing for himself the name of "liberal," will confess surely that materials for a better view are being prepared by liberal hands.

2. The impulse to dwell exclusively on the vital things in Christ is quickened. It was inevitable that dead matter of one and another sort should have lodged itself in the Christian tradition; our gratitude is owed to all who detect its presence and persuade us to revise our estimate of its value. It is not so much, perhaps, that the thought-forms recommended by these moderns are much better—I cannot think they are—but at least our attention is loudly called to the necessity of reminting the old coinage. Thus by persistent scholarly discussion they raise in our minds the question whether in explaining Jesus we are obliged to make room for each minute detail of New Testament Christology. A man starts up to ask, Can Jesus have believed himself Messiah? and whatever our opinion of his answer, at least he compels us to inquire whether messiahship, as a category, is equal to Jesus. Words in short, even New Testament words, are of less consequence than the realities they symbolize; Messiah, Logos, and the like have their day, and then cease to be the only worthy mode of formulating what Christ is to men.

Mr. Glover has said:

It is at least interesting that every one of these terms, so far from making Jesus more intelligible to us then he is without them, needs interpretation today. In other words, these are the accounts that men have given of Jesus Christ and he has been more than they. He has transcended, he has gone through one picture of him and another, one description and another; he has been more, far more, than any of these conceptions, taken by themselves or taken together, have been able to represent. They are inadequate, and there is he, the great fact.³

It is another question, as I have indicated, whether in changing terms the liberals have not fixed on categories totally unequal to the Christian experience, and specifically to the felt power of Jesus as creating a new relation of men to God.

Furthermore, they have convinced many that we dare not tie up the faith which constitutes a Christian with anything like a detailed or speculative Christology. However we may ultimately decide the problem of our relation to the *obiter dicta* of the New Testament, it is good for all of us to face it for ourselves and come to an understanding as to the importance of the issue. Modern discussions even suggest that a Christian may dispense with Christology altogether. Apart from those who are afraid to think and who prefer what may be called coasting traffic to deep-sea voyaging, there are many today who distrust reason. They have but a poor opinion of metaphysics, not least when practiced by the Christian theologian. "I find God in Christ," they say, "but I have no theory of the matter, and at bottom I regard all theories just about equally hollow." Personally I do not feel this a position which can be maintained; the demands of intelligence are insistent; also there are definite interpretations of Jesus before the world which force us down into the arena of debate and impel us to take sides. Indeed for anyone not at the mercy of words, it is obvious that the liberals too have got a Christology like other people, not perhaps a good one. Is no estimate of Jesus implied in the saying of Wernle that "there is much Christianity without faith in Christ?" Waiving this, however, it is beneficial for everybody to have to distinguish the intellectual question about Jesus

³ *Christ and Human Need*, 171.

from the religious. And one merit of much liberal writing is that it stirs us again to consider how doctrinal explanations of Christ are no substitute for a believing attitude to the message and the Messenger.

3. The liberal conception of Jesus, I believe, may well have served as a *praeparatio evangelica* introductory to more genuinely redeeming thoughts of Christ. Particularly for minds nourished upon science and saturated with the dominating principles of modern historical research, the way to faith has been thus kept open or at least not entirely closed. Men convinced of the inviolability of the laws of nature and mind, who have lost touch with the ecclesiastical dogma, yet are becoming more and more conscious of the absolute importance of religion, may well be attracted—even if not ultimately satisfied—by a purely psychological interpretation which does no more than analyze the self-consciousness of Jesus and the immense impression made by him on disciples, and which puts forward these things as exhibiting religion in its purest form—life at its fullest and the soul at its highest stretch. It will be seen that this is in accord with the supreme prevailing interest in *personality* as the finest product of history and the last category of human knowledge. The liberal view may therefore be felt as bringing deliverance from the old rationalistic thought of Jesus as the seer and sage who implicitly trusted God and man and the world they are making between them, who taught a universally valid morality unencumbered by awkwardly romantic elements, who died a martyr in behalf of progress and enlightenment without the least intention of perpetuating himself in a church. Liberalism calls men out of this urbane, self-possessed and eminently sober piety to something more akin to the New Testament. Largely it does so by proclaiming the “wonderful” and “inscrutable” aspects of Jesus’ person. It will not wholly explain him by the facts of contemporary culture—as the product, say, of interfusing Judaism and Hellenism; for it dislikes the thought of explaining him at all. As in Paul or Luther, in him supremely there is found an irreducible element of infinitude, traceable eventually to the creative origin of spiritual life. Both the God-consciousness and the self-consciousness which mark him

give us pause so startlingly as to suggest that he outgoes all our conceptions. Let us bow in humility before the secrets of personality; let us avow that precisely in Jesus its depths show most abysmal and fathomless. His distinction is to be the inscrutably great one in the spiritual world.

Such a gospel, preached with candid and passionate ardor, might well quicken hope in men who had lost faith in God. It might prove a veritable evangel to those who have come to be convinced, with Loisy, that "the question which lies at the bottom of the religious question today is not whether the Pope is infallible, or whether there are errors in the Bible, or even whether Christ is God, or whether a revelation exists—but whether the universe is inert matter, empty, deaf, soulless, pitiless; whether man's conscience finds in it no echo truer and more real than itself. Even should we decide that liberalism stands but for a fragment of the truth, still so vital is the gospel, so vitalizing is Christ, that even fragmentary truth concerning him is charged with saving energy. His name comes with power where it comes at all. And thus the world's debt to liberalism is great.

Let us now turn to the reckoning, *per contra*, and inquire whether the liberal thought of Jesus will bear inspection in the light of New Testament religion and of the experience predicable of the men and women to whom Christian history owes most.

As a preliminary detail, it is observable that liberalism has against it a heavy weight of presumption in so far as it almost necessarily implies the futility of Christology from the first. Virtually everybody has been wrong; pardonably and innocently wrong, no doubt, but wrong none the less. Paul and John first wandered into metaphysic, and it is a quite inadmissible plea that in defense faith always has in it an implicit metaphysic. At the historic crisis of thought, accordingly, the points were falsely set, and the church went off on the wrong track. Ever since men have gone on speaking of the Godhead of Christ, scarce knowing what they say. The mistake came to light only the other day, detected at last only by the untrammelled criticism of the last century. Only then were the inherent possibilities of the universe ascertained and proof furnished that a divine Christ has no place among them.

For my own part, I feel this is an exceedingly grave charge to bring against the Christian intelligence. It is much, as we shall see, if the charge does not cover Jesus himself; since it is conceivable that he shared the church's error. Taken all together, suggestions of this sort come tolerably near an impeachment of the providential order. But we must turn to details.

1. The fundamental weakness of liberal Christology, I think, lies in the assumption that Jesus took his place simply on the human side of reality. This is what logicians have called begging the question. Occasionally the statement is made in categorical terms. Bousset speaks out plainly. "Jesus," he writes, "never transcended the limits of the purely human. . . . He said that none was good save God; he placed himself by the side of humanity in its struggle after God. . . . He came to the baptism of John which led to forgiveness and repentance. With incomparable power he stamped on the disciples' soul fear before Almighty God who is able to destroy both soul and body, and he could speak of this reverence because in his deepest soul he shared it."⁴ No one certainly will doubt that this is a purely humanitarian Christology, and it is hardly surprising that Bousset would later have taken the significant step of denying that Jesus' consciousness was even messianic. The question whether Jesus ever transcended the bounds of manhood is left, however, by other modernist writers, as by Heitmüller, in a haze of ambiguity. At first the verdict is clear enough. "Nowhere does Jesus say that the man who would believe on God must believe in *him*; nowhere does he ask for himself any sort of religious estimate or relationship. He only seems to have claimed to be the way to the Father."⁵ And again: "Between God and man nothing and no one has a place, not even Jesus. In no case did Jesus claim *religious* significance in the proper sense."⁶ His sole demand was that men should believe his message and commandments and follow his example, just as a prophet might invite those who heard him to accept the message with which he had been intrusted, without attributing any special or critical importance to himself. But so strong is the pressure of hard facts that over and over again Heitmüller is obliged to make significant

⁴ *Jesus* (Germ. ed.), 98.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 399.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 376.

concessions to the other side—concessions, it is true, which leave his own personal interpretation of Jesus unaffected but gravely modify his reading of Jesus' own mind. We are told that Jesus regarded himself as bearer of a unique revelation, as Son *simpliciter*; his consciousness of vocation was such as to transcend every human analogue, towering up and up into the mists of infinitude till it positively becomes "uncanny." There are even many well-authenticated details of tradition proving it to have been Jesus' private conviction "that not his message merely or his activities but his person was indispensable for the salvation of his people."⁷ On the other hand, the contrary impression is the stronger and sharper, and must be given the preference; he did *not* after all take a religious or mediating place. In spite of this, still later we read once again that Jesus "has no scruple in binding the salvation of men with his own person; according to their attitude to him will be the judgment upon them at the last."⁸ A more vacillating interpretation could not be imagined—Jesus as mediator, and Jesus as mere prophet—and it obviously results from the sheer impossibility of carrying through consistently to the end the principle that our Lord conceived himself as a voice only, not a savior. After all our efforts, it comes in upon us irresistibly that in his own mind Jesus was the redeemer of the world—this, and nothing less. Heitmüller's scientific conscience is too honorably exacting to permit of his ignoring, much less denying, a fact so patent; but so far as I can understand his personal conclusions they amount to this, that whether Jesus did or did not assume a position of religious mediatorship, his *right* to it must be disallowed. A way to the Father he was, incontestably, but not *the* Way. This clearly is to raise an appeal against Jesus' self-consciousness; and it then becomes an arguable point, surely, whether this is not to renounce the Christian attitude to Christ. What it issues in is not so much Christianity as a new religion, which has really not been formed out of the other but rather substituted for it. Has any man, or group of men, the right to say that henceforth Christianity shall mean what it has never meant in all the course of history and did not mean in the intention of its founder?

⁷ *Ibid.*, 376.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 395.

There is indeed no evading the conclusion that for the believing consciousness Jesus' conviction of his own religious value is absolutely conclusive; and that he uniformly took a transcendent place in the religious field, a place paramount over every relation of man to God, has, I think, been demonstrated for good and all in Professor Denney's *Jesus and the Gospel*. The mass of evidence he has accumulated, sifted, and combined is overwhelming. For the simple reader of the New Testament—whose judgment on most points of real importance has the infallibility of common-sense—the surprising thing must be that the discussion should have reached a point which made it necessary for Dr. Denney to write his book. Who can help being impressed by the fact that in all the Gospels—and there are no other sources—not one saying can be pointed to where Jesus ranks himself with the prophets; while on every page, Heitmüller being witness, there is proof in abundance that his consciousness, alike of Sonship and of vocation, was much more than prophetic? "He knows himself," we are informed, "as the unsurpassed and unsurpassable Revealer of God, the Son of the Father absolutely." He did *not* then conceive himself as a prophet; he did conceive himself as the Christ. Now in Jesus' mind, as in the mind of every pious Jew, the Christ or Messiah was the person in whom all God's purposes were gathered up and consummated. The last foundations of being were in him. All creation in heaven and on earth, all the divine ways of history, all time and all eternity—they meet and converge in this one transcendent figure. Whoever turned out to be Messiah would thereby be constituted the pivot of the universe, the person on whom everything turned in the religious hopes and possibilities of mankind. In him every promise is answered and every human prayer gloriously fulfilled. That was a tremendous claim, and the quietness, almost silence, with which the claim was made does not alter its tremendousness in the least. How to deal with it, how to escape from its boundless implications, is the unsolved problem—one had almost said the despair—of liberal modernism. It has been said:

You cannot take up any competent critical humanitarian treatise that does not betray its difficulty: Jesus never called himself the Christ, Jesus called

⁹ *Ibid*, 395.

himself the Christ but he never felt easy in doing so, Jesus called himself the Christ because he had to do it to win his people, Jesus called himself the Christ because he was of an excitable disposition, but he was mistaken; theory succeeds theory, and each betrays the weakness of the other. What wonder if today the preposterous controversy has arisen as to whether Jesus has ever existed at all? Time is a more ruthless logician than the individual mind.¹⁰

We must then steadily repel the superstition that the modern liberal view of Jesus has, as history, any paramount claim on our belief. Its merits we have canvassed, I hope without prejudice; but taking the Gospels at a reasonable historical estimate, it is absurd to imagine that liberalism explains the more important facts. It can only start virtually by rewriting the Gospels. It is of course possible for many critical writers to ignore the really vital issues—vital for religion, that is—by protesting that they speak as historians only, not believers; but this distinction, ultimately, is quite unreal. "History" and "faith" in this relation are eventually mere abstractions; for the case which really matters, and which instantly banishes the distinction as anything but a makeshift, is that in which historian and believer are one person. It is sometimes worth while to reflect that we have only one mind, and that this one mind, in all these deeper questions, resembles the cloud in Wordsworth, which "moveth altogether if it move at all."

2. The liberal view of Jesus is noticeably silent in regard to the risen Christ. And once more I put here the plea that men write as historians merely, and have no concern with the ultimate significance of things. If that principle be once admitted as fundamental, obviously it cuts away much more than the resurrection of Christ, or his pre-existence; it disposes even of Jesus' worth as a true revelation of the Father. On the other hand, if I receive such an impression of Jesus' ethical greatness and splendor as compels the admission that he is a unique revelation of God, why may I not receive such an impression of his greatness as emboldens me to believe that he must have triumphed over death? It is idle to say that the latter problem belongs to history but not the former.

Now it is surely obvious that the risen Lord, as a transcendent reality, is a quite vital part of the Christian gospel. For consider:

¹⁰ Cairns, *The Student World*, 1911, p. 132.

in what sense would the career of Jesus Christ have been a glorious revelation of God not as Love merely, but as Almighty Love, if for him death had been the end? How could such a *dénouement* possibly have given the disciples a joyous and transfiguring and unconquerable assurance that the Father's love and power were with Jesus? What the disciples needed after Jesus died—and is it incredible that the Father of Jesus Christ gave them according to their need?—was to have their faith in God's power to save rebuilt out of its ruins; to have it shown them, irresistibly, that the love present in Jesus was not only supreme in worth, but supreme in fact, and not only deserved to win, but in sheer actuality had won. And this the resurrection accomplished. The power of God to make love and righteousness prevail were vindicated, and Jesus' victory over death, the last enemy, was exhibited not only as ideal but as real in the most comprehensive and concrete sense. It was shown that while death has silenced and removed all others, Jesus it could not hold. Personally I am quite sure that the bodily resurrection is not the insignificant and negligible point it is often said to be. The effort to represent Paul as indifferent to the empty grave will simply not bear inspection in the light of Bible religion, which knows nothing of the modern and quite unphilosophical dualism between the spiritual and the natural. In the Old and New Testaments, the physical and the spiritual are one live unity. We may talk of a spiritual resurrection indeed; but yet for spirit to rise, it must first be buried, and no one, I presume, will wish to contend seriously for this. But apart from that, apart also from the otiose question how the essential minimum of Christian faith is to be defined, it is noteworthy that all modernists concede that belief in the resurrection of Jesus was causally and creatively connected with the rise of the Christian church. That belief launched the church in deep water. Now at this point two alternate views are possible: either the belief was a delusion, though a beneficent one, and death (so far as experience in this world-order goes) was the end for Jesus as for us. In that case there was plainly no revelation but the revelation through Jesus' character. The man who is satisfied with that, accordingly, is satisfied with a more meager and less inspiring revelation than we can

conceive and than the church has from the first claimed to possess—viz., a revelation mediated not by the character of Jesus simply but by his total experience, including actual triumph over death. Or belief in the resurrection is true; then, however it be supposed to have happened and whatever we make of the empty grave, something once happened as wonderful, as abnormal and supernatural and revolutionary as even bodily resurrection itself could be. Philosophically there is nothing to choose, so far, between this second view and the church's faith. But if Christ the Risen One is now, as even Wendt holds,¹¹ in possession of full blessedness and power, has this no bearing on the dimensions and the content of his historic life? Can one who is now clothed with universal power *ever* have been a mere prophet?

Not only so; but victorious Christianity throughout the past has lived by faith in the risen Lord. The last and highest credential of the gospel has been the known fact that Christ still evokes in man the same renewing experience as he evoked in the disciples. He still breaks them down in shame and lifts them up anew in faith and hope. Now when men undertake to explain Jesus, this present actual power is part of the reality to be explained. Our suggestion is that the liberals simply put it aside. For them the story closes at Calvary; all else is the posthumous influence of a great personality. It is no solution to say that history can go no farther. They themselves, as religious men, insist on going much farther; they transcend history when they proclaim that in Jesus' life they see an index to the Father. Why should they not transcend it also by recognizing the living Christ?

I believe that the question for the church today is the question whether in Jesus, and in what happened to him, we have obtained a revelation equal to the world's need. The revelation given in Jesus as the modernists depict him has a certain greatness, we shall all concede; but is it great enough? Is it a match for the world's impotence and misery—for sin, disease, death, and tragedy? I feel it is not, for the simple reason that I can conceive a revelation greater far, which I find set forth in the preaching of the apostles. A risen Lord is a Lord superior to the iron rigors of the world-

¹¹ *System der christlichen Lehre*, 399; cf. Thieme, *Von der Gottheit Christi*.

process; and nothing less, we may be certain, will meet the pessimism of today. Every reader of fiction knows that much popular modern thought represents the universe as a chamber of torture—the contrivance of a being or beings above us who may deceive, torment, or destroy us for the ends of their own pleasure or utility. Can we meet this with the story of a prophet who lived and died and passed? Is it not an incomparably greater thing—worthier therefore of the Father of Jesus Christ our Lord—to proclaim a Savior in whose cross and resurrection is visible the love and power of the almighty creative God who is willing to do for us more than we can either ask or think? Here stand the mountains of faith in which rose the streams of joy and life which flow through the New Testament; when we move downward to the plains of humanitarianism, we part with the springs of gladness.

3. If one may say so with respect, the liberals' conception of Jesus, as their books expound it, does not appear to represent worthily their personal attitude to him as Savior. They may not indeed have so far wrought out its systematic exposition, but any reader of good-will perceives that in this Jesus they have found God and been made one with Him. They too, theories apart, are gladly conscious that in Jesus the very God himself seeks and finds us. Is there any reason why they should not let this fact determine their Christology, joining without reserve in the great words of Herrmann that "when we confess Christ's deity we simply give him right name"²²—because the only name answering to, and reflecting, the specifically Christian experience? What is Christology anyhow but the articulate statement of Jesus' centrality and absoluteness for religion? What is it but the result of resolutely giving Jesus the same place in doctrine which we give him in devotion? If our own life-story proves that Jesus' influence still operates, and operates with divine effect; if he stands for us as the incursion of creative divine love and life and power into the world, somehow or other we must bring ourselves to say so doctrinally. And however we get it said, it will not be by ranking him with the prophets.

I think that when they are not arguing the point one can observe the liberals being driven up and up to ever-loftier conceptions of

²² *Communion with God*, 143.

Jesus, driven by the exigent pressure of spiritual fact. One category after another is brought in and tried; and still before their eyes Jesus grows and grows, dwarfing all the rest by sheer magnitude, till at last they are fain to confess his transcendence of all thought. In loyalty to the canon of uniformity they have tried to find a class or type for him, and they have failed. In many minds this progress of interpretation may be noted; is it not simply the recapitulation, in essence, of the church's experience long ago? And orthodoxy has sinned deeply, quite certainly, by insisting that every good Christian, in his thought of Jesus, shall start at the end of the road instead of the beginning; whereas all wise evangelists know that if a man's thought of Christ is to be worth anything he must travel the road for himself, helping himself forward as he may by the means and instruments of precision supplied by his historic movements of human thought for the expression of a complete and joyful faith.

One thing, however, may be confidently predicted. Men will not long be satisfied with the epithets of "mysterious," "inscrutable," or "super-phenomenal," as representing the last and highest truth we can utter concerning Jesus Christ. This is at present the terminus of liberalism; but it is worth remembering that the inscrutable, *quâ* inscrutable, has no connection with religion. And the attempt to make it the controlling category would mean a lapse from ethical and spiritual faith. If it be the case that Jesus evokes an impression of the infinite and incomprehensible, religion has only one name for such spiritual infinitude, and the name is "God." When he touches us, it is not to lift up into the region of pure inscrutability; it is to lift us, by mediation, into fellowship with God. On such a matter conscience is, and must be, final arbiter. Hence the category of "inscrutable," as applied to Jesus, is at best a *passage à la limite*; it indicates the unceasingly renewed effort of reflection laboring to attenuate difficulties, to measure, with a growing approximation, a reality incommensurable with our thought. It is the initial confession that this man outstrips all the familiar concepts; but faith knows it is not, after all, the right or the sufficient predicate. *That* we give to him, as Herrmann puts it, when we name him our divine Lord.

It has been held as a mark of intellectual parochialism that men should propose to test doctrines by their working power in life. And it *is* parochial, when the test really is employed on a parochial scale. On the other hand, as in the related case of teleology, the test is an admirable one if the scale be reasonably broad and wide. Now we cannot experiment with Christology, but we can survey the generations of the past; we can survey the church of our own time. *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.* Judged then by the massive trend of Christian life and achievement, I submit that the liberal conception of Jesus cannot stand. It fails to inspire as a dynamic which will make the church equal to its task in the slum and the mission field. It conveys no overwhelming impression of the self-sacrifice of God. When it is placed before us, we see at once that it is inadequate, for we can imagine something infinitely greater; and the Christian instinct which we call faith tells men that the God whom Jesus revealed will give nothing but the greatest and best.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY AND MINISTERIAL EFFICIENCY

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It was altogether to be expected that with the emphasis that has been placed of late upon the importance of a modern training for the ministry there should be uttered in certain quarters warnings against a mere technical and commercially conceived efficiency. And these warnings may well give us pause and require of us a definition of this easy term. As a matter of fact, everything depends upon the criterion of ministerial efficiency. The criterion of any efficiency is necessarily inherent in the nature of the activity involved. The efficiency of an engineer is mechanical. It would be folly to say that he is a poor engineer because he has no musical taste. The efficiency of a carpenter must be stated in terms of his trade, of a musician in terms of his art. The efficiency of a minister of Jesus Christ is spiritual. If anyone ever thought of ministerial efficiency as concerned with ability to entertain a crowd or to get conversions, as cleverness in handling men and in keeping a religious plant going at full speed, he knew not what spirit he was of.

The department of practical theology is especially charged with the final task of technical, professional efficiency. But it never regards itself as concerned with making able pulpiteers, clever evangelizers, hustling administrators, psychological religious educators. It always presupposes in every man seeking the benefit of the discipline that it may be able to afford that there is first, as a *conditio sine qua non*, a call of God to the Christian ministry, a sense of prophetic purpose, an appreciation of the church as a community of religious persons seeking to realize for themselves and for others the kingdom of God. It always assumes that the supreme need of man is God. But a modern practical theology assumes also that God is not found merely in lonely meditation

but also in the touch of human life, in the joyousness of childhood, in the play of youth, in the working of man, in every human relationship, in reverent worship, and in free and healthy recreation. The true theological seminary should write as the first law of efficiency, and give to its students as parting word of counsel, "Except the Lord build the house they labor in vain that build it: except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain."

Realizing, then, the hopeless inadequacy of a mere technical efficiency in the ministry, which is not real efficiency at all, we return to the use of the valuable word, which we are not by any means ashamed to have learned from the commercial world. It has too long been most unfortunately true that "the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light." The world has, very properly, no place for the lawyer who cannot secure justice for his client, for the physician who cannot diagnose and skilfully treat disease, for the manufacturer who does not understand the latest appliances and methods of industry. And the church has no place for the man who, believing himself filled with a great message, has no ability to proclaim it so that it will seem great to anyone else; who, longing to help men by comfort, inspiration, and instruction, yet is so inept in his endeavors that he only annoys, estranges, and befogs them. It is a simple and lamentable fact that the Christian ministry today has altogether too large a proportion of religious ignoramuses, spiritually minded incompetents, consecrated dullards. And it has a still larger number of men, noble in spirit, truly successful, who look back with wistfulness to the seminary, asking why they could not have been more generously helped to meet their tasks and problems, why they had to devote so many blundering years of their early ministry to attaining ability in matters which able men before them thoroughly understood, and why the young men of the future cannot be more technically prepared for the task which, spiritual though it is in its essence and purpose, must be carried on in this world, and among men, and in accordance with the inevitable laws of human accomplishment.

Practical theology is concerned with the making of an efficient

ministry in three respects: (1) in the effective presentation of a spiritual message suited to the needs of the people and of the times in which the minister lives; (2) in the organization and administration of the church in its wide and increasing activities; (3) in the leadership of the church as an educational enterprise.¹

I. HOMILETICS

The notion that is current in certain quarters that the emphasis upon efficiency means a diminution of the significance of the preaching function of the minister is utterly unfounded. No modern department of practical theology has the slightest sympathy with such a view. When a business man recently said that the church was not now very much concerned about a man's ability to preach, but was desirous of securing competent leaders of men, he expressed a superficial judgment, which would soon result in the ending of the church altogether. Theological seminaries at all events are reaffirming the conviction that the pulpit is to be of permanent importance in modern life and that effective preaching is the pre-eminent function of the ministry. This may well be modified by a recognition of the fact that we are coming to a specialized ministry, in which men may serve as pastors, directors of religious education, of social endeavor, of music, or of other special activities, without including any preaching at all in their work. But so far as concerns men whose business it is to preach, our times demand them more than ever, and demand the best preaching. As President Faunce has very well pointed out, there was never such a preaching age as ours. Everybody has gone to preaching—labor leaders, social reformers, educators, even presidential candidates. It is no time for the pulpit to minimize its significance. The man of speech is still a man of extraordinary power among us, for, as David Swing well said, "We talk, and talk, and talk for a hundred years, and then the thing is done, and if we had not talked it would not have been done."

¹ In most encyclopedias practical theology would also include the study of Christian missions. In the Divinity School of the University of Chicago this subject is organized in the Department of Church History. There is a certain propriety in either procedure.

The theological seminary is not very much concerned with the training of pulpit orators. Perhaps they are born, not made, and perhaps it may be just as well that only a few of them are born. But we do recognize the high importance of preparing men of persuasive, convincing, and effective speech, who shall make the gospel in all its splendid meaning seem to men to be of supreme importance. The pulpit is still to speak words of comfort that can be spoken nowhere else, to kindle hopes beyond any others that the heart of man can hold, to cheer with peculiar power the hosts of those who are battling for the right, to appeal as incarnate conscience to that moral sense which is in us all, but which so easily is lulled asleep.

The department of practical theology has the difficult task of helping men who wish to preach to see something of the way toward this effectiveness which the modern pulpit demands. The endeavor involves these three elements of study: (1) the message of the preacher, (2) the psychological study of homiletic presentation, (3) the technique of sermon preparation and delivery. And their importance is in the order indicated.

The message.—In the older theory of seminary discipline this was not the concern of practical theology but rather of systematic theology. It was there that the man found what he was to preach and practical theology undertook to show him how to do it. Every department of human thought today shows a man what to preach, and certainly not the least systematic theology. It is the business of practical theology to insist upon a man going back into his own religious experience and answering to himself the questions, What really is my message? What does the world need that I have to give? What are the modern life-problems about which I really know anything? No small part of homiletic discipline is the constant effort to answer these questions so that the man shall be saved from the folly of preaching the New Testament, or the Old Testament, or theology, or sociology, or any other science, and shall see clearly that he is to preach religion, and that the only religion he can preach is the religion that he himself experiences. The literature, the history, the philosophy of religion are great sources for the enrichment of religious experience. The vital

teaching of these subjects in the theological seminary should effect the broadening of the student's outlook, the deepening of his faith, the enlarging of his sympathy. In this sense, of course, they are the great materials of preaching. But they are so only when he makes them his own. He must not be the intermediary between the professor and the people—and that is just as true if the professor be of sociology as of theology. The preacher is the exponent of religious conviction, he is the interpreter of religious life. In this lies the secret of efficiency. But the efficiency itself is not gained by a mere statement as here given, and the individual acceptance which any preacher would accord. It is only reached as the result of constant study and practice. Gradually a man acquires the power of discriminating between what he knows and what somebody else thinks, and then really speaking to his own generation a living voice. Rigid criticism, the cultivation of the art of self-criticism, unceasing insistence upon reality, the study of the masters of the pulpit, past and present—these are the means employed to train men in an understanding of the essential nature of their message.

The psychological study of homiletic presentation.—Given a man with a message and a congregation willing to hear, the problem of presenting that message so that it may have vitality to that congregation is a psychological problem. It involves questions of mood, the nature of attention, of the emotions, of the will, the whole matter of apperception, the psychology of suggestion. It includes a consideration of the emotional quality of the entire service of worship and of all its accessories. To be sure, the born orator understands all these things by instinct. So does the born master of anything understand his trade. Schools are not designed for people who are born efficient. One of the great Yale lecturers on preaching confessed that he had discovered that most of his life he had been more concerned with subjects than with people. To the extent that that was true he had failed of the most elemental psychological approach to his problem. Another psychological failure was indicated some time ago in the genial article of one of our favorite essayists on "The Colonel in the Theological Seminary," in which the professor of military tactics undertakes to

teach the young preachers how to make a real advance upon a real situation. The soldier intends to secure some definite result, and he knows that there is some definite way of doing it. The preacher must be as definite in his expectations and his effort. A sign of the times is the publication of a little book with the significant title, *The Pedagogics of Preaching*, indicating the essential psychological character of the undertaking. How practically effective such methods may be was indicated when a successful advertising expert recently stated that he had formed his own method of work upon the results of a professor of public speaking who had devoted himself to training theological students—an interesting example of the children of this world going to school to the children of light for the purpose of learning business efficiency, and not an isolated instance by any means.

It is a matter of grave concern that in not a few cases the men who are least likely to be helpful in these times when wise leadership is so necessary are those who seem most able to secure a hearing. There are many evangelists whose influence is anything but healthy, who have mastered the art of controlling crowds and so exercise an influence altogether out of proportion to the significance of the message which they preach. It has sometimes seemed that the sensible presentation of a modern message was incompatible with the passion of the orator and with that careful study of effect, which has characterized the popular masters of assemblies. But surely this is a most unfortunate error. Of what use is our message if it does not pass from us to our auditors? What necessary connection need there be between a rational gospel and a small congregation? Of course there are very many notable instances of men of popular power and of modern thought. There is great need of more such preachers. We do not need to learn the tricks of "spellbinders," but we do need to understand the psychological conditions of an impressive religious service, and of the presentation of a powerful message that shall move men to their duty.

Why did Amos startle the worshipers at Bethel with his strange visions? Why did Isaiah walk barefoot through Jerusalem? Why did Jeremiah use the concrete symbols that could be seen?

Why did Jesus speak in parables? Why did all the men who have spoken and been heard speak as they spoke? Whence came the hush on the vast throng in the cathedral attent upon the preacher's opening words, and whence the earnest expectancy in the country meeting-house, and why the nervousness and carelessness of so many religious crowds? By psychological analysis we must answer these questions, and so train ourselves to understand how we can make our modern folk hear, and feel, and act.

The technique of sermon preparation and delivery.—The subject of technique, of course, requires careful attention. There is some natural and economical way in which sermon topics come, and the message shapes itself, and the arrangement of thought is determined, and the whole is put into the vehicle of language, and then is interpreted in oral speech. Inductively, and by practice, by observation, by mutual criticism, the class in the theological seminary must seek to find the way. It is probable that there will not be very great advance upon the technical methods that have been so elaborately wrought out by the masters of homiletics in the past. Provided the vitality of treatment which the preceding discussion has sought to emphasize be always present, the traditional methods may well be followed to a large extent.

The technique of voice production, the employment of expressive gesture, the attainment of an effective platform presence, ought to have been secured in the earlier stages of college training. As long as this is so generally wanting, the department of practical theology would wisely secure the alliance of experts in public speaking. An admirable plan is the co-operative teaching of homiletics by the professors of practical theology and of public speaking. Of course a man only really preaches when he is in his own pulpit, and the department of practical theology ought to have available an instructor who would personally visit the men in their student pastorates and help them on the basis of an observation of their actual procedure.

II. CHURCH ADMINISTRATION

There is a second great field of ministerial service. It has always been recognized under the general title of pastoral duties, the cure

of souls, parochial work. It has been extraordinarily extended in our day. There are some who deplore the tendency. They are afraid that the prophetic office will lose its power in a general fussiness about an ecclesiastical machine. And that is a real danger. A good deal of so-called work is a mere effort to make the wheels go round. But we are in glorious days of increase in the significance of the church. We are really saying with the Roman orator, "There is nothing human that is alien to our interest." We have not escaped a religion which was bound up with a theological intellectualism that we may confine its glorious meaning to a modern mysticism. There is, of course, delightful opportunity for sarcasm in contrasting apostolic unction with the successful conduct of a boys' club. Shall the apostles leave the word of God to serve gymnasiums? However, there are boys' clubs in the modern church because boys will have clubs anyway. It is God's way of making a man out of a boy, and the church would better understand it, and lead the process. And there are a thousand activities, clubs, societies, organizations, philanthropies, evangelizings, missions, industrial schools, employment bureaus, organized parochial visitations, literary societies, singing classes, choral clubs, recreations, picnics, and there are going to be more, please God, until there shall not be a human interest that has not been touched and beautified by the spirit of religion. All this needs a leader, not only because it is a big plant and costs a lot of money and must be made efficient, but because it is a church and must not become a *congeries* of unrelated social activities; because it is a church and whether we eat or drink or whatever we do we are to do all to the glory of God; because it is a church and its members are there learning the meaning of life in the spirit of Him who came that we might have life and that we might have it abundantly. Of course, the activities may run away with the church. Certainly it may be possible that in our eager development of means we may lose sight of the end, so that it shall come to pass that we shall have everything else in our institutional church except religion. We may have every human interest cultivated except God. And then the entire undertaking will be inefficient. Efficiency means that the whole complicated institution shall be

pre-eminently religious. If we socialize with the ability of men and of angels, and have not God, we are nothing.

Efficiency in church administration never means the mere organization and conduct of activities that can be made to look well in an annual report and that produce results which can be tabulated and pointed to with pride. Efficiency means that boys' clubs shall contribute to the strong and healthy life of manly, clean, God-fearing boys. Industrial classes mean a contribution of gracious, skilled womanhood to the inspiration and practical help of neglected girlhood, with all the moral uplift and religious power that comes from such devotion and such fellowship. And so through all the varied activities of the modern church. Money, members, officers, committees, machinery, are not the ends, but rather earnest, altruistic endeavor, helpful co-operation, gracious human fellowships, religion as the life of God in the lives of men.

It is the business of the modern department of practical theology to recognize the changing conditions of church life. If it seems strange that modern men could suppose that a seventeenth-century theology could have permanent significance in the modern world, is it any less strange that they should suppose that a New England meeting-house could afford the permanent limits of organization and activity for the advancing Christian church? Nobody knows what the work of the church is. There are communities today where the church will have to do everything that is done for the better life of the community from cleaning the snow off the sidewalks to nursing babies, from helping the farmers to raise better corn to opening the eyes of the people to the glory of art. There are other communities where the social and civic activities are so admirably organized that it would be a mere impertinence for the church to interfere, and its work becomes largely one of inspiration and encouragement. Most communities are between these two extremes, the proper work of the church being partly in directing its members into useful social organizations, partly in undertaking helpful activities of its own. The man who ought to be able to find out in any community what ought to be done is the resourceful, efficient minister.

Who is sufficient for these things? The conduct of such an

enterprise demands great qualities of leadership. The prophet in the pulpit is not enough; a statesman and leader of men, a large-hearted, wide-visioned, tactful, resourceful minister is the need of the church. And all the better if the preacher and the minister can be one man. It is the new business—very difficult—of the department of practical theology to seek to train men for this larger efficiency in the modern church. The day is gone for the quiet student to make a few parish calls in the week and deliver great sermons on Sunday. A church is much like a school. Our new pedagogy has shown us that more important than what the teachers teach is what the students do. So it is what the members do rather than what the preacher says that makes them strong Christians. It is extremely important that we hold in one ideal the significance of the great pulpit with the burning message of a vital gospel and the absolute necessity of the active, achieving church where everybody is going about doing good.

So we must study the needs of modern men, the natural interests of developing human personality, the relation of religion to the whole world of human life. We must make a practical study of efficient churches, for there are some, and they are very busy places, and God is in them. We must study the efficient ministers, for there are some, and they are very busy men, earnest students, men of prayer, and men of the world at the same time. We must try to open the eyes of the young men who are studying for the Christian ministry to the need of the development of our churches.

All this, so far as it can be carried on in the classroom, the seminar, and by observation, is being well developed in our best seminaries, and something is being done in what may be called laboratory practice. It is at this point, however, that the most serious reform is needed. Every student for the ministry should have actual practice for several months in a well-organized church. He should act as assistant in the office of the church, learning the routine of keeping records, arranging assignments, organizing the details of business management. He should have the opportunity of gaining experience in the various departments of social activity, in boys' work, in managing the recreative interests of the church,

in teaching classes, in the systematic canvass of the community, and in pastoral visitation and care. It is a serious question whether it will be possible to do this in any large and systematic way by giving students apprenticeship under successful city pastors. It is probable that the only way in which it can be made really efficient is by having one or more churches actually under the direction of the theological seminary. Perhaps this means the enlargement of the department of practical theology to include men competent to conduct an aggressive city church as preachers and administrators, together with others who shall have the technical direction of the practice work of the students. This would call for a considerable endowment, but its justification would be in the extraordinary increase in efficiency in the students so trained, and also in the noble religious service which such a church might accomplish as a definite city mission enterprise.

The difficult question of student aid is involved in this problem. It would seem that it would most satisfactorily be met by the payment of the young men for the actual service rendered in the church or churches. If there could be gathered a thousand members in a needy section of the city, it might well be that there would be required a ministry of fifty students in the various departments of religious activity for such time as the students would be able to give without interference with their studies. A mission work carried on upon such a scale and under such expert management would be an object-lesson of notable value to the entire church, and would in itself be worth the whole cost involved.

In the third year of the student's course he should have a small church by himself, or perhaps better, two men should have a church together. The conditions of the smaller churches are not quite the same as those of a great city church, and it is a mistake that a man's practice work under direction should be only in a large organization. Moreover, he must have opportunity to develop initiative and resourcefulness while still associated with teachers who may be able to help him in his problems as they arise. It has already been suggested that an instructor in the department of practical theology should be free to visit the students who are preaching, in order to hear them under natural conditions.

This same instructor could hold conferences with the students on their fields regarding the actual problems as they arise.

Quite another field of church administration, which it is already becoming the duty of the seminaries to study scientifically, is that of the rural church. In every department of practical theology there should be an expert who has had actual successful experience in a significant country pastorate, and who is a student of the rural problem at first hand. With the right leadership we are undoubtedly likely to have a wonderful expansion of the country church. It is to be hoped that there will be able men with the interests of country life at heart, who will expect to devote themselves entirely to such service. The seminaries should be in a position to train them in the varied opportunities which a country parish affords. Incidentally the reinvigoration of the rural church will afford us again the strong recruits for the ministry which used to come from this source.

In this survey of the activities of the minister no mention has been made of what has always been understood as strictly pastoral duties—the office of the pastor as comforter, adviser, friend, winner of men's souls. This is not an office by itself. It is part of the preacher. It is the very spirit of the minister as the administrator of the church. He is always a pastor. He is never too busy for comfort and counsel. All his work is to win men's lives, which includes their souls. The department of practical theology cannot give men tact, sympathy, and wisdom. Some of the books of the great pastors can be read and an older brother of larger experience can talk over with his younger brothers some of the ways of the pastor's work. But he must learn to help men by helping them, and conference of the professor of practical theology with men in their student pastorates should be constantly carried on.

There is still another element in church organization, which is of the utmost importance, viz., the organization of the worship of the church. The purpose of the service of worship is the cultivation of religious feeling—reverence, humility, faith passing into joy, aspiration. Of course the fundamental need is sincerity. The best contribution the minister makes to the worship of his people is the impartation of his own feelings in the thought of God and of duty. Yet

one may feel reverence and only express solemnity; one may feel humility and only express gloom; one may feel the whole gamut of religious emotions and express them so ineptly that nobody else is helped to feel them. The actor's criticism of the minister has often been quoted: "We say unreal things as if they were real and you say real things as if they were unreal." There is such a thing as a liturgical technique. There are laws of aesthetics that can no more be neglected with impunity than the laws of dynamics. It is the business of practical theology to study the great liturgies of the church, the hymnology of the church, and then to study the laws of group psychology, and then to study the conditions and needs of the modern congregation, its heredity, its prejudices, its responsiveness, and so to find the worship which can minister to its best life.

III. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

There remains to be considered the third field of ministerial service, viz., the leadership of the church as an educational institution. Of course this cannot be rigidly separated from the two that have already been discussed. Preaching is educational, and the better the preaching the more it is educational. All the activities of the church are educational, so that a good test of the value of any activity is its educational quality. But the definite study of educational values and of the whole subject of moral and religious development is so important that it may well receive separate consideration. Moreover, the educational leadership of the church, if properly carried out, makes so large a demand upon the minister that it will undoubtedly come to pass, as is already the case in many of the stronger churches, that this will be a specialized form of ministerial service. And this is particularly to be desired because it will open the ranks of the ministry to many men of first-rate ability, who yet have not the preaching gift. It is unfortunately true that strong men have often turned aside from the ministry to the teaching profession because they did not find themselves at home in the pulpit. Yet gifts and abilities of educational leadership are a great desideratum in the modern church. Further, it is very much to be hoped that the masculine prejudice

of the church will sufficiently give way to open this great field of the Christian ministry to women. When the second city of our nation, after searching the Republic for a superintendent of the public schools, found that a woman of its own citizenship was the one altogether to be desired, it is time that the church should consider whether its educational work may not be wisely committed in many cases to able and trained women who have a hereditary aptitude for the task. Perhaps it would not be well to press this matter, lest the specter of the feminization of religious education be called forth.

Historically, practical theology has always been charged with the subject of religious education, but it has for the most part been comprised under the title of catechetics, which sufficiently indicates its scope. In the churches laying great stress upon confirmation the seminaries have given emphasis to the importance of drilling children in catechisms and leading them to an understanding of the duties of the religious life. In the seminaries of other churches there has been some discussion of the relation of the pastor to the Sunday school. But in none of the churches until very recent years has there been any proper conception of the full duty of the church toward its children and young people. The educational work of the church has been largely confined to the Sunday school, and that school has held a very indefinite relation to the church itself. Moreover, it has generally been conceived of rather as an evangelistic than as an educational institution. The minister felt himself so little related to it that in many cases he was too busy even to know what it was doing, and in many other cases it was deemed an impertinence for him to take too lively an interest in its work.

Very considerable progress has now been made toward the understanding of the task of religious education, and it may be said to have grown out of the general acceptance of the following modern ideas: (1) Whatever religion is (and it is not easy to define), it is not something by itself, but it is a certain quality of life, a certain spirit of living, a certain attitude toward the whole of life. (2) Religion is not an impartation from above, it is the result of social education. (3) Every reaction of the individual to his

physical and social environment is inevitably educational, for better or for worse. (4) Consciously directed education is a personal process by which immature persons are assisted in reaching their largest self-realization in the society to which they belong. On the basis of the acceptance of these modern ideas it has been conceived that we should endeavor to develop a science of religious education and to train our students for the ministry in that discipline. The task has been assigned, in accordance with the traditional encyclopedia, to the department of practical theology.

It is evident that in the statement of the ideas out of which a demand for scientific study of religious education has grown, we have rather easily employed some very important words: religion, life, physical and social environment, immature persons, education, self-realization. It is our business to understand what these mean. What is the religion that is our goal? If we are to follow the modern scientific method of study we shall have to answer that question historically, genetically, which means that the subject of comparative religion must be understood. Evidently again we are making a biological approach to our problem and we must understand what biology has to offer us. We are speaking of persons, and of immature persons, which means that our problem involves psychology and especially genetic psychology. The education is in the social environment, and therefore we shall have to know what sociology can tell us for our guidance. We are making our aim ethical and so we must gain the data that Christian ethics can afford. And we are including our efforts under the subject of education and therefore the history, theory, and modern practice of education, including all that is being done in moral, industrial, vocational education, must be understood. And then we must ask ourselves what the church itself has done during its history, which requires a study of the history of religious education. And finally, we must address ourselves to the opportunities of the modern church to make of itself a school in which religion may be learned, and this involves all the problems of organization, materials, curriculum, the training of teachers, the expression of religious life.

Of course so large a task as is here outlined cannot be under-

taken by the department of practical theology, unless it should be supplied with a corps of instructors larger than that of any department in any theological seminary. But in point of fact there is no need of anything of the sort. Already in the fully equipped university there are available the experts whose contribution is essential to our problem. Practical theology has therefore considered its duty to be largely that of co-ordination of courses already provided in the university curriculum. In biology, anthropology, sociology, comparative religion, Christian ethics, psychology, education, the contributory courses which the study of religious education requires are actually being offered. Certain fundamental courses with the religious interest dominant are properly given by the department of practical theology itself. These naturally will be increased in number, as the province of religious education is more clearly defined. It is probable, however, that the general principle of organization of the contributions from various departments will continue to be found satisfactory.²

It would be insincere not to state that at the present time a science of religious education scarcely exists. There are only a handful of men giving serious consideration to the matter in the whole country. The subject shares with its older sister, sociology, the great difficulty that experimentation is almost impossible, and that results are very difficult to measure. Perhaps religious education must always be empirical. Given a youth of a certain religious development, it will never be possible to say exactly what he needs in order to advance to a certain further stage of religious development. If *materia medica* is empirical because the action of drugs on the living human organism is so difficult to estimate, how much more subtle the action of influences upon the human spirit. But *materia medica* is empiricism founded upon scientific knowledge. The medical practitioner knows his anatomy, his physiology, his chemistry, and he experiments with his drugs on the basis of the best knowledge. So the religious educator must

² The organization here outlined has actually been made during the last four years in the University of Chicago. The various departments have co-operated most cordially in the endeavor to meet the needs of the new subject. The same organization is taking place in several other seminaries.

know the process of the development of the psycho-physical organism, the development of the intellectual, moral, educational interests of childhood and of youth, the real nature of the material of study, and of the activities and plays which he employs. He must know the experience of competent workers who have been experimenting in this field, and must then intelligently do his best to assist the educational process, and note as carefully as he may the results that seem to be possible of measurement. It is in this sense that we are working for efficiency in religious education. It is in this sense that we may dare to speak of a science of religious education. There is as yet no exact-or satisfactory method that has been developed for this procedure. The department of practical theology must invite its students to investigate what has been done, to be patient with those who cannot venture to give prescriptions when they are only entitled to give suggestions, and to accept the fascination and responsibility of students of a science that in a peculiar sense is still in the making.

IV. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

The department of practical theology has usually been assigned with the other traditional departments one-ninth of the three years' work required for the D.B. degree. Two-thirds of this time has usually been devoted to homiletics and one-third to pastoral duties. These proportions will probably not be changed. On the basis of one-twenty-seventh of the curriculum being regarded as a course, one such course of four hours a week for three months would be devoted to the theory of preaching, including the consideration of such personal qualifications of the minister as has usually been included in pastoral duties. A second course of a very practical nature would be devoted to the preparation and delivery of sermons. The third course, instead of being merely a series of paternal lectures on pastoral theology, would be the exact and definite study of the organization of the activities of the modern church. The development of religious education demands the addition of a fourth required course in practical theology, which should be devoted to the fundamentals of the

psychology of religion in their application to the life of the childhood and youth of the church.

Opportunity should be offered in the elections of the curriculum for students to specialize in any of the three departments of practical theology, or to make a judicious combination of work in the whole field. Those who desire to prepare themselves as specialists in religious education will of course need to lay the broad foundation in the various related subjects that has already been indicated.

In Memoriam

WILLIAM NEWTON CLARKE

SHAILEY MATHEWS
The University of Chicago

The death of William Newton Clarke has removed the most interesting and possibly the most typical member of that little group of men who have enabled so many Protestant clergymen of America and Great Britain to pass from the older to the newer point of view in evangelical theology. During his term as professor at Colgate University Professor Clarke's health did not permit him to participate widely in public tasks, but for this very reason he became even more the prophet of Protestant Romanticism. Like Wordsworth, he dwelt apart from men, detached from the incidents of theological struggles as well as from those importunate social duties which assail men of more active relations. His theology has in it the serenity of the beautiful valley over which he looked as he thought and worked. He knew what it was to lose the confidence of timid and obscurantist souls and to be subjected to the criticism of those who never quite lost his friendship; but he was spared many of those temptations proposed by theological controversy to take short cuts to theological conclusions. His theology has little of the adventurous or the belligerent spirit of youth, his *Outlines* being published after he was fifty-seven years of age.

The fact that he did not publish much during the years of transition which he has described so frankly in his little volume *Sixty Years with the Bible* accounts in large measure for the quality of his theological work. His volumes are not of a class with the work of men who are either searching for new truth, or who, having discovered it, are seeking to vindicate their new allegiance. Investigation in the technical sense of the word is almost absent in them. I doubt if there is a single footnote in all of his volumes. That he thought deeply and read broadly is constantly in evidence,

but that he made any effort to follow the various currents of religious philosophy or the progress of technical biblical criticism or even the varying schools of theology, his volumes give us no clear evidence. He was not a pioneer, and open-minded though he was, he gave no indication of sympathy with men who, possessed of a less untroubled faith than his, challenged those beliefs which to him were presuppositions.

His theology is singularly personal. There is in his volumes something of that mature wisdom which is one of the perquisites of a vigorous and intellectual maturity. One can never understand fully his *Outlines of Theology* and his volume on *The Christian Doctrine of God* until after reading the little autobiographical volume to which reference has been made. Then the entire situation is plain. Dr. Clarke inherited an orthodoxy which he never abandoned, but which he humanized and, one is almost tempted to say, christianized. With all his open-mindedness and genuine sympathy with theological science, he never developed a new theological technique or modified the primacy accorded by orthodoxy to the Bible. He did abandon, however, the scholastic doctrine of inspiration and came to see that only those contents of the Bible could be used for a Christian theology which are consonant with the heart of Christ. But if his volumes leave us no record of any change in method, they are brimming over with evidences of a change in spirit. In his earlier days he tells us that he tried to answer Herbert Spencer with quotations from the Scriptures, but in his later days he set forth with sweet eloquence the ideals of Jesus himself, in full sympathy with evolutionary thought. As German humanism passed through Luther's religious experience to produce Lutheranism, so orthodoxy passed through the experience of Dr. Clarke to become a message of religion. One can trace with considerable clearness the progress of his denaturizing of orthodoxy. The essence of orthodoxy is its submission to supernatural authority expressed either in the decrees of the church or in the Scripture. Protestant as well as Roman Catholic orthodoxy has accepted the great mass of material inherited from Augustine and the ecumenical councils, and has used this material as the standard for interpreting the Scripture.

Dr. Clarke ceased to appeal to this supernaturalism in so far as it concerned the Scriptures, but never rejected supernaturalism as furnishing the content of a theological system. There is little in either of his two main volumes that is not either a restatement or a reevaluation of an inherited orthodoxy. His doctrine of God, for example, is orthodoxy, but it is orthodoxy cleared of such characteristics as make it inhospitable to modern thought; Dr. Clarke is a Trinitarian, but in his treatment of the doctrine of God there is nothing to show the method by which Trinitarianism arose from, and satisfied the religious needs of, the social mind by which it was formulated; but there is a facile reinterpretation of the Nicene formula into harmony with modern ideas. His doctrine of man is all but unaffected by an avowed belief in evolution. He is cautious about affirming the literalness of the biblical account of the fall, yet holds to the corruption of human stock through the race, although he refuses to believe that this corruption involves guilt. The two pages given in his *Outlines* to this important matter can hardly meet with the approval either of a thoroughgoing Augustinian, or of a modern anthropologist, yet it is orthodoxy with its disagreeable qualities removed, and its profoundly religious and moral character manifested. Here, as in his treatment of the Trinity, Dr. Clarke shows extraordinary power to write religiously about theological matters.

Speaking generally, the material for his theology he found in the Bible. It is true that formally he declares that theology finds its subject-matter in religion, but he never makes a comparative study of religious experience. One might almost say that just as the Roman Catholic church demands that the Bible be interpreted in accordance with the decisions of the Fathers, so Dr. Clarke uses the Bible as interpreted by his own deep religious experience. He himself would certainly have been the first to deny such an autobiographical element in his theology and would doubtless prefer to sum up his method as the use of scriptural elements "in the light of the large truths that Christ has contributed to human thought." But as a matter of fact, his system is a religious interpretation of theology rather than a theological interpretation of religion.

His system centers about Christ, but the problems which the modern world finds in the life of Christ he almost never mentions. He accepts the supernatural birth of Jesus without calling it the virgin birth, and holds that Jesus' relation to God was unique and that he worked miracles. But he declines to face the real problem raised by the use of the word "miracle" and leaves the issue in such shape that both the conservative and the progressive find in his treatment partial agreement with themselves. As regards the incarnation he holds to the presence of humanity and divinity in Christ and follows a line of thought which, except to the technically trained theologian, would seem hardly unlike the ordinary orthodox presentation. But here again the old problems which gave rise to orthodoxy are not distinctly faced and the formula finally reached is more homiletic than scientific. His method of treating this highly important point is so characteristic that I venture to quote it at length. The technical reader will be interested in observing how an evangelical impression is made by an anthology of Christological heresies.

Holding the doctrine of supernatural birth, we find it most simple and natural to think of the humanity of Christ in such a way as this: that the Logos provided his spirit, and formed the material of normal humanity so far as the spirit is concerned; and that his humanity further consisted, outwardly, in his possession of a human body and human relations, and, inwardly and more significantly, in the human limitations that restricted the action of that divine which constituted his spirit. He was divine in spiritual nature, and human in range of life and action, and hence in experience. The spirit that constituted the personality of Christ was divine: the fact that that spirit was living within human limits, spiritual as well as physical, rendered the personality human.

According to this view Jesus was not such a human being as human parents could bring into existence, but, by virtue of being divine, was the normal and ideal man; for surely God, coming into human personality, would constitute a man. He was not only more divine but more human than any other; for the normal and ideal man is most human of all. This view shows why Jesus did not inherit human depravity, and was not born to human sinfulness. Instead of being produced out of the vitiated common stock, his humanity was divine, initiated by divine act, constituted by divine indwelling. It was a clean humanity because it was a divine humanity.

This view avoids all questions about double consciousness and will; it

shows a single personality, neither wholly divine nor wholly human in consciousness, but partaking in both qualities: it shows why Jesus differed in consciousness from ordinary men, and why from God unincarnate; it relieves us of all question about his acting now as God and now as man; it makes his sinlessness seem reasonable. It does not solve all the difficulties in the case, but it solves more than other views, and corresponds reasonably well to the conditions that we find in the Scriptures.

Yet it would not be true to say that Dr. Clarke's work lacked originality. On the contrary, it abounds in originality. Only it is the originality of experience and conviction rather than that of hypothesis. He never sought so much new truth as he did new applications and new presentations of old truths. Of the empirical method in theology he apparently had no thought. The epistemological questions which lie below theology, and the historical questions concerning Jesus which are now so much to the forefront, he never treated. Of the problems in historical evaluation forced upon the theologian by studies of comparative religion in general and of the apocalyptic literature of Judaism in particular, of questions of method in the use of the experience of Jesus and of the Christian church, of the nature of assurance as affected by the rise of pragmatism and other new philosophies, of all these subjects we find no mention. But we find none the less something which for the non-technical reader is quite as valuable, possibly more valuable, and that is the mature convictions of an open-minded, profoundly religious man regarding the great structure of orthodoxy for which Protestantism stands. Dr. Clarke has saved the faith of many a man sorely beset by a new scientific thinking, and his salvation was accomplished, not by argument, but by an exposition of the heart of Christian truth expressed in beautiful literary form and with the warmth of real religious conviction. Whatever may be the theology of the future, however much its method must be changed and its problems redefined, the service rendered by Dr. Clarke will never be outlived, for he not only freed the spirit of orthodoxy from its scholastic wrappings, but he also enabled men to hold courageously to that spirit while turning their faces to the exigent problems which Dr. Clarke himself did not attempt to answer.

GEORGE WILLIAM KNOX

The untimely death of Professor George William Knox of Union Theological Seminary occasions to the cause of theological thought and religious activity a loss which will be felt throughout the world. Professor Knox was born in 1853, and after his graduation from Auburn Theological Seminary in 1877 was engaged in missionary work in Japan, filling the chair of philosophy and ethics at the Imperial University, and the chair of homiletics in Union Seminary at Tokyo. In 1897 he returned to this country, and has since that time occupied the chair of the philosophy and history of religion at Union Theological Seminary. As a co-operating editor of the *American Journal of Theology*, and by an occasional contribution, Professor Knox generously gave the benefit of his wide experience and catholic scholarship in the interests of promoting the soundest theological thinking. Professor Knox's greatest power lay in his virile and inspiring personality, and his remarkable ability to stimulate in students and hearers an eagerness for scholarly activity. He made it a rule never to refuse an invitation to speak unless prevented by some conflicting engagement. His services were thus freely given to the larger public interests in addition to his work in Union Theological Seminary. His published writings have furnished distinct stimulus to theological thought. Among them may be mentioned the Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures at Yale in 1903, entitled, "The Direct and Fundamental Proofs of the Christian Religion"; "The Spirit of the Orient," published in 1906; "The Development of Religion in Japan," in 1907, and "The Religion of Jesus," in 1909. At the time of his death he was in the Orient under appointment as the Union Seminary lecturer on Christianity in the Far East. The purpose of this lectureship is similar to that of the Barrows Foundation. He had spent three or four months in India and China and was in Korea when he was attacked by pneumonia, which, after a brief illness, resulted in his death.

RECENT THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE

BABYLONIAN RELIGION AND LITERATURE

Scholarship has the twofold task of original research and popular presentation. Modern pragmatism has decreed that that knowledge has double value which is worth knowing, not only for itself, but also because of its direct influence upon present life and thought. Not every scholar can popularize successfully. Perhaps the truest test of any popular presentation is that it not only interests a large lay public, but also carries this public so deeply into the subject that the presentation has actual scientific value for fellow-investigators. The happy combination of an authoritative scholar, thus presenting the results of scientific investigation, and particularly of his own investigation, and of a subject with actual, far-reaching interest, naturally promises much.

The American Committee for Lectures on the History of Religions were fortunate in selecting both the subject for the lectures of 1910 and the lecturer. Because of its relation to the religions of the Old and New Testaments the religion of Assyria and Babylonia has commanding interest for modern thought. The recent *Bibel-Babel* controversy did much to popularize the subject in Germany. But in this country it was until now almost a sealed book to the general public. Nor could anyone be found, either here or abroad, better fitted to present this subject properly than Professor Jastrow.¹

The six lectures give a clear and comprehensive presentation of the subject. The amount of material compressed into the limited space is remarkable. The author has carried his readers deep into the subject, and has so well summarized the results of the most recent research that this book forms actually the latest and most complete, even though concise, study of Babylonian religion.

Lecture I, really a general introduction, gives a rapid survey of the history of the early peoples and empires of Mesopotamia, with especial attention to religious influences and development. The discussion of the vexed Sumerian question is particularly illuminative.

Lecture II is a comprehensive treatment of the Pantheon from an objective, historic standpoint. After first discussing the selective

¹ *Aspects of Religious Belief and Practice in Babylonia and Assyria*. By Morris Jastrow, Jr. New York: Putnam, 1911. 471 pages. \$2.25.

processes by which the Babylonian religion eventually fixed upon the sun, moon, vegetation, storms, and water, the forces of nature with which man comes into most constant contact, as objects of deification and worship, the lecture treats in logical succession of the chief gods, Enlil, Ninib, Anu, Marduk, Ea, Nebo, Nergal, Shamash, Sin, Adad and Ashur, and Ishtar as goddess of war, of love, and mother-goddess. The presentation of the process of syncretism in the figure of Enlil is noteworthy.

Lecture III treats of voluntary divination, i.e., divination by means of some object, voluntarily chosen, through which man hopes to secure a sign indicative of future events. In the Babylonian religion this was generally the liver of a sacrificial animal, usually a sheep. The animal became sanctified by sacrifice. Its soul became attuned with the soul of the god to whom it was offered. The liver was the seat of the soul. By studying the liver of the animal it was possible to study its soul and the soul of the god attuned with it, and thus, peering "into the mental workshop of the gods, surprise them at work, planning future events on earth." The lecture is devoted almost entirely to this subject of hepatoscopy, according to the author, the most common form of voluntary divination in Babylon. While not disputing this, nevertheless the feeling is imminent that the importance of other forms of voluntary divination, particularly by means of oil and water, has been unduly minimized. None the less this lecture is certainly the best exposition to date of Babylonian voluntary divination.

Lecture IV discusses involuntary divination, or astrology, "wherein signs, indicating the purpose of the gods, are not sought, but forced upon our notice in spite of ourselves." This subject is of particular interest because of its immediate bearing upon the pan-Babylonist theory of astral religion. Professor Jastrow states emphatically that astral religion can be only a theoretic, artificial system, the product of priestly speculation alone, and never of spontaneous and natural origin and growth, never the religion of people or nation.

Lecture V treats of temples and cults, omen and incantation texts, evil spirits and their removal, lamentation rituals, penitential hymns and prayers to the moon-god, and the cult of Tammuz and Ishtar.

Lecture VI discusses after-life and ethics in Babylonian religion and life. The treatment of this last subject is original and suggestive.

The work is completed by valuable chronological tables, a carefully prepared index, and a large number of well-selected illustrations with lucid explanatory notes.

While naturally the detail of the German edition of the author's *Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* is impossible here, none the less in many respects these lectures represent a distinct advance upon the material and views there set forth. Our knowledge of Babylonian religion grows by leaps and bounds, due to the untiring labors of scholars, in whose very front rank Professor Jastrow occupies a foremost place. Particularly in his treatment of Ishtar and Tammuz is he happy. He no longer insists that Dumu-Zi and Dumu-Zi-Zu-Ab are separate deities. He now properly regards them as one and the same deity, identical with Tammuz whom, however, he still looks upon as a solar deity. He would have been more correct had he realized that Tammuz is rather a god of vegetation, and the son, as the name Dumu-Zi denotes, as well as the consort of Ishtar, the deification of Mother-Earth. He furthermore shows that the conception of the goddess as Mother-Earth was common to all Semites, and therefore presumably of primitive Semitic origin. Here he is certainly correct, as also in his further contention that the dual worship of Tammuz and Ishtar was chiefly of private, extra-temple character. It is one of the merits of this work that it distinguishes between systematic, hieratic temple cult and theology, and private, individualistic folk-religion. Undoubtedly much that has come down to us, particularly in incantation texts, belongs properly in the province of folk-religion and sympathetic magic.

Professor Jastrow deserves our sincere thanks for this distinct contribution to the knowledge of Babylonian religion. By studies like this the true belief and practice of religion is simplified and intensified.

JULIAN MORGENSTERN

HEBREW UNION COLLEGE

The first lectures delivered on the Wilde Foundation in "Natural and Comparative Religion in the University of Oxford," by Dr. Farnell, are a convincing demonstration of the need and the value of such a lectureship.¹ Dr. Farnell's wide researches in the domain of ancient religions, especially in Greece, have qualified him to speak with authority in this field. It was a happy choice which led him to select the question of influences from the religions of the eastern Mediterranean region (exclusive of Egypt), especially Babylonia, upon the religion of the earlier Greeks—a question to which little sober research has been devoted, although the most sweeping conclusions and assumptions have been

¹ *Greece and Babylon, A Comparative Sketch of Mesopotamian, Anatolian, and Hellenic Religions.* By Lewis R. Farnell. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911. 311 pages.

made and widely circulated. It is perhaps superfluous to state that Dr. Farnell's method is careful and sound throughout. He carefully defines his categories, as anthropomorphism and theriomorphism, the predominance of the goddess, the deities as nature-powers, as social powers, religion and morality, divine power and cosmogonies, the religious temperament of the eastern and western peoples, eschatologic ideas, ritual, etc. Following these, systematically marshalled, he endeavors to array the essentials so that a clear comparison is possible, and in this effort he has succeeded admirably. The method is so clear and so consistently and impartially carried through, that no one but the adherents of the "Pan-Babylonian" school will question Dr. Farnell's final result, viz., that in the second millennium before Christ there is no demonstrable influence from Babylonia upon Hellenic religion. The cumulative evidence of the successive categories as they are carefully scanned and summarized is altogether conclusive. The author demonstrates his case. This book, together with the recent researches of Kugler in Babylonian astronomy, and those of Cumont in tracing the actual progress of Babylonian religion westward in Graeco-Roman days, will undoubtedly do much toward the extermination of an epidemic of "Babylonitis" which bade fair to become chronic.

In offering the following suggestions all invidious criticism is entirely disclaimed. It is well known that we must base our chronology of early Cretan civilization upon the chronology of Egyptian history and Sir Arthur Evans accepts the Egyptian chronology as reconstructed by Petrie. That the enormously high dates of Petrie in the chronology of Egypt will not stand is perfectly evident, and such dates as the fourth millennium for Cretan remains, accepted by Dr. Farnell, must unquestionably be regarded with reserve. Again it is surprising to find Babylonian inscriptions cited by the author "dated as early as 4000 B.C." (p. 104), when it is highly improbable that we have a single inscription from Babylonia as old as even 3000 B.C. To be sure Dr. Farnell does not write as an orientalist and the discoveries of King which have completely discredited the old high dates in Babylonian history (precisely like those in Egypt) seem to have escaped the author's notice. They became common property, however, in 1907, and have been given wide circulation in King's *History of Sumer and Akkad*, as well as in the second edition of Ed. Meyer's *Geschichte des Altertums*. We even hear of the advanced state of society "in the fifth millennium B.C." in Babylonia (p. 117), and Lugalzaggisi appears "dated near to 4000 B.C." (p. 120), some fifteen to seventeen hundred years too early. The

author's chronological notes from earlier books seem not to have been correlated with the state of our knowledge so much altered since 1907.

The burning of the dead (p. 208), supposedly a Babylonian custom after Koldewey's report on his alleged "Feuernekropolen," has been shown to rest upon an error of Koldewey's and is without support. To the observations on the deification of the temple (p. 225) we can now add the further example of the Elephantine temple of the Hebrews in Egypt. In connection with the origin of Greek iconic religion (p. 233), we should doubtless recall the fact that the early Ionian so-called Apollos like that of Tenea in Munich are now generally regarded as strongly under Egyptian influence. Similarly, should we not turn to Egypt and ask if it be an accident that the slayer of Adonis should be a boar (p. 255), and that one version of the Osirian myth discloses Set, the murderer of Osiris, as a swine? In the interpretation of Hesiod the author seems not to have employed the brilliant essay of Eduard Meyer in *Genethliakon* which has thrown a new light on the significance of Hesiod. The discussion of ecstatic prophecy (p. 303) makes no reference to the Syrian youth in the Egyptian story of Wenamon, the earliest known example of prophetic ecstasy and belonging in the latter part of the age discussed by the author.

As to minor matters: there are more misprints than one would wish in so valuable a book. We find "Cybele" and "Kybele" on the same page, while in a number of cases the orthography of proper names is carried over from foreign sources without change, like the German "Sanherib" for Sennacherib and the French "Gargamich" for Carchemish. There is a slip in language on p. 19, "Zarathustra, in whose historic reality we ought not to doubt." These are very small matters, hardly to be mentioned in a work of such solid merit—a work for which the learned author has placed every student of the early world under substantial obligation.

JAMES HENRY BREASTED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The fourteenth volume of the *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments* (edited by Bousset and Gunkel assisted by Ranke and Ungnad) furnishes the biblical student the first trustworthy translation and interpretation of the Gilgamesh epic.¹ Almost without exception, the scholars who have worked upon this important

¹ *Das Gilgamesch-Epos*. Neu übersetzt von Arthur Ungnad und gemeinverständlich erklärt von Hugo Gressmann. Göttingen, 1911. iv+232 pp. M. 2.

piece of Babylonian literature have developed astral-mythological and pan-Babylonist symptoms. That is to say, they have followed the students of comparative mythology of the type of Stucken, who explain every myth, legend, or folk-tale which the mind of man has ever invented, as a nature myth portraying in the primitive man's "philosophical" language the wanderings of sun, moon, or star (which of these depends, not upon the tale or legend, but upon the subspecies of comparative-mythologist), and have found in the Gilgamesh story an account of the journey of the sun (Gilgamesh) from the east to the west and then back again through the underworld to the starting-place. Their fertile minds have discovered with ease the astral significance of every one of the many episodes of the epic. Having fixed upon the astral nature of the story of Gilgamesh, the pan-Babylonists proceeded to trace the influence of the same upon the literature of the world. The high-water mark of this method was reached in Jensen's *Das Gilgamesch-Epos in der Weltliteratur*, Vol. I, in which practically every story or episode recorded in the Old and New Testaments is traced back to the Gilgamesh epic as prototype. In a second volume this method is to be applied to the literature of Europe, the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, etc.

Now it is the chief merit of the work of Ungnad and Gressmann that it is free from such vagaries. While full recognition is given to the admirable philological and exegetical work of Jensen, Ungnad finds it necessary to disagree with that scholar at many points. The arrangement of some of the fragmentary sections of the epic differs in this translation from that of Jensen, largely because Ungnad does not seem to be bound down by any theory as to what the epic must be like. For the same reason the translation of Ungnad is less "brilliant" but more accurate than that of Jensen.

In like manner Gressmann's part of the work is to be commended for its sanity. Gressmann recognizes that the Gilgamesh epic, if read without any astral hypothesis in mind, readily resolves itself into a number of episodes which have been more or less loosely woven into one story. So, for example, the account of the deluge probably circulated independently in Babylonia for a long time before it was appended to the story of Gilgamesh. Many of the episodes of the epic undoubtedly go back to historical occurrences of the days before Hammurabi. Babylonian cult and nature myths also found their way into the epic. That similar myths are found outside of Babylonia does not, however, make it necessary to suppose that these were borrowed from that source. These are the points upon which Gressmann rightly lays stress. On the other

hand, Gressmann holds with other scholars that many of the stories of the Old Testament, the account of the creation, the deluge story, etc., undoubtedly are to be traced directly to Babylonia. One may not agree with the date at which Gressmann believes this borrowing took place, but that borrowing did take place few will deny. Another valuable feature of the second part of this work is the keen literary analysis of the epic.

D. D. LUCKENBILL

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TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF THE RELIGION OF ISRAEL¹

The indefatigable industry of Professor König has now produced the book for which all his previous publications have been preparing. Having disposed of such subjects as Hebrew grammar, Old Testament introduction, Hebrew and Semitic lexicography, Old Testament poetry, the Old Testament idea of revelation, and the history of the kingdom of God in a series of bulky volumes, he now gathers up the results of all his work in this history of the Old Testament religion. He has felt called upon to do this, especially because "the development of the religion of Israel has, in many particulars, not been presented by the more recent works upon this subject in accordance with historical actuality." This failure to accord with reality, Professor König thinks, is not confined to questions of minor significance, but is apparent also in the consideration of some most fundamental topics. He naturally endeavors to point out the right way as over against the errors of his predecessors. This involves not only a statement of the author's own view, but a statement and criticism of the chief divergent views. In the arrangement of the text, the latter element in the discussion is printed in small type to differentiate it from the author's own positive and constructive statements.

König's method is that of the historical student. His results, however, differ from those presented by the majority of modern students in many particulars. This is largely because he shrinks from the thoroughgoing criticism of the Old Testament sources that is now prevalent. For example, he insists that the Decalogue and the Covenant Code go back to the days of Moses; that E and J belong respectively to

¹ *Geschichte der Alttestamentlichen Religion kritisch dargestellt.* By Ed. König. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1912. viii+608 pages. M. 7.

Biblische Theologie des Alten Testaments. Begonnen von B. Stade. Band II: "Die jüdische Religion von der Zeit Esras bis zum Zeitalter Christi." By A. Bertholet. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. xvi+546 pages. M. 10.

the period of the Judges and the days of David, and that the substance of the pre-Mosaic traditions is trustworthy, because writing was known in Israel as far back as the age of Abraham and because the memory of the primitive peoples is very tenacious. These premises being granted, the conclusions that must follow regarding the religion of the patriarchs, for example, are unavoidably different from the conclusions based upon a different evaluation of the earliest historical sources.

Scarcely a page of Dr. König's book is free from statements of directly opposite import to those found in the well-known works of such men as Wellhausen, Stade, Kautzsch, Cornill, Marti, Gunkel, Duhm, Smend, Giesebrecht, Driver, and G. A. Smith. One of the more important particulars in which this divergence is found is the evaluation of the religion of the period prior to Amos. One-half of the book is devoted to its treatment, an altogether disproportionate amount of space from the point of view of most modern students. Dr. König is undoubtedly right in refusing to recognize in Amos one who created a new religion in Israel, as some interpreters have claimed. Amos was the heir of generations of religious experience and was but carrying a little farther principles that had been formulated by his predecessors. But, on the other hand, to make the distinctive religion of Israel begin with Abraham is to make an uncritical use of the sources. Here and elsewhere the author fails to make sufficient allowance for the distance of time between his sources and the situations they describe. He accepts the statements of his sources too implicitly as representative of the actual conditions which they profess to set forth.

Professor König is right, as it seems to the reviewer, in his rejection of the hypothesis regarding the origin of Yahwism among the Kenites. The objections he urges thereto are forceful. In addition to these, attention may be called to a further difficulty with the hypothesis as expounded by Budde, its most eloquent advocate. The latter traces all the wonderful ethical progress of Israel to the fact that it has *chosen* its God, whereas other nations were born into the service of their gods, and served them as a matter of course. This explanation, however, fails to explain the ethical superiority of Israel, for the simple reason that the choice of new gods elsewhere in the world's history has never yielded such exalted ethical results. Another important respect in which our author is to be indorsed is his criticism of the view, that Israel, upon entering Canaan, came into a sphere where Babylonian culture was all-pervading and controlling. As a matter of fact, the results of recent excavations strongly support the testimony of the monumental and biblical records

to the effect that the dominant culture in Palestine from very early times on down through the history of Israel was that of Egypt. The evidences of Babylonian and Assyrian influence in this realm are surprisingly few and slight. The pan-Babylonian theory of the rise of Hebrew religion naturally and rightly finds no acceptance with Professor König.

But the author goes too far in this direction. He makes the life of Israel altogether too much a thing apart from the world's life. He denies the fact of any appreciable contribution to the thought of Israel either from Canaan and Baalism, or Babylon, or Assyria, or Persia. Not even agriculture was learned from the Canaanites; and consequently the rise of the agricultural feasts among the Hebrews is not to be traced to them. In positions such as this, Dr. König reveals his failure to appreciate and exercise a genuinely historical criticism. Literary criticism of itself is insufficient for the needs of Old Testament interpretation. It is only as one is saturated with the spirit and method of historical research that progress toward truth is made. In this regard Dr. König's work leaves much to be desired.

Exception might be taken to many other conclusions of this book, did space permit. For example, it is hardly safe now to deny the occurrence of the name Yahweh in early Babylonian documents (pp. 160 f.). The theory that Moses may have formulated laws with reference to conditions that were about to be confronted in Canaan (p. 149) fails to reckon with the fact that elsewhere laws have been made in response to actually existing needs, as they have been discovered in experience, rather than in anticipation of conditions yet to arise. Scarcely any use is made of the recently published papyri from Elephantiné, notwithstanding the many problems they present to the student of Hebrew religion. The discussion of the names Bethel (p. 88) and Anath (p. 257) would have been enriched by the use of these papyri. The difficulties that confront the hypothesis of the introduction of the Pentateuch as a whole by Ezra (p. 419) are too lightly passed over.

The volume by Bertholet is devoted wholly to the last section of Israelitish religious history, upon which König's volume expends but little more than a hundred pages. Bertholet treats it in three divisions, viz.: (1) the development of Judaism between the days of Ezra and Alexander; (2) Judaism in its relation with the Greek world; (3) the self-defense of Judaism against internal and external influences. The treatment of these subjects is somewhat atomistic in method. That is to say, details are brought out in great fulness, but the succeeding sections of the discussion are not always held together firmly by being linked to

certain great underlying movements or principles. The method set for this volume by the fact of its use in the first volume is a somewhat artificial and unnatural one in its rigid insistence upon a series of numbered sections and subsections throughout the volume.

In distinction from Professor König's attitude toward the indebtedness of Israel to foreign nations for religious and social ideas, that of Dr. Bertholet is very generous. He makes large place for the operation of outside influences upon Israel's thought, and especially for the influence of Greece. In the main, this is much nearer right than the view of König; but Bertholet falls back upon the theory of foreign influence at times too easily. It is certainly not necessary to attribute the universalism of the Psalter and of Jonah to hellenizing influences in any appreciable degree. The basis for the development of a universalistic attitude was already laid in the Servant of Yahweh songs. The assignment of Ecclesiastes and Zech., chaps. 9-14, to the Maccabean or later times seems unnecessary, if not impossible; and the placing of Habakkuk as a contemporary of Alexander the Great does not carry conviction, despite Duhm's clever advocacy of that view.

But the volume offers us, on the whole, the best and most comprehensive treatment of the religion of the Jews from the time of Ezra on. The general trend of Hebrew thought is clearly grasped and the spirit of the religious literature is distinctly perceived and appreciatively presented. Particularly good are the treatments of the religion of the law, the Psalter, and the Wisdom writings. As long as so much uncertainty prevails in reference to the dates of most of the literary sources for this period, it is, of course, impossible that anybody should succeed in so reconstructing the religious history of these times as to win universal approval. But this volume will prove helpful, even to those who differ from the author in many particulars, because of its abundant citation of facts and its suggestiveness in the interpretation of them. No better hand could have been found to carry the work of the late Professor Stade to completion. In spirit and in method the two volumes are one.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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THE HISTORICITY OF JESUS AND THE GOSPELS

We are being told by a number of vigorous writers that Jesus, instead of being a historical character, is a mythical character, that the Gospels, instead of being records of first-century events, are fictitious compositions, designed to present a series of mythical concepts. That this contention inverts all the existing evidence Professor Case

has made perfectly clear in a noteworthy book.¹ The root of the matter comes out clearly in the difference of method between a writer like Arthur Drews (author of *The Christ Myth*) and his Chicago critic. The one begins with a philosophical reflection, the other with a historical inquiry. Like the most rigid Christian orthodoxy, the mythologist conceives Jesus in purely dogmatic terms, as a concept related to a certain philosophic and theological system. This concept and this system are to him repugnant, therefore their reality is denied. So far so good. Then the conclusion thus a priori attained is given further support by appeal to historical data. Here the philosopher, not being a historian, nor possessing the historical sense, falls into difficulties and weakens his contention. The "Christ" of dogmatic systems may be a myth; philosophic considerations are at least in place against it. But the Jesus of history is wholly unaffected by such considerations. Whether or no he lived is a question for the historian to answer, differing in no wise from the question whether Seneca or Luther or Napoleon lived.

This Professor Case sees, and, without philosophic speculations as to the "Christ" of any system, he points out clearly and positively that the historic evidence demonstrates beyond any doubt that Jesus lived. The origin of the Christian movement, the mission and letters of Paul, the composition of the Gospels, the allusions in early non-Christian writings are explicable only on the hypothesis that the Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels really lived, and that these gospels are history, perhaps with a measure of elaboration and idealization, but history still. It is perhaps a pity that this had to be demonstrated, but since it was necessary Professor Case has done it admirably. The English reader who can read the *Christ Myth* and then read the *Historicity of Jesus*, without being sure that Drews has no case whatever, is not to be envied.

As the deniers of Jesus' historicity agree with "orthodoxy" in viewing Jesus dogmatically, so too they agree that the original of the Jesus-figure was the God-man Christ, not a human being exalted to divine status, but a god brought down to earth. The position of Catholicism and conservative Protestantism, that Jesus is a superhuman divinity, is correct, says Drews, and he joins these forces in polemic against the common enemy, "liberal" Protestantism. The Jesus who is a great religious man is a creation of the Protestant theologians of the nineteenth

¹ *The Historicity of Jesus. A Criticism of the Contention that Jesus Never Lived, a Statement of the Evidence for His Existence, an Estimate of His Relation to Christianity.* By Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. vii+352 pages. \$1.50.

century, we are told, the miraculous dying God is the only Christ whom the first century knew, and that only in faith. Case's first chapter therefore deals with the "historical Jesus" of liberal theology. The chapter is brief and necessarily inadequate, but at least leaves the clear impression that the historical Jesus was found in the Synoptic Gospels, not in the brains of modern theologians. The next three chapters present the negative statement and the historical arguments adduced in its favor. The summary of the literature here is extremely valuable, and the thesis that the mere statement of an untenable hypothesis is often its best refutation is strikingly exemplified. At the same time the weakness of the so-called "proofs" is pointed out, and positive errors are corrected. The last chapters present the positive evidence, canonical and non-canonical, for Jesus' existence. That this evidence cannot be denied or explained away, as Drews would do, is clear. With perfect positiveness and simplicity Professor Case has put the whole matter in the proper light and won the gratitude of every English reader. Not least among the book's merits is the fine appreciation, at the end, of Jesus as a religious man and a helper and friend of all religious men. There is nothing dogmatic, nothing of theology, here, but only what is deeply and wisely Christian.

In 1909 the Jewish savant, Solomon Reinach, issued in Paris a brief manual of the general history of religions, including Judaism and Christianity, from the dawn of history to the present day. This volume, entitled *Orpheus*, sprang into an immediate vogue, and was widely translated (English edition by Miss Florence Simmonds. London: Heinemann, 1909). Not less immediate and marked was the criticism it provoked from a wide variety of sources. Among earlier critics was Loisy, soon followed by Batiffol, who published in 1910, under the title *Orpheus et l'Évangile*, a series of eight lectures delivered before a representative Catholic audience in Versailles. The theme of the lectures is expressed in the title *The Credibility of the Gospel* of the English translation (by Rev. G. C. H. Pollen, S.J.).² Their substance is "a Catholic reply to *Orpheus*," in the form of a criticism of Reinach's chapter on "Christian Origins." That it is a Catholic reply conditions, of course, its position and general conclusions. It is a restatement of the tradition of the church. And yet its method is that of modern scientific scholarship; it rests on adequate knowledge, not only of the sources, but of the best critical work of our times. There is no hesitation to engage in the critical examination of the tradition, even if the tradition

² *The Credibility of the Gospel*. By Monseigneur Pierre Batiffol. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. 220 pages. \$1.50 net.

always emerges unscathed. "We can trust the church of the second century" (p. 154). "We can trust the church of all time" (p. 156). So of the "assertions in the Fourth Gospel which cannot be verified by history. We hold them to be true because they are inspired, and we hold them to be inspired because the church guarantees them as such" (p. 156). Here speaks the true Catholic.

Yet the critical discussion is for the most part such as a scholarly, conservative Protestant theologian might offer. A large part of the work is naturally occupied with the sources for our knowledge of the life of Jesus, their authenticity and trustworthiness. While there are few, if any, new points of view, excellent are the chapters on the non-canonical evidence, the demonstration that Paul had full knowledge of Jesus' career, and the discussion of the synoptic problem. Fresh and persuasive is the argument in the seventh lecture for the authenticity of the synoptic utterances of Jesus, based on their unity of conception, their inimitable style, and their exact conformity to the local and temporal setting. Less convincing are the chapter on Acts, following Harnack's latest view, and much of the last chapter, which treats of the miracles and other less natural elements of the gospel story. Yet here too there are points well taken, such as the refutation of Reinach's resolution of the Passion into a mythical echo of the Sacaean festival, and the caution concerning the use of Old Testament passages as the origin of gospel episodes. On the whole, wherever positions advanced in *Orpheus* are directly controverted, Batiffol is usually right and Reinach wrong. As a piece of sober, popular apologetic the work is commended, and those who do not have its material conveniently at hand elsewhere will do well to make its closer acquaintance.

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STUDIES IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

Of the three studies here noted, that of Wendt¹ is literary, Overbeck's² is primarily historical, while Büchsel's³ is biblico-theological. For some

¹ *Die Schichten im vierten Evangelium*. Von H. H. Wendt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1911. 158 pages. M. 4.40.

² *Das Johannesevangelium: Studien zur Kritik seiner Erforschung*. Von F. Overbeck. Aus dem Nachlass herausgegeben von C. A. Bernoulli. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. xii+540 pages. M. 12.

³ *Der Begriff der Wahrheit in dem Evangelium und den Briefen des Johannes* (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie. XV, 3). Von F. Büchsel. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1911. 144 pages. M. 2.80.

years Wendt has been known as the advocate of a partition hypothesis by which he seeks to distinguish between the original apostolic tradition and the later accretions in our present Gospel of John. His present work is a restatement of this same general position. After a brief survey of recent discussions of the problem the author cites a few illustrative passages, such as 1:15; 3:18 f.; 5:28 ff., where the interruption of the narrative is thought to be particularly evident. On applying this principle of distinguishing the original narrative from the interrupting paragraph, we are shown the original *Redenschrift* which was thus later supplemented and to some extent rearranged by an editor whose interest was, among other things, to stimulate belief in Jesus' messiahship, to harmonize John with the Synoptic Gospels, to show the proper relationship of John the Baptist to Jesus, and to affirm the apostolic authority of the work. The primitive document was composed in Ephesus by John the apostle, who thought of Jesus mainly as a prophet and recorded his discourses from that point of view. Finally, Wendt prints the whole gospel in a German translation, distinguishing by a typographical device the primary from the secondary elements. It is not easy to free oneself from the fear that a large subjective element may have entered into the application of this hypothesis.

The posthumous work of Overbeck, who died in 1905, seems likely to prove more valuable as a compendium of data than as a contribution to the solutions of special problems. It offers a valuable survey of the study of this gospel beginning with the rationalists, the external tradition regarding the gospel and its author is examined at length, the internal evidence is briefly stated, the divergences from the Synoptic Gospels are noted, the question of the Fourth Gospel's origin is treated with considerable fulness, and the chief data regarding the Johannine writings as canonical documents are recalled. In a few closing pages the editor brings the literature of the subject up to date.

A more specific examination of Overbeck's views on the question of authorship may serve to indicate the character of his work. After a full statement of the external evidence he concludes that Irenaeus was more concerned to affirm apostolic authority than to record reliable tradition for any gospel, hence what he says about the Fourth Gospel's origin does not help to solve the riddle but only adds to the difficulty. The testimony of Papias preserved by Eusebius is thought to be similarly fruitless, the tradition of the apostle John's early death by martyrdom is accepted, and the real source of the whole tradition about his Ephesian residence is said to have grown out of the desire to give this gospel apostolic authority.

The book itself probably arose in Asia Minor and was pseudonymous, the author deliberately leaving his name a mystery. The effort of tradition to solve this mystery produced the tradition of Johannine authorship. Recent notions about a "school of John" in Asia are said to be wholly unsupported by evidence, and the hypothesis of two Johns in Ephesus, particularly as used by Harnack, is held to represent almost the height of absurdity in the treatment of the Johannine problem. This search after the name of some distinguished person—John the Apostle, John the presbyter, a member of the school of John—is declared to make impossible any true understanding of this gospel: "Just here is the Johannine question run entirely off the rails of a scientific treatment." This whole interest is apologetic and is correspondingly unscientific, in Overbeck's opinion.

His book is deserving of more attention than is usually given to posthumous publications. It shares the defects which sometimes accompany volumes issued under these conditions. It is not free from repetitions and the arrangement of material may not always seem to the reader ideal, yet the editor is to be commended for making the work available for the public. Although the main part of the book takes no account of the last six years of investigation, the problems which it discusses are not yet closed. Overbeck has gathered together with care and comprehensiveness, and in the spirit of rigid critical research, many of the materials which have to be taken into account in any thorough study of this New Testament book.

Büchsel's monograph is an interpretation of the word *ἀλήθεια* as it occurs in the gospel and epistles of John. The principal topics discussed are the contexts in which the word truth and its derivatives stand, the evangelist's conception of Jesus as "truth," the "spirit of truth," and the recognition and nature of truth. In this study the comparative method is not employed; the exposition is made solely upon the basis of Johannine usage. While this usage is doubtless distinctive, signifying, as the author points out, a recognition of the divine character of Jesus, it can hardly have sprung into being fullgrown. Other New Testament writings, the Old Testament, and the thought-world in which the writer of the Gospel of John happened to find himself must have had more or less importance for determining his ideas. It is doubtful whether his thought can be adequately interpreted without bringing it into the light of these genetic relationships.

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RECENT OPINIONS ON NEW TESTAMENT CHRONOLOGY

The recent brochures of Koch,¹ Harnack,² and Westberg,³ treating certain phases of New Testament chronology, present conclusions which are radical and sometimes seemingly erratic. In an excursus at the end of his third volume of *Beiträge*, Harnack expressed the opinion that weighty arguments could be advanced for dating the Book of Acts early in the sixties. He was then content, however, to conclude that "Luke wrote in the time of Titus or in the early days of Domitian, but perhaps even at the beginning of the sixties." Koch has taken up this suggestion and worked it out, as he thinks, to a certainty. From Acts 28:30 f., where Paul is left in his own hired house to preach without hindrance, Koch concludes that the Book of Acts was written while Paul was still in this condition. The date, then, is not later than 62 A.D. The Gospel of Luke must have been written a year or two earlier, and Mark earlier still; and since Mark presupposes the existence of Matthew (here Koch follows Zahn), all our synoptic gospels existed by the year 61 A.D.

Harnack takes up his former suggestion of an early date for the Lukan writings, and commits himself definitely on the question. He arrives at much the same conclusions reached by Koch, with the exception of following the more usual view of placing Matthew after Mark. He assigns Matthew a date soon after the fall of Jerusalem, "yet composition before the catastrophe is not to be positively excluded." The first part of Harnack's discussion is taken up with a defense of his contention for the Lukan authorship of "Acts" and "Luke." In this he has little to add to his former arguments, and it is doubtful whether his reply to criticisms will seem more convincing than were his former statements. Apparently he does not attempt a comprehensive rebuttal of objections, for he quite ignores some of the most incisive criticisms that have been passed upon his former work.⁴ The discussion of the chronological problem is the feature of the present volume which naturally attracts most attention.

¹ *Die Abfassungszeit des lukanischen Geschichtswerkes: Eine historisch-kritische und exegetische Untersuchung.* Von H. Koch. Leipzig: Deichert, 1911. vii+102 pages. M. 1.80.

² *Neue Untersuchungen zur Apostelgeschichte und zur Abfassungszeit der synoptischen Evangelien* (Beiträge zur Einleitung in das Neue Testament. IV. Heft). Von A. Harnack. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1911. 114 pages. M. 3.80.

³ *Zur neutestamentlichen Chronologie und Golgathas Ortslage.* Von F. Westberg. Leipzig: Deichert, 1911. iv+144 pages. M. 3.

⁴ E.g., Bacon, "Professor Harnack on the Lukan Narrative" in the *American Journal of Theology*, XIII (1909), 59-76.

Harnack follows much the same line of argument as does Koch in placing Acts early in the sixties. The principal argument rests upon the fact that Acts breaks off with Paul "in his own hired house" preaching the gospel without hindrance. If Paul had been brought to trial the issue, it is held, would have been indicated. Subsidiary arguments are drawn from the silence of Acts regarding historical events in the seventh decade, and from the alleged primitive character of its terminology and theological notions. The second main argument for the early date is connected with Luke, chap. 21, the so-called eschatological discourse of Jesus. This as recorded in Luke is usually supposed to betray a knowledge of the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D., but according to Harnack's dating this supposition must be shown to be false. The success or failure of this new chronological scheme may be said to hang upon these two crucial points—the interpretation of Acts 28:30 f. and Luke, chap. 21. While the world of New Testament scholarship places great confidence in Harnack's opinions, it seems doubtful whether these recent expressions of his convictions are likely to win general assent.

Westberg covers a wider field, also defending views expressed in an earlier work.¹ He had advocated 64 B.C. (instead of 63) as the date of Pompey's conquest of Jerusalem; 67 rather than 66 A.D. he held to be the beginning of the Jewish revolt which resulted in Jerusalem's fall; he set Jesus' death on April 3, 33 A.D. and his birth in 12 B.C. These views were severely criticized by Schürer, hence the author's restatement of his opinions. His fondness for unusual hypotheses appears also in his treatment of Paul. He rejects both the North and the South Galatian theory, and locates the Galatian churches in a northwestern province of Asia Minor "lying between Mysia, Lydia, Phrygia and Bithynia." He also follows Lisco and Deissmann in advocating an Ephesian imprisonment for Paul. The last thirty-six pages of the brochure are taken up with the problem of Golgotha's location. Westberg does not accept the traditional site, where the Church of the Holy Sepulcher now stands; he prefers the view which fixes upon the vicinity north of Jerusalem. He thinks he finds new evidence for this theory in the Essene letter which purports to have been written by an eye-witness of the crucifixion seven years after the event, and addressed to a brother Essene of Alexandria. Westberg admits the spuriousness of this document, which at intervals during the last two centuries has been imposed upon the public in Germany, England, and America, yet he thinks it embodies some other-

¹ *Die biblische Chronologie nach Flavius Josephus und das Todesjahr Jesu* (Leipzig, 1910).

wise unknown features of primitive Christian tradition. Whatever is to be said in favor of locating Golgotha north of Jerusalem, certainly no critical value can be attached to the alleged Essene manuscript.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

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NEW TESTAMENT TEACHING ABOUT RESURRECTION

Professor Bowen writes a valuable book¹ on a subject which is deeply in need of more intelligent treatment. The subject is too complex and obscure to permit the expectation that any author will give full and equal satisfaction at every point, but Professor Bowen's book is on the whole a luminous and welcome contribution.

The strongest feature of the discussion is perhaps its presentation of the radical difference between Paul's view of the resurrection of Jesus and that which is most conspicuous in the Gospels. Paul witnesses to experiences and convictions of the disciples, while the Gospels witness to *post-mortem* acts of Jesus. With Paul the rising of Jesus is always from among the souls of the dead, in the Gospels it is from the grave. What Paul contended against in Corinth was essentially that view which later found expression in all the gospels and which has dominated Christian thought to the present. Paul's witness to the resurrection of Jesus is treated as fundamental. Then follows a discussion of Mark's data. Mark 14:28 is regarded as an interpolation, and the episode of the women at the grave owes its origin wholly to pious imagination. As to the empty grave, the whole course of events is held to be strongly against its probability. "It was not the three women on the morning of the third day who discovered the empty tomb: it was the Christian church about the year sixty." The empty tomb was the inference from the materialization of the original spiritual thought of resurrection. "Mark 16:1-8 is as truly a legend as the grotesque picture of Pseudo-Peter."

Professor Bowen regards Matthew's conception of the exact time of the resurrection as "psychologically and dramatically more true" than that of Mark. He admits that Matthew's note of time, read literally, puts the visit of the women *before* Sunday, but holds nevertheless that he meant to express by it Sunday morning. Matt. 28:9-10 are an interpolation. They break the connection and are in every

¹ *The Resurrection in the New Testament. An Examination of the Earliest References to the Rising of Jesus and of Christians from the Dead.* By Clayton R. Bowen. New York: Putnam, 1911. 490 pages. \$1.75.

respect a disturbing element. The story of Matt. 28:11-15 is, of course, held to be utterly impossible. Matt. 28:16 is understood to refer to the mountain where Jesus had chosen his apostles. The author, however, does not suggest why the disciples should have gone to that particular spot to await the fulfilment of the promise that the risen Lord would appear to them in Galilee. The Emmaus episode is Luke's own construction, and "designed to set forth the thought that the Christian movement which eventuated in the world-church of the second century did not go out altogether or chiefly from the twelve apostles." In Luke's account of the appearance to the Eleven "every shred of historicity is lost in the urgency of the apologetic need." The Johannine story of the resurrection does not contain any historical element. This position is justified both by the character of the Fourth Gospel as a whole and also by the study of the narrative itself. Historical fact can be predicated of only two of the appearances of Jesus recorded in the Gospels, and as these were both in Galilee, Galilee is regarded as the birthplace of the church.

This brief sketch merely affords the reader a glimpse at the trend and quality of Professor Bowen's book. One could desire, let it be said in closing, that the results of this study, stripped of all technical details, might be brought to the attention of Christian people in general.

GEORGE HOLLEY GILBERT

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A NEW MANUAL OF EARLY CHURCH HISTORY

The student of church history certainly cannot complain of the lack of manuals in his field; on the contrary, he is confronted rather with an embarrassment of riches. With the *Moeller von Schubert*, the *Kurtz*, the *Karl Mueller*, the *Heussi*, the *Newman*, etc., before him, his problem is one of choice rather than search. To complicate this problem comes under the editorship of Professor Gustav Krüger of the University of Giessen yet another manual differentiating itself from its predecessors by being of a co-operative character. Following on the third part, there has now appeared the first part, covering from the beginnings to the end of the seventh century.¹ This section of the

¹ *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte für Studierende*, in Verbindung mit Gerhard Ficker in Kiel, Heinrich Hermelink in Thekla bei Leipzig, Erwin Preuschen in Hirschhorn, Horst Stephan in Marburg, herausgegeben von Gustav Krüger in Giessen. Erster Teil, *Das Allertum*. Bearbeitet von D. Dr. Erwin Preuschen, Pfarrer in Hirschhorn a. N., und D. Dr. Gustav Krüger, Professor in Giessen. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1911. xiv+295 pages. M. 5.

work is written partly (to Diocletian) by Dr. Erwin Preuschen, pastor in Hirschhorn, and (Diocletian to the end of the seventh century) by the general editor. The book possesses high merit as a summary of facts and as a bibliographical guide on periods and on topics. It has been polished till it gleams. For orientation on any subject falling in the periods treated both in fact and bibliography no better means can be found. On the side of interpretation and form one or two features invite further comment.

To the question of form the reader's attention is turned by the general editor's reference to the relative value of longer or shorter subdivisions split up into a greater or less number of topical treatments. This discussion is of greater significance for the history of the writing of church history in Germany than might at first sight appear. For the old method of presentation, some details of which the authors attempt to modify, goes back to the *Magdeburg Centuries*, as the Rev. A. C. Headlam has well said. Before these, according to Headlam, history had always been looked upon as a narrative of facts. But the narrative now became subordinate. "Instead of a continuous narrative, the reader finds his subject divided into centuries, and in each century the matter is subdivided under fifteen headings. This method, entirely destructive of the real value of history, has been imposed on all historians who have had their inspirations from Germany."² How true these remarks are is amply illustrated by the volume in question, where, in spite of the efforts of the authors to break away from the absolutely artificial period divisions into centuries and the wooden division into topics, the fell conception of the writers of the *Centuries* still holds sway. For, while the volume is far more than a series of dissertations on the developments of dogma and philosophy, as Headlam alleges of the earlier works, yet in conception it is still a *series of essays*, essays on the same topics recurring in different stratas of time. The result of this treatment is indeed to destroy much of the real value of history, for it is very difficult to get a sense of continuous development—almost impossible, one would say, for a beginner. The present authors, therefore, are significantly moving in the right direction when they attempt a treatment of the development of the church that corresponds with real landmarks in its history.

On the side of interpretation, there are found some promising foundations for a broader interpretation of church history. In the first place, Christianity is placed, or nearly so, in the perspective of

² "Methods of Early Church History," *English Historical Review*, XIV, 7.

the evolution of religion. In the second place, the process of transformation as a whole, especially the orientalizing of many of its features, through which the Empire was slowly passing, is much more successfully suggested than usual. Finally, a beginning is made here and there of showing the significance of Christianity and the church for this process of transformation.

But it is only a beginning, as witness, for instance, such a paragraph as that headed "Das Verhältnis zu Staat und Gesellschaft" (§ 10), where the point of view is entirely that of the reaction of the state on the church and deals with the beginnings of persecution. The paragraphs entitled "Die sozialen Aufgaben" (§ 20), "Der Sieg der Kirche" (§ 26), and "Kirche und Welt" (§ 34) are excellent in their statement of the attitude of Christianity toward the state, toward public life, of its attempts to raise the morality of its ever-increasing membership, but they fall short of showing what all this means for the society of the Roman Empire as a whole; namely, that even if Christianity did not, at least before the fourth century, set itself systematically to alter conditions in the society around it, yet by its very growth in numbers it was tending to make the bounds of its own state approximately those of the Roman world, and that in this state, in spite of all the continuous modifications, there prevailed ideals of social practice, conduct, education, and culture widely different from those of the contemporary non-Christian world. In other words, Christianity tended to transform the Roman world less by a definite campaign directed to that end than by a substitution of its world for that of the non-Christian world, a substitution that takes place by growth and construction of its own society accompanied by corresponding shrinkage in the numbers of the non-Christians. It is chiefly in these paragraphs that the authors approach most nearly to what seems to the writer the most fruitful attitude to be assumed in the study of church history. That attitude is one which conceives of the history of the church as that of an attempt on the part of a social group to revolutionize inside its own bounds the "mores" of the surrounding society from which it at first attempts to withdraw but which it ends by attempting to dominate. It is needless to say that such a book, so conceived, will lay before us a presentation of church history in which, as the object of interest is new, the emphasis will be markedly different from that in current treatments.

CURTIS H. WALKER

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WORKS ON LUTHER AND CALVIN

Of the score of *Quellenschriften* thus far published in G. Krüger's scholarly series none deserve a more hearty welcome than those pertaining to some phase or character of modern history; for, most distinctively, they fill a long-felt want. In the book under discussion another volume is added to the two already belonging under that category. It is, of course, needless to say that its primary object, like that of its fellows, is to serve the purposes of the seminar, and the book is planned accordingly; but it may be well to point out that as a tool of a course in historical methodology for sharpening the student's perception and strengthening judgment the widely scattered materials here gathered have few rivals. But for the fact that they have been so far, except in a few places, not very readily accessible they would no doubt have been oftener put to that service.

Above all, however, it is the supreme interest attaching to the important subject with which they deal that leads us to hail with delight anything that may illumine a situation still somewhat beclouded. Odious and futile as has been Denifle's attempt to vilify Luther's teachings—the excrescence, as he put it, of his moral bankruptcy—his partisan polemics had at least one good effect; for he caused Protestant historians, obliged freely to admit that his criticism of the Weimar edition was partly justified, to bestir themselves. Since then, with the added stimulus that has come from Ficker's publication, students in this field have centered their activities on the earlier years of the reformer. New questions in abundance have been raised, and there are many cases in which no agreement has been reached among scholars. That Grisar's voluminous effort would be definitive no one seriously expected; and indeed so many are the implied aspersions cast upon the hero of his so-called biography that one is inclined to be rather skeptical with respect to his self-alleged *bona fides*. We think that Professor Scheel was right in assuming that the mere putting together and judicious grouping of documentary evidence might aid in ascertaining the exact truth concerning the "beginnings of Luther."

It cannot be denied that Scheel is exceptionally well equipped to perform the task; for we are already under obligations to him for an

Dokumente zu Luthers Entwicklung (bis 1519). Sammlung ausgewählter kirchen- und dogmengeschichtlicher Quellenschriften als Grundlage für Seminarübungen. By Dr. theol. Otto Scheel. Herausgegeben unter Leitung von Professor Dr. theol. G. Krüger. 2. Reihe, 9. Heft. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. xiii+146 pages. M. 3.

exceedingly thorough, if not very readable volume, entitled *Die Entwicklung Luthers bis zum Abschluss der Vorlesung über den Römerbrief.*" He does not essay to put before us all the evidence which might be presented—an undertaking which would, of course, have necessitated a much larger volume. There are no quotations, as might be expected, from Biel, or Augustine, or from the mystics; likewise all that may be found in Koehler and Stange has been discarded. Within these limits, the collection is fairly complete; at least, it suffices to show how the main thoughts in Luther's theology gradually grew in clearness. The *dictata super Psalterium* have been put to good account, and there are seventy-five extracts from the newly discovered lectures on the Epistle to the Romans.

Still, there are omissions which in some cases will be keenly felt. How much might have been added has in one instance—the journey to Rome—been indicated by Scheel himself. In connection with the contention that Luther was inspired by Hutten's *Vadiscus*, a number of passages in the comments on Romans severely criticizing existing conditions are very significant; we find in them the germs of what grew later to be the mighty appeal *To the Christian Nobility*. From the few short excerpts given we derive, however, a rather inadequate idea of what Luther really says (cf. Ficker, I, 2, pp. 30, 31, 272, 300 f.). As Luther's tortures in his convent days have been interpreted by Braun as being "mystical exercises," the famous paragraph in the *Resolutiones* ought not to have been reprinted in an abridged form, and in order that the absurdity of this view might be more plainly seen, Weimar edition, I, 558, 25 f.; II, 688; and V, 620 f. should have been added. There are sufficient quotations to show whether or not there are traces of neo-Platonism (Hunzinger) in the comments on the Psalms, and the influence of the mystics, which of late has been greatly exaggerated, can also be studied. But in the extracts from Romans we miss several telling utterances bearing all the marks of the *Theologia Paulina*. We refer especially to the beautiful passage (Ficker, I, 2, p. 44):

Cor enim credentis in Christum, si reprehenderit eum et accusaverit eum contra eum testificans de malo opere, mox avertit se et ad Christum convertit dicitque: Hic autem satisfecit, hic iustus est, hic mea defensio, hic pro me mortuus est, hic suam justitiam meam fecit et meum peccatum suum fecit. Quod si peccatum meum suum fecit, iam ego illud non habeo et sum liber.

The extracts are chronologically arranged and numbered; there are 326. For didactic reasons the book divides into two parts, the second- and third-class sources being followed by the far more numerous

first-class material. But is it not conceding decidedly too much to Denifle to relegate to the first group even reminiscences found in the earlier writings, for example No. 94 (*Resolutiones*) and No. 98 (Ficker I, 2, p. 273)?

Every extract is prefaced with a heading approximately stating its contents. Though on the whole that will prove helpful, it may sometimes be misleading. Chronological arrangement is what we naturally look for; but that might have been retained, if closely related materials, which are now woefully detached, had been gathered under a more general heading. It should not have been too difficult to find such headings, as, in the main, they would have been suggested by the problems now being discussed. Of course, retrospective references would be needed in case of recurrences. As the book, even in its present form, to a certain extent paves the way for the research student, the needs of the seminar could hardly be cited as an obstacle to making such a change.

Here and there the Weimar text has been altered to accord with corrections made by Denifle (cf. 238), and wherever possible the text of the Erlangen *Ausgabe* has also been improved upon (cf. 8). Still, nowhere an attempt has been made at changing the faulty spelling and punctuation of the original. No. 115, *sysiphium* (Weimar *Sysiphium*), and even *isioneumque* are retained. The great scantness and brevity of footnotes is likewise regrettable, as they would have considerably enhanced the usefulness of the volume. It is a pity, moreover, that there is no index, or rather, that there are no indices; for not only is a topical index wanting, but we also miss, to our great annoyance, a summing-up of the Erlangen as well as of other quotations. However, we have every reason to be grateful for two other lists contained in Scheel's introduction, a list of the principal books and articles drawing from these sources, and a list of the documents discussed by Denifle and Grisar with references to the respective pages of their works. Several misprints (p. 130, 20, *a rudentia* for *a prudentia*; p. 127, note, "No. 6" for "No. 7"; and p. 56, 25, *iquae* for *quae*) have been overlooked.

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L'Excuse de Noble Seigneur Jaques de Bourgogne, Seigneur de Falais et de Bredam is a product of the pen of John Calvin¹ with which, doubt-

¹ *L'Excuse de Noble Seigneur Jaques de Bourgogne, Seigneur de Falais et de Bredam*. Réimpression sur l'unique exemplaire de l'édition de Genève 1548 avec une introduction par Alfred Cartier. Deuxième édition. Geneva: A. Jullien, 1911. 49 pages. Fr. 15.

less, comparatively few scholars are familiar. All copies of the original edition, published at Geneva in 1548, had apparently been destroyed. The editors of Calvin's works, after extended but vain searches for it in France and Switzerland, were compelled to content themselves with a sixteenth-century Latin translation of the original—not, however, by the hand of Calvin—of which there exist a few rare copies. A few years later, however, a copy of the long-lost original edition was discovered in a private library. In 1896 a reprint of this long-concealed pamphlet, together with an introduction by M. Alfred Cartier, the discoverer of the work, appeared in the *Bibliothèque d'un curieux* founded at Paris by Alfonse Lemerre. This limited edition was soon exhausted so that it became almost impossible to obtain a copy. The work under discussion is an excellent reprint of this edition of 1896.

M. Cartier's introduction, covering some seventy-five pages, gives an interesting account of the life of the Seigneur de Bourgogne and of the circumstances which induced Calvin to write his apology.

A brief summary of the contents of the *Excuse* will convey some idea of the interest and importance of the pamphlet to the historian, the philologist, and the bibliophile.

Beginning with a plea for the right of a man to be heard in his own defense, Calvin takes up the specific charges made against his client. To the first of these, namely, that he is a sectary, hostile to the Catholic Christian faith, Calvin replies by asserting his client's belief in the essentials of Christianity as expressed in the creeds of the church. The second charge, namely, that the Seigneur is an adherent of the Anabaptist sect is answered by a denial of the charge and an assertion of the Seigneur's abhorrence of the sect. A discussion of the charges of disloyalty and disobedience to the Emperor makes up the remainder of the *Excuse*, being considered in three parts, namely, first: the Seigneur's manner of life before his departure from the Netherlands; second, the nature and reasons for his departure; and third, the grounds for his inability to observe certain practices or accept certain teachings maintained by the clergy—in short a confession of faith and his reasons for adhering to it rather than disobey the dictates of his own conscience.

In order to indicate further the value of this comparatively unknown product of Calvin's genius, I cannot do better than quote a few lines, freely translated, from M. Cartier's introduction. He writes:

L'Excuse de Jaques de Bourgogne is a chef-d'œuvre of its kind and contains pages worthy to be compared with that admirable epistle to Francis I which forms the imposing preface to the *Institution of the Christian Religion*.

Even if we were not informed by other documents of Calvin's authorship of the pamphlet, each of its pages is too deeply marked with the imprint of the master to leave us in any doubt about the matter. In this eloquent vindication of the rights of persecuted innocence Calvin appears very noble and truly great. With his superior reason, his depth of insight, his unimpeachable logic—that powerful dialectic which forces home its argument—he transforms defense into attack, foresees objections and refutes them in advance, leaving the adversary no time to recover his footing. Without neglecting the facts which he discusses with an adeptness which masters of judicial eloquence might well envy him, he is constantly enforcing the plea: it is for the truth ignored that he contends, for the imprescribable rights of conscience. Arrived at this height, the personal question is effaced, or rather it is mingled with the great cause for the triumph of which the reformer has consecrated his life. Not that he forgets the interests of his client in order to urge his own ends. The defense of Jaques de Bourgogne—a model of precision, of method, of vigor, and of clearness—carries conviction into every unprejudiced mind . . . and in the presence of posterity makes the condemned of Malines the accuser of those who have prosecuted him. When addressing himself to Charles V the clever advocate neglects nothing which could appease a prejudiced and irritated judge. He does not forget, above all, that he speaks in the name of one who has remained a loyal and devoted subject notwithstanding the unjust severity he has suffered, yet the respect which he manifests toward the person of the emperor . . . does not diminish in the least degree the proud tone or the dignified bearing of the advocate.

It remains only to remind the reader that such a document reflects the age in which it was written, reveals conditions, social, intellectual, and personal, which are most illuminating.

The fact that there has long existed a good Latin translation of the original and the further fact that copies of an earlier edition of the French original are still accessible—though with difficulty—makes the value of this new edition lie chiefly in the greatly improved form in which it appears and in the increase in the supply of copies obtainable, thus making a hitherto rare work easily accessible to a greater number of readers.

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WARD'S REALM OF ENDS

These lectures¹ form a sequel to *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, likewise delivered as Gifford Lectures which, as the author says, might

¹ *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism*. (The Gifford Lectures, 1907-10.) By James Ward. New York: Putnam, 1911. xvi+490 pages. \$3.25.

well have been entitled the *Realm of Nature*. The primary title suggests at once the line of thought of Leibniz, Kant, and Lotze, while the secondary title brings before us the setting given to the problems of philosophy, most recently, in the contrasting statements of James and Royce.

These two contrasting points are of course as old as philosophy, for each has its basis in an aspect of experience. One seeks to develop the implications of the continuity and unity of experience—one world, one principle of thought, one supreme standard of right and goal of good. The other fixes attention upon the breaks, the spontaneity, the unique, the "new." It sees individuals, but is doubtful of a single whole.

Dr. Ward believes that we must start at least with this latter aspect. At the outset this world immediately confronts us not as one mind, nor even as the manifestation of one, but as an objective whole in which we discern many minds in mutual interaction. "The unity of the world . . . is an idea of our reason, not an object of our experience." The attempt to begin with the one has always failed. On the other hand, Dr. Ward holds that if we try to think things through we cannot rest in pluralism. "For pluralism, though empirically warranted, we find defective and unsatisfactory." Pluralism points to theism, "but the theism to which it points is only an ideal—an ideal, however, that, as both theoretically and practically rational, may claim our faith though it transcend our knowledge."

This conclusion is very familiar to the student of Kant, but there is little in the detail of the book to remind one of Kant. Aside from two lectures on Hegel of a historical character, designed to show that even his system starts with pluralism, the body of the work is a fresh examination of the problems presented by current discussions. Our historical setting, says the author, is this: In the nineteenth-century absolutism or singularism in some form predominated. Then the rapid advance of scientific knowledge brought naturalism or physical realism for a time to the fore. Now the insufficiency of realism is becoming apparent, and with it the necessity of interpreting nature in terms of mind. "But the recoil from absolutism still persists; and accordingly the twentieth century opens with the attempt to work out the idealistic interpretation not in the old way as essentially a devolution of the One, but rather—as far as possible—to represent it as an evolution of the Many" (p. 49).

Dr. Ward begins then with individuals "animated in various degrees,

and striving for self-preservation and self-betterment." Self-consciousness is our immediate experience, but this implies both a cognitive and a conative attitude toward a not-self. This immediate experience gives us the paradigm or pattern of an individual. An individual is not to be defined as something that cannot be divided without being destroyed, e.g., a clock. A true individual is rather a subject striving for self-preservation and self-betterment. In our dealing with persons we necessarily assume a multitude of such individuals. Some of these may be more developed than we, others less. The tendency is to view nature after the analogy of persons, physical laws as "inveterate habits." Instead of the physicist's "atoms" which are alike, the pluralist claims there is no evidence that any two beings are exactly alike. As contrasted with absolutism and realism alike, there are for pluralism no laws antecedent to the active individuals who compose the world, no laws determining *them*, unless we call their own nature a law, and then indeed the world would start with as many laws as there are individuals (p. 76). There is "contingency" and no rigid concatenation or fixed sequence. But as a necessary consequence of the interaction of individuals there should be a general tendency to diminish the mere contingency of the world and to replace it by a definite progression. Such progression we speak of as evolution. But evolution from this point of view is not the unfolding of any single plan, any more than it is the mechanical resultant of a composition of abstract units; it is a "creative synthesis." It is the origination of new properties in the whole which its constituents in their isolation did not possess. Whereas naturalism regards experience as the result of organization, pluralism regards organization as the result of experience. There is no fixed environment. Hence there is no fixed limit to progress. With growth of conscious social interaction comes the transition from subjectivity to objectivity of experience—knowledge and morality. Progress finally becomes a conscious ideal. Its goal is progressively higher forms of unity and co-operation. It might be expressed in the petition "Thy Kingdom come, Thy will be done." "But on the pluralist view the divine will would only be a reality as it was the ideal toward which the whole creation moves, attained at length."

So far pluralism. What are the defects which Dr. Ward finds in it? Not the defect of intrinsic absurdity which absolutists have affirmed. For if there is not at least the pluralism of self and not-self there is no ground for affirming anything. But there is a limit at each end of the process. The plurality of worlds leads the pluralist to assume individu-

als of a higher order, culminating in a highest, or in a society. But if our individuals are as absolute as we have supposed, our supreme spirit would be confronted and conditioned by free agents: a "finite God." And further, without some principle of the "conservation of value," some higher spiritual order, what ground have we to expect progress on the whole? At the lower limit, as we attempt to regress to an absolute origin, we seem only to get nearer to the indeterminate that affords no ground for distinct individuals. The process points beyond itself at both ends.

Has theism any advantage over pluralism? The theist maintains that beyond the universe of the Many there is a single transcendent experient who comprehends the whole. This offers a superior unity, and, what is more important, it affords an assurance that the pluralist's ideal will be attained. Its conception of creation is an attempt to maintain that the Many exist somehow in and through the One. Nevertheless it must be admitted that this "ideal without a place" cannot be demonstrated. Creation cannot be experienced. Nor can we regard it as an event at any finite point of time. Nor can it be conceived as an act of efficient causation. Can it be identified with evolution? Easily enough with the literal conception of evolution as the unfolding of a single plan. Not so obviously with the "creative synthesis" in which the Many become themselves creators. For this brings up under another guise the old theological conflict between determination and freedom. Naturalism and orthodox theology of the Jonathan Edwards type are here in league against the pluralist. But we insist here as before that without the creative activity of the self the very world as we know it would be impossible. Kant was right in maintaining the freedom of the self as practical. And this affords a more possible line of approach to the problem of evil. An evolution which admits of contingency and implies that knowledge and character are gained through experience seems to be the only sort compatible with moral good; and from such a world neither physical evil nor the possibility of moral evil can be excluded.

Two lectures are devoted to the question of a future life. While the position of Kant is taken that a future life is matter for faith rather than of knowledge, the "rational basis" of the faith is once more shown to be in the dual aspect of all our experience. "The gradual advance through impulse and desire to practical reason runs throughout it on all fours with the advance, through sensation, and imagination, to theoretical reason." In all progress we must be conative. It is not

merely a "wish" to believe; it is the active endeavor to move on where the issue cannot be demonstrated in advance. "As active beings striving for betterment we see that the way is not closed against us, and so we try to advance." "Faith is striving, and striving is faith." If man stands alone and if this life is all, the realization of the moral ideal is impossible. "Either the world is not rational or man does not stand alone and this life is not all."

The importance of Dr. Ward's book should be apparent from this brief outline of its method, although to appreciate its fairness of statement, its clearness in expression, its freedom from technicality, and its general "human" quality one must read it. In this field the recent contributions of greatest significance have been on the one hand that of Royce from the point of view of the One, and that of James and other pluralists from the side of the Many. But as many feel unable to accept the absolute by the former, because of the conviction that reason is proceeding too abstractly, so many feel that the "radical empiricism" of the latter errs by an equally one-sided depreciation of reason. Neither absolutist nor pluralist will accept Dr. Ward's method. For a thorough pluralist it is indeed an obvious inconsistency to ask what holds true at either limit of evolution, since this question would imply the applicability of present standards of thought to situations so different from that of the present thinker that we have no right to use them there. For a thorough monist, on the other hand, it will appear impossible to make any rational beginning at all with the assumptions of pluralism. The justification of the method must be tested largely by the success with which it maintains its central position of the twofold nature of experience, namely of the self as both conative and cognitive and as in both these aspects implying a not-self. The working-out of this principle is at times obscured by the large space given to criticism and exposition of other doctrines. But it seems probable that this is the line of greatest promise at the present time. It is the general method and very nearly the general conclusion of Kant, but the material examined is the material being disclosed by the scientific thought of today.

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PROBLEMS OF PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Professor Carl Clemen, of the University of Bonn, is editing a series of publications, covering many phases of practical theology, which should be of great value to students of this subject. Dr. Clemen

purposes to present at intervals studies of scientific significance, based on various phases of the subject, which will not only promote a further understanding of the questions under consideration but will at the same time broaden the immediate, not merely historical, interest. The single pamphlets contain, as a rule, but one article and are published singly; however, they may be obtained by yearly subscription at a much less price.

The studies treat of the growth of the church, of the moral and religious life, and of the practical methods growing out of these. Together, the publications afford opportunity for comparative study of the religious ideals, problems, and methods of the different countries and peoples. The countries investigated and the subjects treated give an idea of the scope of the series. Since 1907 the following have been published:

- Professor D. Dr. Clemen, Bonn: *Zur Reform der praktischen Theologie.*
 Professor D. Eger, Friedberg, i. H.: *Die Vorbildung zum Pfarramt der Volkskirche.*
 P. Haupt, North Tonawanda, N.Y.: *Die Eigenart der amerikanischen Predigt.*
 Professor D. Dr. Schian, Giessen: *Die evangelische Kirchgemeinde.*
 P. Liebster, Leipzig: *Kirche und Sozialdemokratie.*
 Kons.-R. Dr. von Rohden, Berlin: *Probleme der Gefangenenseelsorge und Entlassenenfürsorge.*
 P. Fritze, Nordhausen: *Die Evangelisationsarbeit der belgischen Missionskirche.*
 Professor Lic. Matthes, Darmstadt: *Aussichten u. Aufgaben d. evangel. Landeskirchen in der Gegenwart.*
 Professor D. Dr. Clemen, Bonn: *Der Religions- und Moralunterricht in Nordamerika.*
 P. Haupt, North Tonawanda, N.Y.: *Staat und Kirche in Nordamerika.*
 P. Lic. Dr. Boehmer, Raben: *Dorfpfarrer und Dorfpredigt.*

The following are to be published soon:

- Archdiak. Lic. Dr. Dibelius, Crossen: *Das evang.-kirchliche Leben Schottlands.*
 Professor D. Eger, Friedberg: *Das evang. Religionsunterricht in der Volksschule der Gegenwart und seine Reform.*
 Pf. Dr. Grilli, Livorno: *Das evang.-kirchliche Leben in Italien.*
 Priv. Doz. Lic. Günther, Marburg: *Über Gesangbuchreform.*
 Pf. Lachenmann, Leonberg: *Das evang.-kirchliche Leben Frankreichs.*
 Doz. Rodhe, Lund: *Das kirchliche Leben Schwedens.*
 Pf. Schmidt, Isselburg: *Das evang.-kirchliche Leben Hollands.*
 Pred. Dr. Schubert, Rom: *Die Osterpredigt der Gegenwart.*
 Pf. Stuckert, Schaffhausen: *Das evang.-kirchliche Leben d. Schweiz.*

Many other articles by able men are to follow.

In the second number¹ of Vol. III Dr. Clemen reviews the development as well as the present situation of moral and religious instruction in this country. He traces the moral and religious ideals from their sources in the mother-country and then follows their subsequent changes and development in the situations and relations here. As long as the United States of America were still English colonies the home, the church, and also the school cared for religious instruction. All education was religious. The author traces the conflicts of the diverse faiths and how this conflict gradually led to the separation of Church and State. The school became divorced from religious instruction and "since the separation no religious instruction has been permitted in the public schools." The growing tendency toward further removal of the Bible from the schools and the weakening even of the "Open Exercises" is looked upon by the author as unfortunate. Besides, most of the moral instruction in the public schools is so indirect that it does not fulfil the mission claimed for it. Dependence upon the personality of the teacher and upon indirect teaching through games, clubs, societies, and lectures, good in themselves, is not sufficient. The author recites in detail the efforts toward direct moral instruction as seen in the public schools of Anderson, Ind., and of the Ethical Culture School of New York City. These fail in that they are not distinctly Christian. "All other literature possible shall be used, but none specifically Christian." While other literature may be rich in illustrative material, yet "what they desire to teach can be illustrated through nothing better than through the New Testament." Again, existing definite moral instruction is weak in that all illustrations are of men, and therefore, for boys. The girls have no provision made for them, and womanly virtues, which are very different from those of men, are not provided for.

A chapter is devoted to the development of the Sunday school and its force in religious instruction. The strength and weakness of the International Lesson system along with the newer graded system are set forth. The author cites the efforts of Coe, Haslett, Pease, Burton and Mathews, and others, as hopeful for the future, but holds that there must be a much better training for Sunday-school teachers, especially in psychology and child development. The future preacher, too, must understand the principles of education and psychology so that he can direct the forces at his command to the greatest advantage.

¹ *Studien zur praktischen Theologie*, 3. Band, Heft 2. Der Religions- und Moralunterricht in der Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, von Carl Clemen. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1909.

A final chapter, by Richard D. Moulton, professor in the University of Chicago, on the "Art of Telling Stories," is well worth reading.

The third number² of Vol. III of these studies is an excellent historical survey by Hans Haupt of the development of separation of State and Church together with the conditions after the separation. The author sets forth the inner life of the early Puritan community with its union of State and Church. He then recounts the inner development of the separate colonies, Plymouth, Massachusetts, New Haven, and Connecticut, and the contribution of each of these to future separation of Church and State. A keen analysis follows of the part that each denomination played in bringing about separation. The Episcopal or state church with its emphasis upon the word state, the Congregational with the emphasis on the word church, the Quakers who quietly suffered, the Baptists, at first divided, the Catholics, the Methodists with emphasis on individuality, are all shown to have contributed definitely and specifically to the cause of separation. The forming of the Constitution with all the problems of separation definitely analyzed is given a chapter. A final chapter seeks to interpret the Constitution regarding (1) "The State and the Church," (2) "The Church and the Individual States," (3) "The States and the Bible," (4) "The States and Sunday," (5) "The Unfolding of Church Life after the Separation."

Students of Church and State and their accompanying problems will do well to look into this survey which follows the problems of separation from their earliest beginnings down to the present.

J. M. ARTMAN

CHICAGO

RELIGION OF THE ANCIENT CELTS

Dr. MacCulloch gives a trustworthy synthesis of the latest results of Celtic scholarship.¹ His book attempts no original investigation, and, although worded occasionally in rather technical language, is evidently intended for the serious-minded general reader—in England a great and honorable class, which in America, let us hope, may rapidly increase. A personal touch is imparted to the work by numerous tilts with solar myths, which diversify its pages like combats in an Arthurian romance. The author, like an Arthurian hero, makes short work of his opponent in

² *Studien zur praktischen Theologie*. 3. Band, Heft 3. Staat und Kirche in den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika. Von Hans Haupt. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1909.

¹ *The Religion of the Ancient Celts*. By J. A. MacCulloch. New York: Scribner, 1911. 399 pages.

every conflict. Another individual touch appears in the relentless way in which the author excludes from his studies of Celtic mythological story all incidents which are identical with *Märchen* formulae. *Märchen* formulae, he feels, are universal and have nothing specifically Celtic about them.

In his discussion of the Irish *Tuatha Dé Danann*, Dr. MacCulloch (p. 63) has not observed Stern's article in the *Festschrift für W. Stokes*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 18. Stern explains the name as "people of the divine race of art and wisdom," or, "people of the divine race of Ana," and rejects altogether the goddess "Danu," who is meant, as Dr. MacCulloch relying on older authorities believes, in the word *Danann*. It follows that the identification of "Danu" with "Dôn," supposed mother of Welsh mythological beings (p. 103), is very hazardous.

Dr. MacCulloch thinks (p. 119), because no reference to Arthur occurs in the four branches of the Mabinogion (Mabinogi, the singular form, seems to be more correct, see Loth, *Revue Celtique*, XXXII [1911], 421 f.), that Arthur the god or mythic hero was either recent, or local and obscure. But Loth's explanation in the *Revue Celtique* is more probable. The four branches of the Mabinogi, Loth says, were written down after the mythic Arthur was both famous and widely known. But they belonged to an old tradition, long since fixed, which the Welshman who put them into writing did not feel at liberty to alter or transform. His not introducing Arthur into these impersonal and in some sense classic tales is no evidence for his ignorance of Arthurian myth.

On the vexed question whether the Druids of Britain were ever an organized body of priests and teachers as in continental Gaul, Dr. MacCulloch is inclined to an affirmative view (p. 295): "Our knowledge of Brythonic religion is too scanty for us to prove that the Druids had or had not sway over the Brythons, but the presumption is that they had." Compare, however, W. F. Tamblyn in *Am. Hist. Review*, XV (1909), 21-36, who, after studying the references in Caesar and Tacitus, and demonstrating their weakness as evidence, ridicules the idea of there ever having been any Druids in Britain except scattered wizards and sorcerers. Dr. MacCulloch thinks that the Druids of Ireland surely formed an organized class (p. 311), and explains the absence in Irish texts of any reference to their organization as due to Christian copyists who, he thinks, deliberately suppressed all mention of Druidical cult and ritual.

Dr. MacCulloch's solution of the Grail problem (p. 383) is that most generally accepted: "In the Graal there was a fusion of the magic

caldron of Celtic paganism and the sacred chalice of Christianity." But he enters no further into the matter, and gives no references more recent than Nutt, *Legend of the Holy Grail* (1888). Unfamiliarity with recent books on the subject seems indicated by his calling Wauchier's continuation of the *Perceval* the "Conte du Graal pseudo-Chrétien."

The book adopts throughout a praiseworthy caution in statement. Its most striking generalization relates to the religiosity of the Celtic people, which the author says was noted by Greek and Latin observers, and is still characteristic of all branches of the race. "The Celts, in spite of their vigor, have been a race of dreamers. Their conquests in later times have been those of the spirit, rather than of the mailed fist. . . . Much that is spiritual and romantic in more than one European literature is due to them."

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BRIEF MENTION

OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

WADE, G. W. *The Book of the Prophet Isaiah with Introduction and Notes.* (Westminster Commentaries.) London: Methuen & Co., 1911. xcii+431 pages. 10s. 6d.

This volume belongs to the same series as Driver's *Genesis* and McNeil's *Exodus* and is a worthy companion of these two. The aim of the series is to reach the intelligent public. This volume, therefore, is less technical than the corresponding commentary in the International Critical series by G. B. Gray. It occupies a position in this respect midway between the commentaries of Skinner in the Cambridge Bible and Whitehouse in the Century Bible on the one hand and that of Gray on the other. In critical method it is free and outspoken, though controlled by scholarly caution. The Book of Isaiah is treated as composed of three collections, viz.: chapters 1-39, chapters 40-55, and chapters 56-66. The genuine prophecies of Isaiah are confined to chapters 1-39. Here there is much non-Isaianic material, viz.: 2:2-4, 11:10-12:6, 13:1-14:23, chaps. 15-16, 19, 21, 23-27, and 34-39. The second collection falls into two parts, viz.: 40-48 and 49-55, the second of which is a little later than the first, though from the same hand. But the Servant of Yahweh songs do not belong to Deutero-Isaiah himself, because while both Deutero-Isaiah and the writer of the songs conceive of Israel as the servant, yet the two representatives of the servant's character are radically different. The songs must, therefore, have been composed by another, and he was a predecessor of Deutero-Isaiah, for the latter inserted the songs in his prophecy himself. The third collection is regarded as coming from the post-exilic period, though not necessarily from one hand or one generation.

This work is well done. The introduction is sufficiently full to present clearly the character of the book and the problems to which it gives rise. The author's judgment is sane and well balanced. He shows thorough acquaintance with the vast literature

on Isaiah and at the same time vindicates his right to a mind of his own. His interpretative comments are concise and to the point and characterized by clearness of insight. The commentary will be found very helpful by anyone willing to take the Book of Isaiah seriously.

MEYER, EDUARD. *Der Papyrusfund von Elephantine. Dokumente einer jüdischen Gemeinde aus der Perserzeit und das älteste erhaltene Buch der Weltliteratur.* Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1912. 128 pages. M. 2.

This is an introduction to the papyri from Elephantine, intended to make their contents and significance clear to the intelligent public. It is the most informing introduction thus far written to this interesting group of documents. Dr. Meyer traces the origin and history of the colony, discusses the religious conditions disclosed by the papyri, considers the significance of the fact that they are written in Aramaic rather than Hebrew, and points out the importance of the Aramaic version of the story of Ahikar, which they offer for our appreciation of the existence of a class of world-literature in the Semitic Orient. The wide range of Dr. Meyer's learning and the excellence of his judgment are manifest upon every page. He points out the probability that the colony existed as early as the days of Psammetich I, in which case its temple may well have antedated the Deuteronomic reform and thus have been a wholly legitimate institution. If it was erected after the adoption of the law, there apparently was no consciousness of wrong with reference to it on the part of the Assuan community. This may be accounted for by the fact that the law was most certainly formulated solely with regard to the Palestinian community. It did not legislate for a Diaspora. When these new conditions arose, new institutions became necessary and were not to be held in check by a law formulated for a wholly different situation. The fact, however, of the erection of a shrine to Yahweh on foreign soil is significant of advance in the idea of God at whatever time the shrine was erected. David had thought of himself as driven out from Yahweh's land to the worship of other gods when he had to take refuge in Philistia. Naaman, the Syrian, requested that he might be given a two mules' load of earth upon which to erect an altar to Yahweh in Damascus. This Jewish colony feels as near to God in Elephantine, far south upon the Nile, as did any resident in Jerusalem itself. Dr. Meyer rightly emphasizes the fact that these papyri afford us an insight into the religious life of the common people, as it was before the Deuteronomic law had greatly affected religious thought and practice. The Assuan colony perpetuated for the most part the pre-Deuteronomic religious practice. Thus the testimony of the papyri to the religious ideas and usages of the colonists is of unusual value.

CORNILL, C. H. *Zur Einleitung in das Alte Testament.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. 124 pages. M. 3.

Recently, E. Sellin put forth an *Introduction to the Old Testament*, which struck out along many new lines divergent from those followed by the usual introductions. Sellin's work was strongly influenced by the utterances of those who sought to account for the Old Testament as largely indebted to a more or less supposititious, ancient Oriental world-view. By the aid of this hypothesis, he would place very much of the Hebrew literature a great deal earlier in the nation's history than it is located by the prevailing school of historical criticism. Professor Cornill, as the writer of the best-known German introduction, has felt called upon to undertake a thoroughly critical examination of Sellin's work and publishes his results in this booklet. The contents

of the treatise make hard reading, for Cornill does not satisfy himself with general statements but examines a series of Sellin's views in most minute detail. In most of the points at issue, Cornill seems to be nearer the truth than Sellin. Cornill has gone astray in his denial of the possibility that Jeremiah's deed of sale (Jer. 32: 10 ff.) could have been written on a clay tablet. All the circumstances of the narrative are easily accounted for on the basis of the view that the transaction was recorded upon a clay tablet in Babylonian style. The "sealed" and the "open" are terms fittingly applied to the well-known "case-tablets" and the ordinary tablets, both so familiar to Assyriologists. The storing in an earthen jar, to which Cornill takes so much exception, was one of the most common ways of storing clay tablets and other treasures for safe-keeping. The emphasis upon witnesses and sealing is very suggestive of the great care in such matters that characterized all Babylonian business transactions. Cornill's exposure of the difficulties of the hypothesis that the messianic and eschatological sections in early prophecies are all original parts of those prophecies is thorough and convincing.

ZERBE, ALVIN SYLVESTER. *The Antiquity of Hebrew Writing and Literature, or Problems in Pentateuchal Criticism*. Cleveland: Central Publishing House, 1911. xxvi+297 pages. \$1.50.

A hodge-podge of quotations from about all of the books and articles—good, bad, and indifferent—which have appeared in recent years on subjects connected with the languages, literatures, and history of Egypt and the Semitic Orient. The author "failed to find in any language a work which discusses adequately the language, script, and writing-material which Moses might have employed in composing the Pentateuch," and consequently prepared such a work. The book is admirably adapted to the needs of, and heartily to be recommended to, those who are interested in the language, script, etc., which Moses *might* have used. Scholars are too busy trying to find out what was actually going on in Syria in those good old days to spend their time speculating on what might have happened. The book contributes nothing to the solution of the real problems before the biblical scholar of today.

LEHMANN-HAUPT, C. F. *Der jüdische Kirchenstaat in persischer, griechischer und römischer Zeit*. Tübingen: Mohr, 1911. 48 pages. M. o. 50.

The "Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher" include some notable condensed pamphlets on phases of religious problems of the present day. The first small volume of the second series was *Die Geschiehe Judas und Israels im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte* by Lehmann-Haupt (1911). This brochure is a condensed edition of chaps. viii to xi in the same author's *Israel: Seine Entwicklung im Rahmen der Weltgeschichte*. In a few places the author differs from his opinions expressed in the larger work. His bird's-eye view of that long stretch of time is necessarily rapid and at times too condensed for the satisfaction of the reader. One misses the good maps and tables of the larger work.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

JACQUIER, E. *Le Nouveau Testament dans l'église Chrétienne*. Tome I: Préparation, formation et définition du canon du Nouveau Testament. Paris: Victor Lecoffre, 1911. 450 pages.

Jacquier is a well-known Roman Catholic writer upon the New Testament. His *Histoire des livres du Nouveau Testament* was a comprehensive, patient, and scholarly

piece of work, though naturally less free and resultful than some Protestant scholars might have wished. This new work from his hand is the first of two volumes, and discusses the canon; the text of the New Testament is to be treated in the second. Jacquier's excellencies are in the main the characteristic French ones: clearness, simplicity, brevity, comprehensiveness. His book is an admirable collection of material and opinion, fairly and clearly presented. Where Protestant scholars take an importantly different view of the same evidence, Jacquier gives their position without pausing to dispose of it. This fair and scholarly temper is one of the attractive qualities of the book. In sketching the history of the canon in the early church, virtually the whole field of early Christian literature has to be gone over, and this is faithfully and compactly done, with at least as much justice to Protestant as to Catholic authorities. Some of Jacquier's opinions on specific matters are indeed open to objection. That the *Didache* can still, after the discovery of the earlier six-chapter form of the work, be dated about 80 A.D.; and that Hebrews was written between 58 and 66 A.D., and the Synoptic Gospels, the Acts, and the epistles of Peter, James, and Jude between 60 and 70, seem to many scholars anything but probable, and Jacquier faithfully records the contrary opinion; but he proceeds of course upon his own. This makes II Pet. 3:15 a witness to the fact that before 70 A.D., Paul's letters were not only collected in part at least, but regarded as Scripture, and the consequences of this for the history of the canon are at once evident. Assuming these early dates for *Didache*, with its evident use of the Gospel of Matthew, and of II Peter with its recognition of Paul's letters as Scripture, Jacquier finds his New Testament practically ready made by the time of Domitian. Marcion (140-50 A.D.) becomes from this approach what Tertullian thought him, a mere reducer of a fuller canon already existing, and the second-century literature really has no canonical problem to solve. It is true II Clement with its disturbing uncanonical quotations strikes a discordant note, but Jacquier refuses to recognize in these that Gospel according to the Egyptians from which Clement of Alexandria quotes almost the same words. In short, this approach really settles the history of the canon before one even reaches it. Still there is much to be learned from Jacquier's extended collection of material, even though his interpretation of it may at important points disappoint the historical student. The omission of indices is greatly to be regretted. It is to be hoped that they will be fully given at the close of the second volume.

DE JOURNAL, M. J. ROUËT. *Enchiridion Patristicum: Locos SS. Patrum Doctorum Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum. In Usum Scholarum.* Friburgi Brisgoviae: Herder, 1911. xiv+887 pages. \$3.15 net.

In this book are collected 2389 passages from the Fathers of the first seven centuries. Where the original texts are Greek, Latin translations follow at the foot of the page. The texts are in general taken over from good critical editions, where there are such, and the whole collection is thoroughly indexed. The editions used ought, however, to have been specified in each instance. The purpose of the selection is to support and illustrate Roman Catholic theology, and the main index is governed by this principle. This leads to the omission of some passages of much importance, such as the allusion to I Cor. in I Clement, chap. 47. In confining himself to the Greek fragments of Aristides, too, the editor omits the remarkable passage on infant innocence, 15:11. The material is chronologically arranged, and authors, works, and dates are kept conveniently in the reader's view. There is naturally much room for differ-

ence of opinion on details of chronology, but there can be little doubt that a mistake has been made in beginning with the Greek *Didache*, as of 90-100 A.D., since the Latin *Doctrina* in its lost Greek original certainly lies behind it, and this combined with its relation to Barnabas and the Gospel of Matthew would push the Greek *Didache*, as we know it, well into the second century. In general, however, the dates are intelligently given. For Roman Catholic students, and for students of Roman Catholicism he has provided a useful manual of select texts. But the limitations of a collection dictated by a dogmatic purpose are of course obvious.

PIEPENBRING, C. *Jésus et les apôtres*. Paris: Nourry, 1911. viii+329 pages.

One might justifiably look back with pride to the literary achievement of a lifetime such as that which Dr. Piepenbring has accomplished, especially in view of the fact that the work has been done in the midst of arduous pastoral duties. The present book represents the best of his work which this reviewer has seen. The first part is on Jewish Christianity. The chapters on the first Christians, the primitive gospel, the first conflicts, Jewish Christianity "légitimiste," and finally Jesus and Jewish Christianity, are all admirable. The second part, on Paulinism, is still more striking.

The author's theological judgments are close to those of such scholars as H. J. Holtzmann and Pfeleiderer. There is to be found none of the unhistorical modernizing that is so common, especially in the cases of Jesus and Paul, as, for example, in the over-ethicizing of the atonement. The positions of Paul and others are set forth in all their oriental, rugged strength. There is no dodging, no blinking a fact, no side-stepping an issue. Sometimes, to be sure, there appears to be a slight overstatement, but the correlative truth will be found, possibly in the next paragraph, just as frankly put. It is possible that a little more justice might be done to the ethical side of Paul's thought. Yet it is refreshing to see how willing the author is to leave utter contradictions in the thinking of the same man, under different influences and on different sides, when these are seen actually to exist. An apologetic use of the facts is made in the beginning and in the sequel, but this does not seem to have vitiated the treatment by controlling or modifying historical judgments. The author has demonstrated that independent of apostolic theology there existed an older and simpler Christianity, which, he thinks, satisfies all the needs of true piety.

The gratuitous remarks regarding present-day customs concerning the subjects of baptism (pp. 228, 229) could have been dispensed with to advantage. Typographical errors are found on the following pages: 57, 76, 96, 110, 119, 120, 143, 210, 264. The ever-recurring "Giffert" instead of "McGiffert" is unpardonable.

CHURCH HISTORY

WAPPLER, PAUL. *Die Stellung Kursachsens und des Landgrafen Philipps von Hessen zur Täuferbewegung*. Münster: Aschendorff, 1910. 254 pages. M. 6.80.

Professor Paul Wappler's recent monograph, *Die Stellung Kursachsens und des Landgrafen Philipps von Hessen zur Täuferbewegung*, is an exceedingly valuable contribution to our knowledge of the Reformation period in European history.

The Anabaptist movement forms one of the most important phases of the Protestant revolt, yet it has received thus far comparatively little special attention or scientific treatment. Any reliable addition to our fund of information concerning this

troublesome, indefinable sect or conglomerate of sects or concerning the treatment of adherents received at the hands of their opponents will, therefore, be welcomed by all students interested in the history of the Reformation.

The monograph under consideration is evidently the work of a competent scholar. In its pages have been brought together the results of long and careful research in this hitherto largely neglected field of Anabaptist history, hence its author may rest assured that many will greet its appearance with gratitude.

As the title of the work indicates, Professor Wappler has endeavored to present the policies of the Electors of Saxony and of the Landgrave Philipp of Hesse toward the so-called Anabaptists within their jurisdictions. Throughout the monograph the more tolerant attitude of Philipp the Magnanimous of Hesse is set forth in contrast with the more severe policies of the Electors of John and John Frederick of Saxony. In presenting this important and interesting contrast the author incidentally sets before us the difficult problem which the Anabaptist movement gave to the princes for solution, thus throwing valuable sidelights upon the character of this elusive and persistent sect of Protestant heretics. Furthermore, an abundance of citations from the sources enlighten us concerning the attitude of Luther, of Melancthon, of Bucer, of Adam Kraft, and of many others toward the Anabaptists.

The monograph consists of 122 pages of text, followed by an excursus of 6 pages considering critically the views of other writers regarding Luther's attitude toward Anabaptist dissenters. An appendix of 110 pages, containing about 100 original letters and documents, has been added, which greatly enhances the value of the work. An index of persons and places completes the volume.

WESTERBURG, HANS. *Schleiermacher als Mann der Wissenschaft, als Christ und Patriot*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1911. 159 pages. M. 2. 50.

In 159 pages Dr. Westerbург, with much enthusiasm and clearness, sets before us Schleiermacher as a man of science, as a Christian, and as a patriot. The book is an introduction to the personality of this epoch-making theologian. The literature of Schleiermacher is extensive, but we believe the author makes good his contention that just at this point there was a gap for him to fill.

DOCTRINAL

CURTIS, W. A. *A History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith in Christendom and Beyond*. With Historical Tables. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1911. xix+502 pages.

Professor Curtis prepared for the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* the article on "Confessions," which is in this volume enlarged, although the main outline of the earlier article has been followed, and no distinctively new section has been added. To observe a proper scale in the treatment of the various religious bodies is extremely difficult, especially when some churches have long and elaborate articles of faith, while others possess only informal expressions of belief. Methodism, in particular, suffers from this circumstance, receiving only five pages, while the Salvation Army (treated as the daughter of Methodism) claims sixteen pages. Over against this we have eighty-two pages devoted to Calvinistic confessions. The reader will naturally be much better informed about Calvinism than about Methodism. The treatment of

non-Christian creeds is so short as to be almost superfluous, since it gives only a very few examples of oriental belief, and is quite devoid of any deep insight into the inner meaning of the oriental forms of faith. Indeed, the author's main interest seems to be to exhibit a few modern statements, in which he discerns the influence of Christianity.

But apart from these traits, which grow largely out of the inevitable difficulties of the task, Professor Curtis has given us a fair-minded, discriminatingly condensed account of official beliefs of the main religious bodies of our day. It is just the book for the busy man to consult, in order to obtain accurate documentary information, with sufficient historical introduction in each case to furnish an intelligent understanding of the place of each creed in the historical evolution of Christianity. It is particularly gratifying to find throughout the book so great a sensitiveness to modern tendencies. Thus one reads of the revision of the Presbyterian standards by the General Assembly in America in 1902, of the proposed confession of faith for the united churches of South Africa and of Canada, and of the statement of faith adopted by the "South India United Church" in 1908. After the historical account of the confessions, three chapters at the end of the book discuss the pertinent questions of the authority and function of confessions, and the ethics of creed-subscription. The necessity for recognizing the paramount importance of "freedom of prophesying" on the part of the ministers of the churches is urged. This carries with it the duty of individual interpretation of both Scripture and creeds. It is held that the creeds ought frankly to be recognized as human creations, designed to further a vital faith. Revision is thus to be expected whenever faith may be promoted by such revision. The adoption of the historical spirit in the study of the creeds, however, brings a greater sympathy with the significance of even those confessions which we may have outgrown. Thus revision can be carried on in a constructive spirit of continuity with the past, instead of as an expression of dogmatic rebellion. The book is a valuable manual of information on an important subject, which will also induce a proper appreciation of the *raison d'être* of the great historic creeds.

BERTHÉ, L. *La sainte Trinité*. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. iii+218 pages.

Not infrequently there appear Catholic works on theology which are of interest to the Protestant reader, not so much on account of the new light they attempt to shed on the questions at issue as on account of the illustrations they supply of the perpetuation of methods of treatment among Catholics which have been abandoned by Protestant thinkers. *La sainte Trinité*, by Berthé, is an instance. The subjects discussed are mostly the abstract questions of scholastic theology, such as: Are there true mysteries, dogmas of faith, to be expounded by the aid of reason? Is there a procession of persons, Father, Son, and Spirit in God? Must a plurality of persons in God be admitted? And is each truly God, though they are personally distinct from one another? Then follow discussions of the proper personality of each, and the real character of their distinctions, the character and true divine character of each and their minor relations to one another. The method is first to propound the question, next to quote the dogmatical answer, and then to expound it. The authorities quoted are the great church symbols, the canons of councils, the decrees of popes, the utterances of ancient theologians, and, occasionally, the sayings of Scripture and the Apocrypha. Thomas Aquinas is the favorite theologian, with Augustine, Athanasius, Gregory Nazianzen, and Chrysostom also prominent. The discussions aim at showing that

the absolute notional distinctions represent metaphysical realities. It is a valuable thesaurus of quotations.

ANDERSON, JOHN BENJAMIN. *New Thought: Its Lights and Shadows. An Appreciation and a Criticism.* Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 149 pages. \$1.00 net.

This is one of the best discussions of the New Thought movement that we have seen. It seeks to appreciate all that is valuable in the movement—and this is much—and then as a frank but kindly antagonist to give it a thorough and destructive criticism. The author shows a thorough knowledge of the literature and he writes in a popular vein. The scope of the book does not include Christian Science—although the author's attitude is shown by a few expressions here and there.

He wields the sword of logic remorselessly, and heads fall in profusion, for he has no difficulty in pointing out contradictions and confusions, and he greatly enjoys the fun. But it does not anywhere appear to our knightly philosopher that logic is a very dangerous weapon. It is usually two-edged—and in metaphysics when one head drops off there is almost always another head dropping at the same time. For example: he is able to show that the New Thought people are out-and-out monists: and then when they face the consequences of monistic logic they turn right about and become pluralists. Taken as a group, the monists are bad company for religious people, but so are the pluralists when we take the whole crowd, and the people of the old thought are quite as much in the narrows as are the people of the New Thought. None of us has been able to find any ultimate resolution, and all of us together, anxious to save truth in its entirety, seem to be straddling.

PERRIOLLAT, CH. *Chrétien et philosophe.* Essai de philosophie religieuse. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1910. 515 pages.

In Perriollat's work, the object is to show that while an examination of the rational faculty and of our conceptions of beauty and art proves that it is necessary for man to rise to God if he would fulfil himself, yet it is only in the actual coming of "l'homme Dieu" that man actually comes to his true and final being. The position of the author is set forth in his own words (p. 2) thus: "As for me, Christian and philosopher, I believe that these two things become truly one [i.e., to be a Christian and to be a philosopher] on condition that I be Christian first and philosopher afterward." To him, of course, to be a Christian is to believe in the Catholic dogmas. The conclusions reached by the philosophy are therefore determined at the outset. This end is reached by the usual scholastic method of abstractions and dialectics.

SKRINE, JOHN HUNTLEY. *Creed and the Creeds. Their Function in Religion. Being the Bampton Lectures of 1911.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. xxvi + 223 pages. \$2.25.

In *Creed and the Creeds* by Skrine the hypothesis "Salvation is life" is used as a method of discovery in religion. Life is a mutual adjustment of the environment and the organism. Hence it involves mutuality of sacrifice. The utterance of a creed is a giving of self—not merely of thought but of heart and will also. The creed is true if in return it imparts life. For instance, the doctrine of the resurrection of Jesus is "reality coming home to men." The creed of a church is marked by self-impartment on the part of the church and should mean reception of life by the church. The individual in the church so avails himself of the communion of the saints by living the

life of the spirit as a social being. Creeds are an essential means to life. Yet they must be judged. Apostolicity is evidenced by the transmission of the life that is from Christ. Faith and creed are not one. Those who protest against creed mistake faith as intellectual. Creeds must be expressed in words. The fixity of words is inconvenient but mutability would work mischief. Let the symbol stand for a new and better apprehension of the truth. The book represents a possible attitude toward formal creeds. How far allegorizing of creed may be carried is debatable. Nor could everyone be brought to sacrifice his thought about creeds. The development of the "spiritual disposition" toward creed desired by the author is more difficult for most than "practical action." It is the temper rather than the practical significance of the book that interests. The argument is well wrought and is helpful in correlating creed to life.

HUIZINGA, A. v. C. P. *The Function of Authority in Life and Its Relation to Legalism in Ethics and Religion*. Boston: Sherman, French & Co., 1911. 270 pages. \$2.25.

Huizinga emphasizes individual conscience in ethics and religion as against so-called social sanctions and subordinates legalism to a moral interpretation that involves the whole personality. Reason is not sufficient to recognize the forms of authority. Any authority less than absolute makes truth a fiction. The feeling of ought is "an original unanalyzable fact," but even then we cannot be good without God. Absolute authority is found in the Bible. It can be vindicated, for truth carries its own vindication, but not established. Pragmatism and Ritschlianism as forms of subjectivism overlook the objective recognition that guarantees action. Without the recognition of objective reality as its ground, Christian theology is adrift on human opinion. The cross is the final seat of authority. The argument is illustrated from a wide range of reading. Assertion plays a larger part in the net result than constructive thinking. In details the book is suggestive, but in the main argument it leads nowhere. Faith as an interpretative principle does not afford even the reconciliation of individualism and authority which possibly is the best solution the author hopes for. Nor is it to be found elsewhere since human judgment is inadequate, faulty, and unreliable.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

TIPPLE, EZRA. *Some Famous Country Parishes*. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1911. xii+244 pages. \$1.50.

In this volume we have sketched for us work in six country parishes, and these among the most noted in England: that of John Keble at Hursley, George Herbert at Bemerton, John Fletcher at Madeley, Richard Baxter at Kidderminster, George Clayton Tenneyson at Somersby, and Charles Kingsley at Eversley. These all identified themselves with their country parishes for life. They did not make them stepping-stones to more conspicuous city charges. They came to poor parishes where ignorance, drunkenness, and vice abounded. They gave themselves, each in his own way, to the moral transformation of the parish. Marvelous results followed in response to house-to-house visiting, sacrificing kindness, catechizing, preaching, lecturing, continued in season and out of season with good work and noble example. The pastorate was their chief business, but their work overflowed into the great world, and

each man made his notable contribution. These six biographies are told as they would be to tourists searching out the loved haunts of these celebrities. Local historic incidents of national interest are woven in and give romantic background. Eighty photographs of village streets, churches, rectories, churchyards, and near-by cathedrals are scattered through the book. Its reading should correct many a wrong current of thinking, placing estimates of pastoral work nearer where they belong.

HENKE, FREDERICK G. *A Study in the Psychology of Ritualism*. The University of Chicago Press, 1910. 96 pages. \$1.05.

This monograph, which was submitted by the author as a Doctor's thesis at the University of Chicago, is a study from the point of view of functional psychology in the origins and history of ritual in religion. Much stress is laid on the fact that a rite is always a social reaction, born out of the social rather than the individual consciousness; that it is essentially practical in its nature, being performed not so much for the direct purpose of coming into relations with the deity, as for the practical purpose of securing through his aid control over the environment; that its form is symptomatic of the subjective state that prompts it, rather than prescribed by an external revelation or command of the deity; and that it is always symbolic of something other than itself. The determining impulses which produce ritual are held to be the elemental instincts of food, sex, fear, and anger. Actions which prove practically helpful in relation to these impulses and needs are ritualized into group habits, and develop or change as the social consciousness and background change. The process of the development of ritual, and the influences which modify it, are illustrated from the history of Israel. Passing to ritual as it survives in modern life, the author points out that it is still predominantly practical, and predicts that in spite of all disintegrating forces it will persist as long as it continues to express emotions and values that are useful to the social group. The entire investigation is based on the presuppositions and follows the methods of historical interpretation, that have been made familiar by functional psychology; and its adequacy and finality naturally depends upon the adequacy and finality of these presuppositions and methods.

REU, JOHANN MICHAEL. *Quellen zur Geschichte des kirchlichen Unterrichts in der evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands zwischen 1530 und 1600*. Erster Teil: Quellen zur Geschichte des Katechismus-Unterrichts. Zweiter Band: Mitteldeutsche Katechismen. Zweite Abteilung: Texte. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1911. 1126 pages. M. 20.

The amazing number of catechisms in use during the Reformation period is evident from this collection. Dr. Reu has gathered in this volume eighty-six different catechisms from middle Germany alone. Another volume contains those of southern Germany. The publication of the full texts of the catechisms is of great value for the student of religious education in the period under consideration.

RAYMONT, T. *The Use of the Bible in the Education of the Young*. A book for teachers and parents. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911. 254 pages. \$1.25.

This excellent book is written by one who understands at once the Bible and the child, and knows how to interpret both to the popular mind. The results of a moderate criticism of the Old and New Testaments are presented in as simple a manner as the

material allows. The various elements of the Bible are assigned to appropriate ages of childhood and youth in accordance with principles generally accepted among students of the problem. Two pedagogical chapters should assist the untrained teacher in his task. A significant statement is that "a judiciously edited New Testament is sadly needed for adolescence."

GUNSAULUS, FRANK W. "The Minister and the Spiritual Life." *Yale Lectures on Preaching for 1911*. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1911. 397 pages. \$1.25 net.

The Yale Lectures no longer deal with homiletic method. There are text-books enough in the technique of sermon-making. But there are abundant themes for the lecturers in the widening significance of the Christian ministry. Dr. Gunsaulus has chosen to go to the heart of ministerial efficiency by discussing the ever-important topic of the relation of the minister's own religious experience to the success of his work. His treatment of spirituality is eminently healthy and sane. He shows the relation of a vigorous religious life at once to the great questions of orthodoxy, changing opinion, social problems, and the smaller though not less vital questions of the choice of text, the leadership of prayer, the art of eloquence, the danger of egotism, the temptation of plagiarism. One recognizes the poetic quality of Dr. Gunsaulus' own preaching in the whole discussion, and in such characterizations as "The minister a minstrel of the spirit," "The profanity of merely formal prayer."

MISCELLANEOUS

SPIVAK, D., and BLOOMGARDEN, SOL. (YEHOASH). *Yiddish Dictionary containing all the Hebrew and Chaldaic Elements of the Yiddish Language, Illustrated with the Proverbs and Idiomatic Expressions*. New York: Verlag Yehoash, 1911. xxxi+340 pages.

This is a dictionary for readers of Yiddish. It undertakes to explain all Hebrew and Aramaic terms occurring in Yiddish by definitions in Yiddish itself. Its authors are a Jewish physician and a Jewish poet. The work seems admirably adapted to its purpose as a popular dictionary for Yiddish-speaking peoples. The authors organize their work as follows: (1) Introduction, giving the main grammatical characteristics of Yiddish; (2) dictionary of the more common Hebrew and Aramaic terms; (3) dictionary of the less frequently used Hebrew and Aramaic words; (4) a list of rare and exceptional words; (5) supplementary lists of personal and family names and names of philanthropic societies. The proportion of Hebrew and Aramaic words in Yiddish is quite small. Our authors assure us that about 80 per cent of Yiddish is of German and Slavic origin. The dominance of the German or Slavic element in any particular variety of Yiddish depends upon the country in which it is spoken. Anybody who knows German and has a knowledge of the Hebrew alphabet can read the Yiddish of this dictionary.

RICHARDSON, ERNEST CUSHING. *Some Old Egyptian Librarians*. New York: Scribner, 1911. 93 pages. \$0.75.

This interesting little volume proposes to introduce to the reader "by name and date and with some details of their lives, not always wholly without piquancy, twenty-one librarians who lived long before Assurbanipal, and by the same token, much

longer before the Alexandrian library was founded." Since the mastery of a cumbrous system of writing was so essential a part of the education of the Egyptians, and since in ancient Egypt as in China, until recently, the learned man or "scribe," as he is usually called, was alone admitted into the ranks of the government officials, a somewhat detailed account of the daily lives of twenty-one librarian-professors, their beliefs, their scholarly attainments and political preferments will surely be of great interest to the modern man of affairs as well as to the student of history.

CHRISTLIEB, MAX. *Harnack-Bibliographie zum sechzigsten Geburtstag Adolf Harnacks zusammengestellt.* Mit drei Anhängen und Registern. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1912. 94 pages.

In connection with the wide celebration of Professor Harnack's sixtieth birthday (May 7, 1911), the preparation of a complete list of his publications of all kinds was undertaken by Christlieb. It was felt that this would be not only a suitable tribute to an eminent scholar and thinker, but a work of practical usefulness to a wide circle of students and scholars and even to Professor Harnack himself. The result is an amazing exhibit of scholarly activity through nearly forty years. Books, monographs, articles, and reviews to the number of 1066 are listed, beginning with the inaugural dissertation on the sources of Gnosticism, published in 1873. Those who know Professor Harnack chiefly through his *History of Dogma*, his *Geschichte der alt-christlichen Litteratur*, his *Expansion of Christianity*, or his *Geschichte der königl. preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, or lesser works like the *Acts of the Apostles*, *Luke the Physician*, the *Sayings of Jesus*, or *What Is Christianity?* will learn with amazement of his prodigious productivity, and of the wide range of his active interests. A list of the translations of his works, especially *Das Wesen des Christentums* which has passed into ten languages, is appended, together with an account of the various editions of his more important books, and an outline of the contents of the collections "Reden und Aufsätze" (1904) and "Aus Wissenschaft und Leben" (1911). The whole work is conveniently arranged and indexed. The mention in the preface (p. iv) of "Herr Professor Dr. Mc. Gifford von der Columbia-Universität" is suggestive.

The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge. Edited by SAMUEL MACAULEY JACKSON. New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co. Vols. XI and XII.

With these two volumes the revision of the Schaff-Herzog *Encyclopedia* is complete. Articles run from "Son of Man" to "Zwingli." The plan of this work involves a very wide range of subjects, theological, ecclesiastical, historical, biographical, practical. It is admirably designed for the minister who desires to have available in one work material which otherwise would have to be sought in many encyclopedias. The field of biography is unusually well covered, including not only all the names prominent in the history of the church and of the nineteenth-century movements but those also of present-day significance. Indeed in this respect it is a kind of "Who's Who in Theology." The popular and practical articles are especially welcome. We find a discussion of evangelical work in Spain, a most interesting article on "Theological Seminaries" with a detailed account of each by one of its officers, a discriminating discussion of "Total Abstinence," others on "Tract Societies," "Young People's Societies," "Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations," etc.

The theological and critical position of the *Encyclopedia* is on the whole liberal, but with a certain caution and reserve. Kittel's excellent discussion of the "Tabernacle" takes, of course, the modern view. Nash on the "Transfiguration" says, "on his mental side the Savior must be described as the supreme prophetic mystic." He regards the story as substantially historic, the experience of the soul shining out through the face. Beckwith on the "Virgin Birth" concludes that no connection with mythology is established, that the doctrine has important bearings on the incarnation, and on the sinlessness of Jesus, but it is not essential either to these or to Christian experience. He affirms his own faith in the statement of the Apostles' Creed.

The last volume contains a "Conspectus of Contributors," with the titles of all articles written by each. This is an admirable feature. It has also a bibliographical appendix bringing the literature on all subjects of the twelve volumes down to the end of 1911. There is finally an appendix of 27 pages including some additional biographies and larger articles on "Monophysitism and the Oriental Separated Churches," "Lay Preaching," "The Orthodox Catholic Church in America," "Psychotherapy and Christian Science" from the standpoint of Christian Science.

VINCENT, JOHN MARTIN. *Historical Research: An Outline of Theory and Practice*. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. 350 pages.

Professor Vincent has rendered a valuable service to American teachers and students of history. There was urgent need of a book in English that would fill a place similar to that which Bernheim's fills in German. The author has used Bernheim freely but not slavishly. He has worked and thought the subject through for himself. His experience as a teacher and writer of history has enabled him to cover the field with independence of judgment and with a true sense of the exigencies of the audience he is addressing. Professor Vincent's conception of history is large, dignified, and altogether worthy the great discipline. He is not afraid of a vast idea. He is duly cautious, but at the close of the chapter on the definition of history he says: "However small the topic, the treatment should have in view the contribution to the larger history of which it is a part." He accepts Ranke's definition: "Universal history embraces the events of all nations, and in their relations, in so far as these affect each other, appear one after the other, and all together form a living totality." This gratifying breadth of view appears again in his chapter on the presentation, and indeed is seen in all the chapters.

The materials of history are classified and there are chapters on the various branches of the classification defining, elaborating, and illustrating each one of these branches. There are chapters on the nature of historical evidence; on the constructive process; the psychological factors in history; the presentation; and the historical novel. All these subjects are treated clearly and concisely. An appendix contains a select bibliography, which might easily have been larger. A good index makes the work convenient for reference. The book ought to be put into the hands of students of history quite early in order that they may, near the beginning of their studies, get a fairly good conception of all the essential elements that enter into historical research and composition. It would go far toward forestalling slovenly habits of work and hasty generalization.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length

OLD TESTAMENT AND ALLIED SUBJECTS

- Box, G. H. *The Ezra-Apocalypse, Being Chapters 3-14 of the Book Commonly Known as Ezra (or II Esdras).* Translated from a Critically Revised Text, with Critical Introductions, Notes and Explanations; with a General Introduction to the Apocalypse, and an Appendix Containing the Latin Text. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, 1912. lxxvii+387 pages. 10s. 6d. net.
- Gray, George Buchanan, and Peake, Arthur S. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Isaiah.* (International Critical Commentary.) Vol. I, Introduction and Commentary on I-XXVII. New York: Scribner, 1912. xix+472 pages. \$3.00.
- Gressmann, Hugo, *et al.* *Die Schriften des Alten Testaments.* 19. Lieferung. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1912. 65-144 pages. M. 1. Das Judentum. Von M. Haller.
- The Messiah of the Targums, Talmuds and Rabbinical Writers.* Copyrighted 1912 by Joseph M. Tydings, M.D., Louisville, Ky.
- The Old Testament in Greek according to the Text of the Codex Vaticanus, Supplemented with Other Uncial Manuscripts, with a Critical Apparatus Containing the Variants of the Chief Ancient Authorities for the Text of the Septuagint.* Vol. I. *The Octateuch (to be completed in four parts).* Part III. Numbers and Deuteronomy. Edited by Alan England Brooke, B.D., Fellow and Dean of King's College, and Norman McLean, M.A., Fellow of Christ's College, University Lecturer in Aramaic. London: Cambridge University Press; New York: Putnam, 1911. vii+270 pages. 15s. net.
- Ungnad, Arthur. *Hebräische Grammatik.* (Hilfsbücher für den hebräischen Unterricht, Band I.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. viii+201 pages. M. 4.

- Ungnad, Arthur. *Praktische Einführung in die hebräische Lektüre des Alten Testaments.* (Hilfsbücher für den hebräischen Unterricht. Band II.) Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. iv+63 pages. M. 1. 20.
- Volz, Paul. *Das Neujahresfest Jahwes (Läubbhuttenfest).* Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. 61 pages. M. 1. 50.
- Wallis, Louis. *Sociological Study of the Bible.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. xxxv+308 pages. \$1.50 net.

NEW TESTAMENT AND PATRISTICS

- Case, Shirley Jackson. *The Historicity of Jesus. A Criticism of the Contention that Jesus Never Lived, a Statement of the Evidence for His Existence, an Estimate of His Relation to Christianity.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1912. 352 pages. \$1.50 net.
- Fiebig, Paul. *Die Apostelgeschichte für die Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten und für Gebildeten der Gegenwart.* Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. 23 pages. M. 3.
- Hoskier, H. C. *Concerning the Date of the Bohairic Version.* Covering a detailed examination of the text of the Apocalypse and a review of some of the writings of the Egyptian monks. London: B. Quaritch, 1911. vii+203 pages. 7s. 6d.
- Hoskier, H. C. *Concerning the Genesis of the Versions of the New Testament (Gospels).* Vol. I. xii+469 pages. Vol. II. Appendices. 423 pages. London: B. Quaritch, 1911. 12s. net.
- Nau, F. *La Didascalie des douze apôtres.* Traduite du syriaque pour la première fois. Deuxième édition. Revue et augmentée de la traduction de la Didaché des douze apôtres, de la Didascalie de l'apôtre Addai et des empêchements de mariage (pseudo)

- apostoliques. Paris: Lethielleux, 1912. xxxii+264 pages. Fr. 8.
- Rothstein, J. Wilhelm. Megilla. Der Mischnatractat "Megilla" ins deutsche übersetzt und mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Neuen Testaments mit Anmerkungen versehen. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. vii+20 pages. M. o. 80.
- Schumacher, Heinrich. Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Mat. 11, 27 (Luc. 10, 22). Eine kritisch-exegetische Untersuchung. Freiburg: Herder's, 1912. vii+225 pages. \$1.35.
- Waylen, Hector. Mountain Pathways. A Study in the Ethics of the Sermon on the Mount, with a New Translation and Critical Notes. Second edition. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., 1912. xvi+128 pages. 3s. 6d.
- CHURCH HISTORY**
- Bury, J. B. A History of the Eastern Roman Empire, from the Fall of Irene to the Accession of Basil I (A.D. 802-867). New York: Macmillan, 1912. xv+530 pages. \$4.00.
- Calvin, Jean. L'excuse de noble Seigneur Jaques de Bourgogne Seigneur de Falais et de Bredam. Reimprimée sur l'unique exemplaire de l'édition de Genève 1548 avec une introduction par Alfred Cartier. Deuxième édition. Geneva: A. Jullien, 1911. 47 pages. Fr. 15.
- D'Alviella, Felix Goblet. L'Évolution du dogme catholique. (Bibliothèque de critique religieuse.) I. Les origines. Première partie. Paris: Nourry, 1912. xiii+346 pages. Fr. 3.
- Kayser, Heinrich. Die Schriften des sogenannten Arnobius junior dogmengeschichtlich und literarisch untersucht. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1912. 198 pages. M. 3.60.
- McGiffert, Arthur Cushman. Martin Luther, the Man and His Work. New York: The Century Co., 1912. xi+397 pages.
- Ritschl, Otto. Orthodoxie und Synkretismus in der altprotestantischen Theologie. I. Hälfte. Die Theologie der deutschen Reformation und die Entwicklung der lutherischen Orthodoxie in den philippistischen Streitigkeiten. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1912. 500 pages. M. 12.
- Robinson, Paschal. The Rule of St. Clare—Its Observance in the Light of Early Documents. Philadelphia: The Dolphin Press, 1912. 32 pages. \$0.10 net.
- Sabatier, Paul. L'Orientation religieuse de la France actuelle. Paris: Armand Colin, 1911. 320 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Tixeront, J. Histoire des dogmes dans l'antiquité Chrétienne. III. La fin de l'âge patristique (430-800). Paris: Gabalda et Cie, 1912. 583 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Van Baarsel, J. J. William Perkins: Eene bijdrage tot de kennis der religieuse ontwikkeling in Engeland ten tijde van Koningin Elisabeth. Proefschrift ter verkrijging van den Graad van Doctor in de Godgeleerdheid aan de Rijks-Universiteit te Utrecht op gezag van den rector magnificus Dr. A. A. Nijland, Hoogleraar in de Faculteit der Wis- en Natuurkunde, volgens besluit van den Senaat der Universiteit in het Openbaar te Verdedigen op Donderdag 30 Mei 1912, des namiddags te 4 uur. 's-Gravenhage: De Swart & Zoon, 1912. ix+321 pages.
- Viscount Halifax. Leo XIII and Anglican Orders. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. vii+461 pages. \$3.50.
- DOCTRINAL AND CRITICAL**
- Brown, William Adams. The Christian Hope: A Study in the Doctrine of Immortality. New York: Scribner, 1912. xi+216 pages. \$0.75.
- Gray, Arthur R. An Introduction to the Study of Christian Apologetics. Sewanee, Tenn.: The University Press at the University of the South, 1912. vii+237 pages.
- Labache, L. Lettres à un étudiant sur la Sainte Eucharistie. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1912. 305 pages. Fr. 3.50.
- Lee, James W. The Religion of Science. The Faith of Coming Man. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912. 304 pages. \$1.50.
- Royce, Josiah. The Sources of Religious Insight. Lectures delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the late William Bross. New York: Scribner, 1912. xvi+297 pages. \$1.25.
- Tillich, Paul. Mystik und Schuld-bewusstsein in Schellings philosophischer Entwicklung. (Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie.)

- Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1912. 135 pages.
 Voluntas Dei. By the author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia." New York: Macmillan, 1912. xxviii+276 pages. \$1.60 net.

HISTORY OF RELIGIONS

- Bliss, Frederick Jones. The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine. Lectures delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the late William Bross. New York: Scribner, 1912. xiv+354 pages. \$1.50.
 Budge, E. A. Wallis. Osiris and the Egyptian Resurrection. Illustrated after Drawings from Egyptian Papyri and Monuments. Vol. I. xxxv+404 pages. Vol. II. 440 pages. New York: Putnam, 1912.
 Moulton, James Hope. Early Religious Poetry of Persia. (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) New York: Putnam, 1911. 170 pages. \$0.40.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

- Fiebig, Paul. Der erste Korintherbrief für die Gebildeten der Gegenwart und für die Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. 20 pages. M. o. 40.
 Fiebig, Paul. Religionsgeschichte und Religionsphilosophie für die Gebildeten der Gegenwart und die Schüler und Schülerinnen höherer Lehranstalten. Tübingen: Mohr, 1912. 44 pages. M. o. 90.
 Hanson, Howland. The Function of the Family. Social Service Series. American Baptist Publication Society. 16 pages. \$0.10 net.
 Hobart, Alvah Sabin. Seed Thoughts for Right Living. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1912. 303 pages. \$0.50 net.
 Hoben, Allan. Why Boys and Girls Go Wrong. Social Service Series. American Baptist Publication Society. 22 pages. \$0.10 net.
 Horton, Robert F. How the Cross Saves. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912. 93 pages. \$0.50.
 Sayer, A. G. Walpole. The Sufficiency and Defects of the English Communion Office. New York: Putnam, 1911. 154 pages. \$1.00.

- Stall, Sylvanus. What Parents Should Teach their Children. Published for the Social Service Commission of the Northern Baptist Convention. American Baptist Publication Society. 32 pages. \$0.10 net.
 Strong, Augustus Hopkins. Miscellanies. In two volumes. Vol. I. Chiefly Historical. Vol. II. Chiefly Essays and Seminary Anniversary Addresses. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press, 1912. Vol. I. xi+493 pages. Vol. II. viii+503 pages. \$1.00 net.
 Ward, Harry F. (Editor). Social Creed of the Churches. New York: Eaton & Mains, 1912. 185 pages. \$0.50 net.
 Willett, Herbert L. The Call of the Christ: A Study of the Challenge of Jesus to the Present Century. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912. 212 pages. \$1.00.

ETHICS

- Sorley, W. R. The Moral Life and Moral Worth. (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) New York: Putnam, 1911. 147 pages. \$0.40.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

- Hebberd, S. S. The Philosophy of the Future. New York: Maspeth Publishing House, 1911. 251 pages. \$1.50.

MISCELLANEOUS

- Biblical and Theological Studies by the Members of the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary. Published in commemoration of the one hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Seminary. New York: Scribner, 1912. 634 pages. \$5.00.
 Crane, Frank. God and Democracy. Chicago: Forbes & Co., 1912. 72 pages. \$0.50.
 DuBose, William Porcher. Turning Points in My Life. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. 143 pages. \$1.10.
 Encyclopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften. In Verbindung mit Wilhelm Windelband herausgegeben von Arnold Ruge. Erster Band. Logik. Erste Hälfte. Bogen 1-9. Tübingen:

- Mohr, 1912. 144 pages. Band I complett. M. 6.
- Haddon, A. C. *The Wanderings of Peoples.* (The Cambridge Manuals of Science and Literature.) New York: Putnam, 1911. 124 pages. \$0.40.
- Lauvrière, Emile. *Edgar Poe.* Deuxième édition. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1911. 252 pages. Fr. 2.50.
- Ross, G. A. Johnston. *The Cross: The Report of a Misgiving.* New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912. 46 pages. \$0.25.
- The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* Edited by Samuel Macauley Jackson. Vol. XII. Trench-Zwingli-Appendix. London: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1912. xxvi+599 pages.
- Thwing, Charles F. *The Recovery of the Home.* (Social Service Series.) Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1912. 24 pages. \$0.10.